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WAR, COMMUNISM AND WORLD RELIGIONS


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# Contents

# Foreword

THE writer has, during his entire active career as a teacher of the history of religion, been much interested in what was happening to religions in the contemporary world. A number of his books have been in this field. Ever since World War II and the rapid spread of Communism throughout the Orient, he has wanted to study the effect of war and Communism upon the world's religions. How could such a study be made? Little has been written about it. Obviously, the thing to do was to visit the areas of the world where the religions are to be found and to discover through firsthand inquiry what effects were being felt by the various religions under the impact of these two powerful forces.

Granted leave by Northwestern University for the fall quarter, 1952, and a subsidy which met about a fifth of the expense involved, he set out in June, 1952, for a seven months' trip around the world. His chief method was that of personal interviews with outstanding leaders, of course in the field of religion—bishops, abbots, popes, ministers, monks, priests—but also outstanding educators, editors, social workers, labor leaders, political leaders, persons intimately involved in the life of the various countries, who were either themselves in policy-making posts in government or religion or at least in position to know, if anyone did, how war and Communism were affecting religion. And in every country an effort was made to get the point of view also of the man in the street. The result of this inquiry forms the content of this book.

The author is of course indebted deeply to many people, so many that no reference can be made here to individuals, people who opened their homes to him, made contacts for him, supplied information to him—and sometimes traveled with him and opened doors for him through which he could not otherwise have entered. To all of these he is enormously grateful. For all the hospitality and the num-

berless courtesies shown him all around the world he expresses his heartfelt thanks.

Little use has been made of published material, but he desires to acknowledge gratefully the permission to quote granted by the publishers whose books were used. These are duly named in the footnotes accompanying the few quotations.

He is indebted especially to his former student, Mrs. Louise Baldanzi, who read the typescript.

A world trip, such as that required for the collection of the materials for this book, could not be other than an enriching experience. The religions of the world have come alive as he has met their best living representatives in a score of countries. He could ask no greater privilege than that of repeating the experience—if only he could.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

April 2, 1953
Evanston, Illinois

# WAR, COMMUNISM AND WORLD RELIGIONS

# I

# War, Communism and the Religions of Japan

I BEGAN my study of the effects of war and Communism on the world's religions in Japan. To be sure, I had had three days in Honolulu, where I had opportunity to talk with both Shinto and Buddhist leaders, but their outlook differed so little from that of the same groups in Japan that for all practical purposes I may well begin my story with Japan. The longer and larger freedom which these religions had enjoyed in Hawaii had led, in some cases, to a degree of modernization of outlook which is not found in Japan. This was due not in any particular to the influence of either war or Communism but rather to the necessity of coming to terms with the general culture of Hawaii, which is in a real sense a meeting place of Eastern and Western cultures. The Shinto shrines showed little response to Western influence, the Buddhists somewhat more. The Buddhist bishops with whom I talked were distinctly aware of the problem of making Buddhism meaningful to a generation of children and young people who are attending that great democratic leveler, the public school system, where they meet others of every kind of faith, or none, and are taught by teachers of widely varying religious backgrounds.

When, therefore, I attended the Hongwanji temple, an English service was being held, in which there was little to distinguish it from a like service in a Protestant Christian church. It was attended chiefly by young men and women, few even of middle age. There were two robed choirs which sang an anthem, under direction of a choir director, and led the singing of hymns by the congregation. I had opportunity to look through the hymnal, and the songs seemed very familiar. With the exception of the use of the name Amida

instead of Jesus, there was almost nothing that might not be found in the songs of the Christian Church.

There was a responsive reading from selections found in the back of the hymnal, precisely as in most Christian churches. And when the minister preached, I found myself in complete agreement with the main points he made. The sermon might have been preached in any liberal Protestant church, only using the name of Jesus instead of Amida Buddha. The preacher had had training in a liberal American Protestant seminary.

This is not, of course, to say that all Buddhist temples in Hawaii are doing just this same kind of thing. The Hongwanji sect in Japan is more liberal than most of the others. But all were making concessions, though perhaps in lesser degree, to the surroundings in which they found themselves. Most of them had gone in for preaching. A beautiful new Soto Zen temple had just been built. It was not quite completed, in fact, when I was there. Its worship hall, just as in the Hongwanji temple, had seats for the congregation and a pulpit for the preacher. It also had a large social hall with equipment for dramatic productions or movies, and with an ultramodern kitchen. Around the temple itself were school buildings, and a hostel for university students. Hongwanji likewise had numerous auxiliary buildings where it could carry on its educational and social activity.

Buddhism had suffered from World War II, particularly since most of the priests or pastors, being Japanese citizens, were interned, so the people were without adequate leadership. Living under the stresses of war, suffering the loss of their sons in battle, many sought religious help from Christian churches. Said one Buddhist priest, "We do not believe in prayer, as Buddhists, but our people were told by some Christian pastors that, if they prayed, their sons would not be lost, so they naturally did so. Some were thus converted." The opinion seemed to be, however, that most of these had returned to their Buddhist faith.

I was somewhat surprised, knowing the strongly pacifist basis of original Buddhism, to discover that there seemed to be no real consciousness of war as a moral or religious problem. I ought not to have been surprised. Only very recently has the Christian Church

begun once again to feel a sense of guilt for its participation in war, and to speak out forthrightly on the issue, calling war mankind's greatest collective sin. This question was to arise again and again in Japanese Buddhism, and in country after country where Buddhism was the dominant faith. Mahayana has probably never been as much a believer in *ahimsa* or noninjury as has Hinayana, or Southern Buddhism, yet it does theoretically honor Sakyamuni, the founder of the faith.

Some feeling was expressed by Buddhist laymen whom I met to the effect that, unfortunately, the leadership of Shinto and Buddhism in Hawaii was largely from Japan. Often these men do not speak English at all and are therefore unable to share fully the life of the younger generations, who, increasingly, do not speak Japanese, much preferring to speak English. Furthermore, they feel no longer bound to the traditions which are maintained around religion in Japan. The problem is to get priests who are properly prepared, since most of them must get their training in Japan.

But let me come now to the story of the effect of war and Communism upon the religions of Japan. The method I had decided upon was chiefly that of personal talks with the best-accredited leaders of the various religious groups, in order to find out, at first hand, if possible, just how these faiths were affected by those potent twin forces at work in the world today. By war I meant wars past, wars present, and wars to come, wars now in the making, in some places quite imminent. By effect I meant not only the effect upon the physical plant of organized religion, in many cases very dire indeed; not alone the effect of scattered leadership or membership due to the exigencies of war—this was indeed a very real experience in more than one segment of the world's religions; not alone the effect of general disorganization of society by the coming of war, with the consequent indirect effects upon the home, education, and government, which in turn subtly affect men's religious thought and action. I certainly meant all these, but more—how had war affected man's outlook upon life itself, his faith in himself, his faith in God; his hope for the future; his conception of what is ultimately man's reliance in a troubled time; his conception of the very nature of man and of God; his conception of religious and

moral values? All these things I sought by diligent questioning to discover, not alone among the rank-and-file representatives of the various faiths, but rather, chiefly, among those who stand in positions of leadership, the men who make organizational policies, whose thinking ultimately is most influential in determining the faith and outlook of those who do little thinking for themselves, but look to others older or wiser or more highly placed to show them the way.

With reference to Communism, much the same inquiry was made. To what degree was it a practical problem for the religious leadership. To what degree were they aware of the tremendous revolutionary upsurge of the humble people of the world, represented in Communism? How responsive were they to those deep-seated needs out of which it arose? What was in their faith that answered the challenge of Communism? How much of the Communist program could they assimilate into their faith? At what point would they offer resistance? To what degree were they attempting, through practical social programs, to meet the basic needs for which Communism purports to offer a remedy? Had they, either as individuals or as participating members of religious organizations, made any effort to face seriously the whole series of problems raised by Communism?

My start in Japan was most auspicious. There, in the brief period of a little less than three weeks, it was my privilege to meet personally and discuss the questions raised above with the most outstanding figures in Japanese religious life, the heads of the great temples and shrines, the leaders in the various federations within the separate religions, and the over all Religions League of Japan. It was this latter interreligion group which got behind my visit and made it such a meaningful one. The very fact that I should have been able to command this great service is itself one of the by-products of a war situation, one of the few good ones of which I can think.

Two factors are to be credited with the creation of the kind of co-operation of which I was the beneficiary, both growing at least indirectly out of the recent world war. First, there is a new spirit of freedom which exists in the field of religion and makes possible

many things that formerly would have been impossible. The second factor was the intelligent job performed during the American Occupation, in seeking to study the religions of Japan as one necessary step in the understanding of the people. This had helped create a responsive attitude toward scholarly inquiry in the field of religion and, practically, had made friendly contacts with the official leadership of the various faiths. To all this I happily fell heir. When at the end of the occupation William Woodard, the man who had largely carried out the research, returned to America, I was able to employ as my interpreter and secretary the person who had performed this service for him. He knew all the people and could easily make the contacts for me which so greatly facilitated my project. My program was arranged in great detail before I ever reached Japan, and proved all that I could ask—indeed, it proved almost too strenuous for one who is definitely no longer among the younger scholars in the field of religion.

Without detailing the whole story it should be said that I had the opportunity, at least, to discover, at first hand, the thinking on these questions of the leaders of the Religions League of Japan, the Buddhist Federation, the Shrine Association, which includes the shrines whose services were formerly regarded as not religious but State ceremonials, the Sectarian Shinto Association, and the National Federation of New Religious Organizations. No specific effort was made to study the Christian group, though in the final phases of the program opportunity was sought to get at the thought of the Christians as well as the others, through interviews and conversations with outstanding Christian leaders and a few missionaries. It had not been my original intention to study Christianity specifically, in this book, but rather the non-Christian faiths, except as occasion was afforded to see it in relationship to each of the countries studied.

The first effect of war to be noted was, of course, just the destruction of the physical plant of the various organizations. This in Japan was very serious, for though apparently some care was wisely taken by the American forces to avoid the destruction of nonmilitary objectives and, particularly, notable cultural monuments, which in Japan would naturally include the more important religious shrines,

the destruction was nevertheless great. It is impossible to control the fires started by incendiary or napalm bombs at the temple precincts, so some noteworthy buildings were actually destroyed. Since so much of Japanese history is bound up in the great shrines and temples, many of them are considered National Treasures and are jealously guarded, not alone because they are religious, but for general historical or cultural reasons. There is a definite office in charge of all National Treasures. Evidence must be furnished which convinces this office that a given shrine is of enough historical importance to be preserved. When this is furnished, the object, or shrine, or what not, is listed officially as a National Treasure and the government contributes a substantial share of the expense involved in keeping it in proper repair. It is quite the usual thing for one's guide through a shrine or temple or museum to point out that this or that object or building is a National Treasure. Fortunately we spared Nara and Kyoto, where some of the most famous of the ancient temples and shrines are to be found. One Japanese remarked to me as we visited one after another of the historic temples, "The Americans were very kind not to bomb Kyoto." And it was not meant ironically either, I am sure. Incidentally, this was a rather typical attitude of the Japanese. Another said to me, after showing me the atom-bombed city of Hiroshima, "The Americans were very kind in helping us after the explosion." They seem to have forgotten the injury and remembered only the kindness. It was one who had himself sustained a serious injury, which long refused to heal, who made the remark.

The exact extent of the losses it is difficult to discover. The bishop of one of the great modern sects said that they had suffered the loss of sixty temples or churches within the Tokyo area. Of these they had been able, thus far, to restore only a small percentage. Fortunately the greatest loss suffered was in the environs of Tokyo, where the bombing was most intensive, but not a few other great industrial areas suffered also, and inevitably their religious buildings as well. It was a heavy blow, and one from which recovery will be very costly and slow. Probably many of the shrines and temples will never be rebuilt, for there is a new religious ferment among the Japanese people which takes many of them into other religious

groups. Also the postwar economic situation of Japan's people makes it difficult to get the necessary funds. According to many informants there are very few families of great wealth left in the country, and inflation and extraordinarily high taxes leave little surplus wealth in the hands of anyone. The income tax begins at about 25,000 yen, which is a little less than $75 per year. A man whose income was, in American dollars, about $1200 a year told me that one-fourth of it was paid in income taxes. Also the costs of building have increased enormously so that much more is required now to reproduce what was lost. It was a priest of the temple in Kyoto which houses a Buddha, "Kannon," and five hundred Buddhas on either side—a thousand in all—who told me of the great difficulty, not so much of building, as of simple repair. These identical Buddhas are hundreds of years old. They are wooden carvings, lacquered in gold, with many ornaments which in time become broken, or disarranged, so he is in the necessity of keeping them in constant repair. Formerly, said he, the repair of one Buddha was 4,500 yen; now it is ten times as much. And the shrine's income has not increased in proportion.

Fortunately this and many other ancient temples are regarded as National Treasures, so some help comes from government, not as a subsidy to religion, it should be emphasized, but because they are of historical and cultural importance.

Second among the effects of World War II is the economic, represented not so much in ruined plant as in a changed economic base upon which organized religion depends. First, take the case of the national shrines, that is, those which were considered by government as nonreligious, commonly known to outsiders as State Shinto shrines, though the Japanese themselves seem never to use the term State Shinto, I was told. By the directive of the American Occupation these were disestablished. Whatever economic assistance they had received from government was cut off, and they were required to find their own support, if they were to continue. No longer were they to be regarded as in any sense under government patronage or control. Their priests were no longer to be considered officials of government. They must, if they wished to continue as

religious institutions, depend upon the voluntary contributions of their constituents.

Generally speaking, the effect of this directive on the State shrines was by no means as great as most people thought. I, for example, had thought that the government subsidy was a major factor in their maintenance, and that they were faced with an enormous task in shifting to the basis of voluntary support. But this was not the case at all. As a matter of fact, out of the 80,000 to 100,000 shrines supposedly belonging to State Shinto only a very small percentage received any support at all, and this varied greatly from one shrine to another. For example, the Grand Shrine at Ise, most sacred of all, I was surprised to discover, never received over 10 per cent of its income from the national government. To be sure, this did not include what was contributed by government to the periodical rebuilding of the shrine every twenty years. Another important shrine at Nagoya which possesses one of the three sacred symbols of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu-o mi-kami, drew but one per cent from government subsidy. The one most indebted to government aid was the famous Kami-Kamo Shrine at Kyoto, which had received 80 per cent from the State. One of which I heard received but one-five-hundredth of its support thus. So, while serious for some of the shrines, the situation is not nearly so serious as at first it seemed.

This does not mean that the shrines have not suffered, for they definitely have. Not only did they lose the governmental subsidy, but they suffered for the first two or three years after the war from a great falling off in the numbers of visitors to the shrines, which meant a corresponding loss of income, since it was upon the gifts of those who visit the shrines that they depended chiefly for their income. Now not only were the former pressures of government to encourage shrine attendance off, but those who came were in difficult financial straits and gave smaller offerings. In turn, inflation decreased the buying power of what gifts came in, so that the shrines were very hard hit economically, especially during the first two or three postwar years. Gradually most of them, at least the more important ones, are recovering, and several which I visited say that the number attending in 1952 was about equal to what it

was in prewar years. Those nearer to the great population centers have an advantage over the others. The Grand Shrine at Ise is in a most beautiful region, a wonderful place to visit. One need not be Shintoist to experience a feeling of awe and reverence as he crosses the river into the sacred precincts, walks under the massive *torii* and follows the broad graveled path, under the shade of giant cryptomerias much like the redwood trees of California, toward the very simple unpainted shrine which is the central place of worship. But it is at a considerable distance from the main centers, and transportation facilities are not all they should be, so that it is under something of a handicap in comparison with other shrines. Yet it holds its place of pre-eminence and probably will continue to do so. I had heard of attempts to organize a kind of regional sectarian loyalty to certain other shrines, and this seemed to be a not unnatural development. But though I inquired at almost every shrine I visited, including Ise itself, I could find no corroboration of this trend, with the possible exception of the Inari Shrine. Indeed, when one stops to consider the matter, it is not easy to see how such a development could naturally arise, since the shrines of a given region may differ completely in the deities they enshrine. Around what center could they build a common loyalty? There is indeed a prefectural Shrine Association which functions for administrative purposes, and reports to the National Shrine Association, but at least the leaders with whom I talked, and they were numerous, recognize no significant growth of a sectarian development around particular shrines.

The economic problem was solved in various ways: reduction of staff, reduction of salaries, neglect of repairs, discontinuance of certain services, and the increase in certain other services for which financial offerings are usually forthcoming, namely, weddings and funerals. Some shrines had all along performed these services, though most of them apparently did not do so. Now the practice is becoming quite common.

In my visits to some of the shrines, opportunity was afforded to observe the gifts of the people. More or less the same system is observed in Buddhist temples as well. Just in front of the shrine center where the people go to bow, to clap their hands, and to

remain sometimes in an attitude of prayer, or, in the case of Buddhist temples, to light an incense stick or sprinkle a bit of incense powder on the burner, there is an offering box. Usually it is of considerable size, sometimes as much as ten to twelve feet long, four feet high. Across the top there is a grille or system of louvers, which permits the gift to fall through into the box below. I recall the box at the Asakusa Buddhist temple, which is at the end of a long, completely thronged passageway flanked by souvenir and food and drink stalls. People come in droves. They wash their hands and cleanse their mouths at an ablution tank close by, where there are dippers with which water can be poured over the hands and from which it can be taken to cleanse the mouth. Then they approach the shrine. Sometimes they bow several times; they may clap their hands and utter a prayer, deposit their gift and retire. Here the money could be seen in the box below, in great piles, mostly small bills of one or five or ten yen, with an occasional fifty- or hundred-yen bill among them. A broom was at hand in the box with which to sweep up the money at intervals and remove it. As one looked at the vast temple under construction, to replace the one destroyed in the war, and reflected upon the slight value of the yen which the paper represented, he realized that it would take many, many boxes full of that kind of money to make up for what war had destroyed. To be sure, there are larger givers, for special causes. In some of the shrines or temples could be seen tablets upon which the names of donors had been written, hung in a fairly conspicuous place. But in general, nothing of the Western system of financial campaigns, systematic weekly or monthly pledging of support is found. It is likely, however, that something of the kind may emerge.

An interesting example of a move in that direction is to be seen in a campaign now under way to rebuild the Grand Shrine at Ise. Heretofore this has been done at government expense every twenty years. The tradition is an old one, and the fifty-fourth such rebuilding fell due only quite recently. But now the government, as government, can do nothing to help, for religion is disestablished. If there is to be any rebuilding, it must be done by voluntary offerings. The result is that an association has been formed, largely by laymen,

which has undertaken to raise the required sum. And it is operating in quite the modern Western manner.

When I asked the head of the Grand Shrine, at a dinner which he gave for us, whether the tradition of rebuilding the shrine every twenty years would be maintained, now that government support was ended, he said he thought it would be, unless the people turned in the direction of materialism and lost their piety. I asked if they might not, after all, given the enormous expense of the periodical rebuilding, decide that maybe once in fifty years would do quite as well. As a matter of fact, in the earliest days, I was told, the shrine was rebuilt annually, doubtless at a time when it was very simple, but the interval had been lengthened to twenty years, and thrice this interval had not been observed owing to wars or other decisive factors. Might it not, therefore, be once more extended? The executive director explained at length that the formation of the committees to rebuild this time was definitely a lay matter, which he held to be a favorable indication that the tradition would be maintained.

Another economic loss as a result of the war was the taking away of temple and shrine lands which were used for income purposes before the war. Under the occupation, an attempt was made to distribute the land more equitably among the farmers of Japan, most of whom had farms too small really to yield a living, while many had none, and served as tenant farmers. Their economic plight was sad indeed. To get the required land, it was necessary for government to break up the great estates, and the shrines and temples were among those holding extensive lands. The government proceeded to the task, not as in Communist countries, by liquidating the owners of the land, but by purchase, at a fairly equitable figure, which was paid to the owners in cash or in government securities of fixed value, and was interest-bearing at a very low rate. But then came inflation, and the value of this money shrank until there was little real worth to what the owners held. So the shrines and temples were bereft of a substantial income, which it has been hard to recover, in a time when the economic condition of so many of the people is very bad. On the part of the government, it should be said that there was no desire to injure the religious groups, but only to

get more land into the hands of the people. It was rice land that was most needed, and it was this the temples and shrines held. Cattle could be pastured on otherwise unused mountain slopes too steep for cultivation, and thus were a real food asset. Indeed, Dr. Kagawa is advocating, as one of the ways of increasing Japan's food supply, the systematic use of mountain slopes for tree culture which could supply food for cattle, as well as fruit and nut crops. This would enlarge the protein element of her food supply which Japan so greatly needs. As one sees the comparatively large proportion of non-arable land and the pathetic attempts to use every available square yard of land that can be redeemed for planting, by costly terracing or otherwise, he is inclined to wonder why there are not more cattle throughout the country. The per capita milk consumption of Japan in comparison to the United States is almost negligible, and meat is a very scarce item in the diet of the lower-income groups.

The economic factor works in several directions to affect religion. One is in the effect it has upon the leadership of the faiths. Universities which prepare priests for both Shinto and Buddhist shrines and temples complained that, with the recession in income, priests have not been able to maintain themselves in a full-time relationship. They have therefore had to turn in some other direction to find income. This has resulted often in their accepting teaching positions in their community. Here may be a vicious circle. With fewer priests giving full time and therefore less service, fewer people may be reached, and therefore less in offerings may be brought. How to break this circle is a matter of very practical concern both to Shinto and to Buddhist leadership.

Another way in which financial trouble affected religion was in the maintenance of schools and such other social services as were formerly rendered. Though these services were never as extensive as we of the West are accustomed to, there was nevertheless an attempt to do more than simply maintain the temples and the facilities for worship, especially by the more modernized Buddhist groups, such as the Hongwanji, and some of the Nichiren sects. But such things require money to keep them going, and with lessened income some of the services were curtailed. The universities where the priests are prepared suffered seriously. Never too well equipped

or endowed, they found themselves in a rather desperate struggle to maintain themselves. I visited some of these and talked with their faculties. One could read in the outworn equipment, as well as in the worn clothing of the professors, the story of forced economy in order to exist at all. Some of their buildings had been bombed and as yet not replaced, and there was everywhere the evidence of a lack of means to maintain in proper condition the educational plant, to say nothing of the adornment, care, and upkeep of the university grounds. Nowhere save at the Imperial University did I find anything like the well-kept campus that one sees in our Western schools, and it seemed clear that even here, where the support is from government sources, things were not as before the war. A magnificent set of buildings, quite Western in architectural style, showed distinctly the strains of war and inflation. How much more, then, the religious institutions!

But in still other ways the economic situation affected religion. This particular effect, I was told by an unusually intelligent Buddhist priest, was not at all uncommon. Many Buddhists are vegetarians in their eating habits. They may have no very deep conviction about vegetarianism, but they practice it, perhaps in dim memory of the original Buddhist principle of ahimsa or noninjury. But in the early days following the defeat of Japan, the whole economic system was in near collapse. Food became scarce. People in the cities had ration cards calling for certain amounts of various foodstuffs, but there was no food in the markets. City people were obliged to go out into the country districts and try by some means to get something, anything, that could be eaten. They could not pick and choose what they would eat. Sometimes it was "eat meat or nothing," and priests and people alike ate what they could get. When a measure of normality was restored, they did not go back to their vegetarian habits. This in itself may not have been a serious matter, but as so often happens when a culture pattern is once broken, it might extend to other elements of the culture, and so was introduced at least the possibility of the general loosening of ties that held people to their traditional faith. It is impossible to assess fully the far-reaching effects which this simple departure from tradition may, in the long run, have upon Japanese Buddhism.

Thus far the effects of the war and its aftermath that have been mentioned have been of a negative sort. But there were other effects which had positive results generally held to be beneficial to religion. Most notable among these was the freeing of religion from rigorous governmental control.

From the beginning of the Meiji era in 1868, religion had been brought under government supervision. No religion could function except as it registered with the government and reported regularly to the proper bureau in the Department of Education. This included the national religion Shinto, the Shinto sects, thirteen of them, Buddhism, and Christianity. In 1882 the government declared that Shrine Shinto was not a religion, but a State ceremonial, separated it completely from the other religions, and administered it through a special department. This seems to have been done in order to be able to require attendance at the shrines as a patriotic duty without violating the principle of religious liberty which Japan, as a modern civilized country, felt obliged to affirm in her constitution. If shrine ceremonials were nonreligious it would certainly violate no principle to compel attendance. But did a simple declaration of government that it was not religious change its religious character? This was a moot question among Christians for a long time. Many Protestants refused to regard it as nonreligious and refused steadfastly to attend or allow their school children to attend. Dr. D. C. Holtom wrote extensively and learnedly to prove that it was genuinely a religion, despite the disclaimer. Roman Catholics finally officially accepted government's estimate and consented that their people attend the shrines.

In times of relative peace and quiet there was little pressure upon anyone to go to the shrines. But as the military clique got power and stepped up the tempo of imperialism, the shrines became a useful tool in their hands, and in the end, particularly in Korea, they made the requirement absolute. Protestants were faced with the necessity of compliance or closing their schools. Not a few accepted the latter alternative, rather than lend themselves to participation in what to them was clear disobedience of the commandment "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." Thus the issue was sharply joined.

Buddhists, most of them not opposed to the worship of more than

one god or divine being, had not the same objections that Christians had, but they were not too happy about the matter. Sectarian Shinto, although in some cases hardly at all related to genuine Shinto, though registered perforce as Sectarian since there was no other category open, generally speaking went along with the government requirement.

How artificial the distinction was may be measured perhaps in a statement in a pamphlet published by a voluntary group which is seeking to raise the necessary funds for the periodical rebuilding of the Grand Shrine at Ise. Now they need to appeal to the religious sentiments of the Japanese people, since there is no longer a secular patriotic basis for the appeal, in order to raise the very substantial sum required for rebuilding. They say in so many words that under the "*pretext* that Shrine Shinto was *not* a religion" the government had done certain things. Obviously these people seem now to have believed all along that it was really a religion, but were obliged to accept the government's declaration that it was not.

Whatever may have been their thought before, the directive of the Occupation definitely disposed of the governmental tie-up with the shrines. As religious or nonreligious they were now completely non-official; their continued existence, if any, as shrines would have to be on a voluntary basis, without any governmental help or encouragement, and their supervision so far as government was concerned was put on exactly the same basis as that of all other religions. They must register, of course, if they wished to continue to function, and must report their activities to the same bureau in the Department of Education.

We have already discussed the financial effect of this change of status upon the shrines. But there were other effects which in the long run may be of much greater importance. We have seen that they chose at once to go on as frankly religious institutions. Government still holds title to most of the major shrine properties, but little by little, title is being transferred to the shrines. I visited a number of the greatest of the shrines and everywhere I asked, usually the chief priest or his assistant chief priest, how they felt about the change. Not one expressed other than a sense of relief at having been liberated from government control, even though in some cases the

financial deficit thus occasioned was seriously felt. I think I sensed a new feeling of freedom among them and some stirring of new life, which may in the end considerably modify their place in Japanese life.

Shinto I had always thought of as a comparatively simple nature faith, with a rather loosely defined theology, quite definitely polytheistic in outlook and practice, on the whole rather formal or ceremonial, and having comparatively little to do with the practical life of the people, certainly little to do with their general moral outlook. Now I am not quite so sure. I feel much less like dogmatizing about the nature of Shinto than I did when I first went to Japan. I suppose we historians or philosophers of religion are always guilty of oversimplifying life, in order to gain a schematic or systematic view of it to give to others. But in so doing we always seem to leave something out, something too elusive ever to get down on paper in a neat, wholly adequate statement.

Undoubtedly, it is always necessary to relate Shinto to the particular level, intellectual and/or spiritual, of the people with whom one is dealing. At the lower level it may be little more than a feeling for nature in its multiple phases, and always including, whether consciously or not, something of a total feeling of all this as constituting Japan. Whether this is the result of an assiduous effort on the part of rulers who had their own private ends to achieve, or something that just seems to grow out of a naïve approach to nature, I cannot be certain, but it definitely seems to be there. Nor is this latter wholly absent from the outlook of the more sophisticated people of a higher economic and social stratum. A sort of mystic feeling for Japan one finds at almost every level, indeed in almost every individual. That this is true of Christians as well as Buddhists and Shintoists complicates the problem. At all events, that is the impression of one who spent only a brief period in Japan but in that time touched people with the greatest variety of religious outlooks.

As one goes from shrine to shrine the deities are different. One gets the impression that it doesn't greatly matter. Indeed, a very intelligent priest in one of the major shrines told me that with their required university training the priests can readily be transferred from one shrine to another. Of course this might reflect only relative

indifference as to the number of gods there are, and the belief that any one is quite worthy of worship, but it might also be that the people regard all the several gods as just phases of, or manifestations of, the one and only God of the Universe. That is to say, they may be saying simply that God is one and only one but may appear in various guises and under various names, so that it matters not that at one shrine He is worshiped as Amaterasu-Omikami and at another as Susa-no-wo, or by any other name. This I believe to be increasingly the tendency in Shinto. Of course this is not a product of the immediate postwar period. Genchi Kato, a noted Shinto scholar, was interpreting Shinto as a monotheism long before the Second World War. But an increasing number of intelligent believers are following his lead. It may be suggested that this is more nearly akin to pantheism than monotheism, but it does not seem to me that it is, for philosophically the Japanese do not as a rule identify God with the universe. It is, rather, a step on the way to monotheism which may or may not ever be completely reached. One Shinto professor of religion explained it more or less in this fashion: "It is like your Christian conception of the Trinity. You think of God as in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We do not limit His manifestations to any fixed number, but we are very clear that under whatever name or form we worship Him, He is the same being." It suggests the query as to whether or not the term "monotheism" may not need some redefining. Perhaps it ought to be defined rigidly, as the Moslems and Jews hold it, and some more adequate term be found to cover such cases as the Trinity and this newer development in Japanese religion and elsewhere, where a like tendency appears. It is not unrelated to a view quite commonly held by intellectuals in Hinduism and in other religions, that the Ultimate Reality is but one, regardless of the names by which men designate it or the terms in which they define it. It is the same God men seek in any place or at any time, however they may apprehend him. This is to step down from the rigidly exclusive conceptions held by Jews, Moslems, and many Christians, but whether good or bad this approach is increasingly appearing in the native religions of Japan. It seems to me altogether likely that, under the new freedom of religious inquiry

and expression in Japan, there may be an attempt to work through to a more systematic theological formulation of beliefs.

One thing is certain: since the war there exists, as it did not before, complete liberty to approach sacred books critically. Before this time, for several decades, scholars had not dared use the techniques of historical-literary inquiry in their study of Shinto's basic texts. There was an official belief that these books were thought to uphold, namely, the divine origin of the Japanese people and of their Emperor as the descendant of the Sun Goddess herself. This must not be tampered with. Men who dared to approach the books scientifically were dismissed from their posts. Now there is complete freedom to probe as deeply as the tools of scholarship make possible, and to announce whatever findings there turn out to be. Already, I was assured, serious critical studies of the texts are under way, and the results of these studies are beginning to appear. Nothing very notable has occurred thus far in the field, but it will be surprising if rather important changes of outlook do not take place as a result of the study. It certainly has been so in the case of most other religions.

In general, Shinto scholars were greatly relieved to be free in this regard, and not to have either actively to justify the interpretation placed upon the sacred books by the militarist group, or at least to remain silent while inwardly disagreeing with that interpretation. Generally the opinion of scholars in the Shinto universities with whom I discussed the matter was that the West tended to overemphasize the role of the Emperor cult as a political force in Japan; at the same time they admitted that the militarists had greatly emphasized it as a means of control of the Japanese mind.

The whole question of the divinity of the Emperor is most puzzling to one who stands outside of Shinto. I thought I knew what it was until I began to talk to Japanese priests and scholars. It was not always clear whether the ideas presently held are the ones held in prewar Japan or whether they are now, in an era of freedom, being read back into an older day. I do not mean that Japanese scholars are insincere, or that they are consciously following the latter course, but this is at least a possibility. If the variant conceptions of the Emperor were in existence during the prewar years,

they were certainly not being publicized, for freedom was lacking, so no easy check is now possible. On the other hand, there are abundant printed materials to support the conviction that the Emperor cult was being assiduously propagated down to and through the war period. Now it is permissible to deny it or to reinterpret it, and to formulate any belief one may. The result is that there is a great variety of views concerning the Emperor.

One statement met with constantly was that there never was a real Emperor cult, with the people actually worshiping the living Emperor, as many foreigners seemed to believe. The imperial ancestors, yes. These were enshrined and worship was paid to them. But, it was pointed out, at no shrine, either public or in the homes of the people, were prayers offered to Hirohito. This I am sure was true. But the cult of Amaterasu was insisted upon, not alone in public shrines, but in homes of the people. I recall one very distinguished Christian leader in Japan saying that it was required even in the homes of Christians. And there was constant insistence by the militarist party in its propaganda upon the direct descent of the reigning Emperor from the Sun goddess. This was undoubtedly for the purpose of enhancing his authority and giving the directions which came from him the force, not alone of an imperial command, but of a divine order as well. That is, this group was making to converge behind the imperial orders the two most powerful human drives, in our age at least—those of patriotism and religion. Over and over again intelligent Japanese leaders stressed the fact that the religious character of the Emperor was deliberately exploited for their own ends by the militarists who had gotten into control of the Emperor himself.

They admitted that in the ancient sacred writings there was a basis for this. In various places it is stated that the Emperor is a living deity. Because of the deep sentiment of respect of the Japanese people for their Emperor, it was not difficult for the militarists to build it up into a dogma that he was indeed divine. But not everyone in Japan accepted the idea. When I asked the professor group in a Shinto university directly whether the Japanese intellectuals had believed in the divinity of the Emperor, the reply was that among scholars specializing in the field of religion the belief was not neces-

sarily held, but that scholars in other fields would probably have held it. Obviously, views differed. One professor said that while the belief might well be qualified as an artificial product of military purpose, a definite stream of thought held that the Emperor is *one* of the sacred beings, and he averred that this sentiment still exists, despite the Emperor's own disclaimer of being different from other men.

One man who had been long a member of the Emperor's household spoke up to say that of course he knew that the Emperor was human, and somewhat bitterly he declared that he was made into a divine being. Shinto was simply misused by the military for their own purposes. Such an insular people as the Japanese are likely to believe what the people in power believe, and they were made to believe it. There was no freedom for many years to dissent from the official dogma. Some who had tried it had gotten into serious trouble.

But it was stated over and over again, in both Shrine Shinto and Sectarian Shinto circles, that while the Emperor had renounced his divine status, there had been no loss of the essential sentiment of the people toward him, though possibly it was to be explained in somewhat different terms. He is still immensely popular with the people, as evidenced on the occasions on which he chooses to appear in public. As one put it, he is revered because of his superior moral qualities. I found it difficult to pin down what was the exact nature of the sentiment toward him, but there was almost unanimous agreement in asserting its continuance.

A revealing statement was made by the head of one of the sects, a man prominent in the interreligious movement in Japan, after numerous cups of *sake*, at a banquet they gave for me. He said he was a great admirer of MacArthur, as most were, but he had told all his priests that they were to oppose the directive issued by the Occupation if it should eliminate the Emperor and attempt to establish a republic. There had been, he said, a genuine fear that MacArthur might follow the example of President Wilson when, in demanding the surrender of Germany at the end of World War I, he required of the German people that they become a republic. When questions were asked as to what the attitude was toward

Communism, all agreed in answering that a fundamental objection to it was the fact that it would do away with the Emperor system.

The fact that MacArthur sustained the Emperor was one of the secrets of his popularity in Japan. It would have been a blunder of the most extreme sort if any violence had been done to his person, or if he had been displaced in favor of any other kind of ruling system in the making of the new Constitution.

As one professor in a Shinto university said, "It is the deepest desire of Japan to preserve its own faith and the imperial family, but the methods and means must be different from those of the past. How to do so is a headache."

Will the Emperor cult ever be revived? May the Emperor ever again be considered a living divinity? No one can say certainly. There are extremists who desire it. One highly placed government official has recently made statements in public looking in that direction. But there was immediate and vigorous opposition, and the gentleman in question had to do a good deal of explaining.

But in Japan generally, by no means such a sharp distinction is drawn between the human and the divine as in the West. Partly this may be due to the language, or indeed the language may simply witness to a fact of Japanese thought. *Kami*, the word translated sometimes as "superior," or "one who is over another," is also the word translated as God. To say that the Emperor is *Kami* may not mean for a Japanese just what it means to an occidental. There is no doubt that the people hold the Emperor to be an exalted personage, even when he appears among them now in democratic fashion. And they love him. I found little difference among Shintoists, Buddhists, and Christians. There is said to be a group of students and young people of student age who do not share this view, and who believe the whole system should be done away with. Of course the Communists denounce the imperial system. But that these are still a distinct minority is quite certain. To what extent the number who oppose the imperial form of government is increasing there is no way of knowing.

It is true that the Emperor is not quite as easily accessible as he was in the days following the Japanese surrender. Protocol has become once more a fact to be reckoned with. Even so, the Emperor

still continues occasionally to drive through the city streets unheralded, and accompanied by only a very small number of police guards.

It may be taken as certain that the early mood of submissiveness on Japan's part will grow less as time passes. There will be a growth of strong nationalism. The old military group is no longer in power, but it has not been liquidated, and there is always a possibility of its resurgence. Indeed, I found uneasiness among some of the people with whom I talked on precisely this score. Over and over it was declared that the danger of a Fascist control of Japan is much greater than that of Communism. A chief ground of fear of a resurgence of the military controls lies in the rearmament of Japan which is practically being forced upon her by the United Nations, despite the fact that her Constitution definitely forbids such a thing. Everyone whom I asked as to his attitude toward the rearmament of Japan deplored it. One of the greatest satisfactions that had come to the religious forces, at least, was the relief from the burden of armaments. This would allow them to employ their greatly depleted resources in constructive ways and result in lifting the standards of living of all the people, always far too low even in the most prosperous periods. With the return of armaments, what is to prevent the return of the people who know most about such things and are eager once more to acquire control of the nation? This does not seem to be an unreasonable fear.

One sure effect of the war in Japan has been to make the religious people hate it and determine to find the way toward a peaceful world. How this is to be done is for them the question. Caught between Russia and the Western powers, there is little they can do about it themselves. They stand to lose enormously if war is joined between the free world and Communism, yet they seem powerless to prevent such a war. And many are quite hopeless about the situation. Japan's population is increasing, they say. There is no place for them to go, and their food resources as well as raw materials for manufacture of goods are limited by their insular position and the cutting off of their sources of materials and their markets for the products of their industries.

Theologically this situation has intensified the appeal of the crisis

theology of Barth and Brunner, though this had already penetrated Japan to a considerable degree before the war. I have no doubt it has contributed also to the rise of Messianic new religions, some of which are growing by leaps and bounds. Man has reached the end of his own power to deliver himself or his nation. His only hope lies in a Savior who can do what man cannot do for himself.

Furthermore, it has had the effect of making religion turn more and more in an other-worldly direction, as is evidenced in some of the newer religions which are growing rapidly. It has given a considerably greater appeal to the numerous Christian sects of very conservative background, Messianic and other-worldly in character.

I found the desire for peace everywhere. Continually I was asked, Why can't the religions of the world do something about it? Do they not all desire peace? Why can't they pool their efforts at this one point on which they are in agreement, even if they cannot get together on all points? Suggestions were made of the desirability of calling a world conference of all the religions to discuss and try to discover what resources the religions possess, which can be thrown into the struggle for peace. I was asked to, and did, write letters to the leaders in America of the National Council of Churches and the Fellowship of Reconciliation telling them of this pressing interest of Japan's religions. When I suggested the desirability of trying to hold first an all-Japanese religious conference, the reply was, "The time is so short." To these people it is a matter of life or death. Time is running out. And, too, what good would it do for Japan alone to hold a conference, since she is only a pawn in the international struggle? Japan's religions, at least as represented in the majority of present-day leaders, are by no means pacifist, though there are pacifists among them. I recall a speech by a priest of Shrine Shinto extolling the peaceful character of Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, until 1945 the patron divinity of the Japanese militarists.

I was much interested to discover how Buddhism, which has such a definitely pacifist basis in the teaching and practices of Buddha himself, had been able to come to terms with war. Actually, I found that Buddhists were in general hardly conscious of war as a moral problem, just as the Christian world had not been since the time of Constantine, until quite recently. A man was a citizen as well

as a follower of Buddha. As such he had no alternative, they thought, but to fulfill his duty as citizen and fight when the leaders of the nation bade him do so. When it was suggested that they might thus be allowing the State to usurp the moral leadership which religion purports to hold, it was to some of them a new idea. There had been no freedom until the end of the war. The government admitted no right of protest, such as recently had been allowed in Britain and the United States to those whose religious conviction forbade them to bear arms.

The religions had not been wholly inactive in this regard. There had been interreligious conferences on peace as early as 1926 or 1927, but there had been no concerted action on the part of the religions in recent years. One effect of the war on religions generally, then, has been to heighten their interest in, and practical effort toward, peace. For some religions such as Omotokyo and Konkokyo it is a constant concern. The latter is not at all pacifist, believing even, if one spokesman is representative of its position, that under the circumstances even rearmament is necessary. But peace is and has, from the first, been a major concern as reflected in its prayers and rituals.

Among the more notable effects war has had upon religion in Japan has been the mushrooming of new religions of all kinds. There are now over six hundred of them, most of them postwar in origin, and some of those born only a little while ago have experienced an unusual growth. Contrast the 722 religious sects in Japan with the 256 given in the last official religious census of the United States in 1936. Seventy-two various Christian sects are registered in the Bureau of Religions. How account for this almost sudden proliferation of Japan's religions? The answer lies in the new freedom which came with the end of the war, the disestablishment of Shrine Shinto, and the complete liberty allowed in the realm of religion. The old regime had kept a tight control upon religion. Only certain ones were recognized. Some religions, as already indicated, which had almost nothing in common with Shinto registered as Shinto sects, simply because there was no other way to obtain the right to operate. Now all the controls were off, and the logical thing happened. New sects sprang up overnight. They were of all sorts. Some were chiefly

Buddhist, or Shinto, or Christian, or Moslem, but some were blends of any two or more of these main constituent elements in varying proportion, plus almost anything else that the founder might have gotten from other foreign faiths or cults, or himself given forth as divinely inspired ideas. They are a curious mélange, which greatly merits more detailed study than has as yet been made. They offer a rich field for the historian and the psychologist of religion to investigate.

But one thing impressed the writer, who was privileged to visit and talk personally with the founders or leaders of a number of them. It is here that vitality in Japanese religions is at present to be found. Among the older religions he felt, to be sure, some stirrings of new life, some clear evidences that they are awakening to a newer appreciation of their role in the life of the Japanese people and a need for a better adjustment to the changing conditions of Japanese life. But at best there was little enthusiasm or urgency to be found within them. In the newer religions it was not so. Here was a vitality, an eagerness, an urgency he had not found elsewhere. The old religions were trying, somewhat desperately, to hold on to what they had. These new religions were aggressively propagandist through preaching, personal evangelism of a sort, through printed matter, to some extent through radio and other means of mass communication. And the people were responding. Everywhere there was building, acquiring of new properties, formation of auxiliary societies, sometimes street preaching. Schools were being built, kindergartens, nurseries, hospitals, orphanages, training schools.

These religions were addressing themselves definitely to the immediate as well as the long-time needs of the people. A number of them are Messianic in character. Several stress healing. Among the fastest-growing is one which closely resembles the New Thought groups, perhaps Unity most of all, with which indeed it is actually in close correspondence. Another specializes in healing and claims that this is a major cause of its rapid growth since the war, though its strong Messianic character, I believe, must be equally if not more important as an explanation of its growth from a few hundred members in 1945 to between 300,000 and 400,000 at the present time, more or less a thousand-fold increase.

Still another, whose chief appeal, I incline to think, is its profound concern for meeting the personal problems of the individual members, claims to be adding 150 new members a day. I visited it one weekday afternoon. In the large worship hall there were approximately fifteen hundred people. Every morning from fifteen hundred to two thousand people are present for a service. At this particular meeting the people were grouped in small circles of from ten to twenty persons around a leader. They were deeply intent, in each group, upon the discussion of their own personal problems and what the new faith had to contribute to their solution. Leaders are carefully trained for this group counseling. When one joins the religion he is assigned to a particular leader. When the group reaches a membership of twenty it is closed and a new group is started. "What kind of problems," I asked the founder, still a young man, "do you discuss in these circles?" "Anything that really touches the lives of the members," he replied. It might be a family problem, a wayward son or daughter, a moral problem of any individual, the necessity of making some difficult decision, the problem of being out of work—in short, anything that is of vital concern to any member of the circle. These are stated and an answer is sought in the light of the teaching of the religion. In the course of the hour confession may be made of wrongs committed, or testimony given of victories won.

To myself, the son of a Methodist parsonage, came boyhood memories of the old Methodist class meetings, now almost extinct in that church but in the early days of Methodism a very vital part of the appeal to people. And I could not help wondering if, in a crude sort of way, these people were not practicing a kind of group therapy. Certainly the confessional element has been a genuine value in many Christian religious movements. I do not know if they had ever heard of the early practices of the Buchman followers, but the resemblance is clear. Then from time to time opportunity is given, to those who have found through their faith an answer to some specific problem, to testify to this fact before the entire congregation. Some of these testimonies are then published and serve as propaganda literature, in the circulation of which the sect is extremely active.

Space does not permit even a brief sketch of the chief new religions, much less the smaller ones. Many of them will, of course,

not last very long and will not affect many Japanese people, but some of them already claim a million or more followers, so in the aggregate they do represent a not inconsiderable portion of the religious people of Japan. Quite recently about one hundred of them which are national in scope have combined to form the New Religious Organizations League of Japan with a national Board of Directors and an active Secretary, a layman who gives a substantial portion of his time to it. This organization is in turn represented in the Japan Religions League and takes an active part in the functioning of that important interfaith movement.

A major concern of the new religions is, naturally enough, the preservation of religious liberty, which of course is the basis of their very existence. They jealously watch for anything that might result in the curtailment of those freedoms which they as well as all other religions at present enjoy. They are active supporters, therefore, of the Freedom of Religion Organization, which came into being as a co-operative effort of the various religions to maintain that freedom. Not a little disquiet was being felt at the provisions of an anti-subversive bill which was before the Japanese Diet while I was in Japan. Although not directed at all at religion—on the surface—its provisions, they feared, could be easily interpreted to cover some of their activities if, as so often happens, any governmental power wished to move against them. They would suffer, not ostensibly as religions, and therefore entitled to freedom, but as subversives. All depends on who does the interpreting of the law. The matter was not yet settled when I left the country. And the Freedom of Religion Organization was sharply on the alert.

Perhaps it will have been inferred from what has thus far been said about the over-all religious associations, such as the National Buddhist Association, the Shrine Association, etc., that these are chiefly a result of war. This would not, however, be true. Most of these except the New Religions Organization antedate World War II. But there is no doubt that these organizations have assumed a greatly increased importance since the war. It has been learned that there is great advantage in union of forces, and the implications are being extended farther than ever before in the postwar period. My own experience of being able to get access to the leaders of the

various faiths was an evidence of that. Part of the stimulus has no doubt been the sympathetic treatment which the religions have received at the hands of American Occupation authorities, and their interest in acquiring a real understanding of the religious life of Japan. They have tended to work through the over-all bodies rather than with the individual religions, and this has no doubt contributed to their strengthening.

We turn now to the consideration of the second portion of our inquiry. How has Communism in its eastward thrust affected the religions of Japan? I had just come from America, among the farthest of any people away from the Communist world, geographically speaking. At home there was a near hysteria on the subject. One had to exercise care how he even talked of Communism, if he was in a public position at least, lest he be investigated or recklessly charged with Communist ideas or connections. What would it be like in Japan, lying just across a narrow sea from and extremely vulnerable to any aggression on the part of Russian Communism? Would I find people willing to talk freely about the subject? Might I myself incur suspicion by reason of my inquiry concerning it? Accordingly one of my first questions to the men who met me at the airport was: "May I talk freely about Communism in Japan? And will people dare talk to me about it?"

They looked at me in blank amazement. "Why not?" they said, as though my question were beyond their understanding. And so I found it everywhere. There was not the slightest hesitation on the part of anyone to answer questions I asked, or to talk of their own accord about Communism. This was in itself significant, and indicative of an attitude toward Communism that is hardly to be found in America. There were some individual exceptions which I shall discuss later, but in general I am obliged to report that for the greater number of individuals and groups in Japan with whom I discussed the question Communism was of very little interest or importance. I was amazed.

Communism has been at work in Japan for almost a generation. In the month of July, 1952, the Communists were to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the party in Japan. It has had its ups and downs and has never had a very large membership.

Shortly after the war, several Japanese informants claimed, the United States had shown it a degree of consideration that had given it added prestige or, as one leader remarked, had made it respectable to be a member. Something like twenty-five members of the Japanese Diet were Communists, but a change of attitude on the part of the Occupation government had occurred, and the party had been largely driven underground. When I was in Japan all but five or six deputies were in hiding, so that their parliamentary strength, never great, was lessened. No one knows just how many Communists there are in Japan, either direct members of the party or sympathizers. It is probably only a comparatively small percentage of the total Japanese population.

The general attitude of the religious groups and leaders with whom I discussed the matter was to minimize their numerical importance. Again and again it was said that most of the Communists were not Japanese at all, but North Koreans along with a few immature students. Over and over it was stressed that none but the unintelligent were attracted by Communism. One man said: "I hope you don't take the Japanese for unintelligent people." Frequently it was said derisively that only "animals" paid any attention to Communist propaganda. In very few cases did it appear that, either as individuals or as groups, those with whom I talked were conscious of Communism as a problem with which religion should concern itself at all.

Most of these people had had little or no contact with Communism. One great shrine had been accused by Communists of having illegally stored up grain, but on inspection this charge had been proved to be false. A few declared that some Communists had been converted from Communistic beliefs and come into their churches. This was indeed a fairly common testimony, though the numbers involved were never large. And none that I recall admitted that any of their followers had been drawn away from them into Communism.

When I asked, as I did everywhere, "Do you fear that Japan will ever go Communist?" the answer was practically 100 per cent No. The general attitude was, "It can't happen here." When I asked the chief priest of one of the greatest shrines, "What makes you think

it can't happen here? It has happened in China, and they said the same thing there," he admitted that there might be some danger, especially in view of the rapid breakdown of Japanese family life which had been caused by war—and, he added, by the Occupation. Through the change of legislation governing the family and family relationships, this had greatly lessened the powers of the head of the household over members of the family and increased the freedom of the individual, resulting in a great breakdown of the family system, which he regarded as chief bulwark against Communism.

On the whole, with some exceptions to be noted, the leadership of the religions of Japan seemed, as evidenced by their statements in response to specific questions, not to have occupied themselves seriously with the question of Communism, or why Communism made an appeal to people. The economic factor, while not the only appeal it makes, is a powerful one to a people whose living standard is as low as that of Japan's lower economic classes. Yet I found scarcely any awareness of the necessity for any marked change in the political or social organization of the country in order to insure a more abundant life to the underprivileged masses. There was, to be sure, mention of improvement of the international arrangements which would give Japan access to raw materials and a market for her goods. A chief desire, often expressed, was that the ban on trade with China be removed, since China is potentially Japan's best outlet for her industrial products. I sensed no awareness of the problems that might arise out of free intercourse between a free Japan and a Communist China.

When I asked, as I did repeatedly, what the causes of Communism were—out of what it grew; what made it appeal to the masses—I got a variety of answers. One person said in a very general way that it was a lack of love manifested in man's relations with his fellows. Specifically, he cited cases of a few persons who testified that they had become Communist because of resentment against their environment. Here was a group that promised them something at least. But when they came into contact with members of his group and felt a genuine love manifesting itself there, they quickly left the Communists. They had become Communist in the first place because of a lack of love in the environment, for there is, he declared, always a

longing for a manifestation of love from any quarter. Here was a sound approach to individuals, no doubt, but there was no evidence of any analysis of what love in human relationships means in concrete terms for society as a whole. Nor did I find this among more than a very small number of those with whom I talked. One founder of a new religion did recognize that there were three great evils which must be conquered in Japan, namely, disease, poverty, and strife. It was to the healing of disease that his movement directed itself chiefly.

To the question why Communism could never win the Japanese people, the answer perhaps most frequently given, and without more detailed analysis, was that it was foreign to the very nature of the Japanese people. In just what way, my informants were seldom able, and indeed seldom tried, to specify. But they seemed quite sure of it. Communism might possibly overwhelm Japan. On that point there was frequent agreement. But it would have to be by means of pressure from the outside. It would never be by the consent of the Japanese people themselves. One thoughtful monk in one of the great Buddhist monasteries suggested that, in the end, Japan might be divided very much as North and South Korea had been between Communists and anti-Communists, but he too thought it would come about rather by external compulsion than inner conviction, and that Japan too might form part of the battleground between the Communist and the free world.

Some said it could never come because it was alien to the nature of Shinto. Possibly this may have been in part responsible for the broader statement that Communism was foreign to the nature of the Japanese people, for Shinto has had a very great part in the determination of the nature of the Japanese people. There is a sort of mystic sense of Japanese peoplehood, encouraged and reinforced by the characteristic Shinto beliefs and practices. Even a foreigner who walks through the silent cryptomerias under the massive *torii* and approaches the simple unadorned shrine at Ise can almost sense this as peculiarly binding one to the Japanese land and people. It is a deep emotion, something spiritual, and it really seems to exist among most of the people. Perhaps it was this that the informant had in mind who gave as one of his reasons for believing that Com-

munism could never win the Japanese people the fact that Communism ignores the emotional aspect of human life and would therefore lack appeal.

Whether he was right in declaring that Communism ignores the emotional aspect of life may be a matter of question, in view of reports concerning the methods by which its adherents seem actually to try to stir the emotions of people by their slogans, their parades, their mass trials, in which, certainly, it is emotion, not intellect, to which appeal is made. But that there would be an almost certain attempt to appeal to other emotions than those which peculiarly attach the Japanese to his homeland there can be little doubt. It is likely that this would find stiff resistance among the people.

Another reason given is in some senses similar, namely, that man is both spiritual and material in his make-up. Communism is an appeal only to the material, and therefore it is bound to fail. Again there may be a real question as to whether this is true or not. Does Communism have no spiritual element in it? At the cruder level there can be little doubt that the emphasis is dominantly material, and its very theoretical basis is a dialectical materialism. But one can hardly look at the history of Communism and the way it has appealed to high-minded and idealistic people the world over without becoming convinced that there is in it a tremendous spiritual emphasis. One may say, if he will, that it is only a material ideal *spiritualized.* It nevertheless comes to have the driving force of a spiritual ideal. At any rate, it was the contention of more than one Japanese religious leader that the preoccupation of Communism with the exclusively material aspects of life would prevent its acceptance by the Japanese people as a whole. Perhaps they are right. Maybe they are less subject to the exclusively material appeal than others, but one cannot help wondering whether this would be the view of vast masses of Japanese people whose whole life is a bitter struggle just to exist, physically, without any knowledge or possible hope of anything higher.

One, at least, reported that even among Communists some of the characteristic practices of Shinto are carried on despite the general Communist hostility to religion. Most of my informants, when asked whether Communism and Shinto were compatible, insisted that they

were not, that they were distinctly opposed to each other and could not be reconciled. But if the two are actually already being reconciled in some degree, perhaps some *modus vivendi* could be worked out and some of the more mystical attachments of Shinto be employed to support Communist ideals.

One very thoughtful informant declared that if Communism should ever come to Japan it would necessarily be modified. It would not be the Communism of Russia, but a Japanized version of it. This was the same assertion made concerning Chinese Communism: that it was really only a Chinese agrarian reform movement, following typically Chinese lines of development. But if, in an earlier day, this was ever true, there seems to be no truth to the claim today. The Communism of Mao Tse-tung seems to be a definitely made-in-Moscow product, differing in no significant way from Stalinist Communism, certainly not in ideal, though some of its methods are different. Even so, Japanese leaders continue to insist that in Japan it would be different.

Possibly the reason given as often as any other for not believing that Communism could win Japan was that it is fundamentally opposed to the Emperor system, and that this is so deeply inwrought into Japanese life that it cannot be uprooted. That it is a deeply cherished system there can be no doubt, as we have already indicated, but that it is impossible to eradicate may be questioned. Given the power of a small minority which once gets into control and can say what may and may not be taught in the schools, preached in the churches, spoken or sung over the radio, almost any change can be effected. That this requires time is true, but that it could in the end create a new outlook is also true. And we have seen that there are those among the younger element in Japan for whom the system holds no great appeal.

But even if Communism should manage to get control of Japan for a time, at least one spokesman for one of the great sects of Shinto declared, it wouldn't last very long. Sooner or later something deep in the Japanese spirit would reassert itself and Japan would once more throw it off and return to her age-old ways. So he wasn't deeply fearful of the worst Communism could do.

Opposition to Communism is on various grounds. Religious leaders

oppose it because it is atheistic and antireligious. This is natural enough. They also oppose it because it is dictatorial. On the whole they dislike dictatorship, whether from the right or the left. The ideal of democracy seems to have captured the imagination of most of the Japanese with whom I talked, and they see nothing democratic in Communism as it actually operates in countries where it is in control. Also it denies many of the freedoms Japan has recently come to enjoy, especially freedom of religion. The Japanese people look askance at any move which would tend to deprive them of that freedom.

But when I asked whether as religions they were doing anything to offset the possibility of Communistic advance in Japan, the answer given most often by Shintoists, Buddhists, and to some extent by Christians was that they did not concern themselves directly with Communism as such and oppose it, but relied on the positive teaching of their faiths to create in the minds of the people a defense against it.

Formal or organized opposition to Communism among the religious groups is almost nonexistent. About two years ago the Young Men's Shinto Association, not unlike the Y.M.C.A., did issue a pamphlet opposing it under the title *Purging Communism.* I was unable to get a copy of it. This was the only publication of which I learned that had been published against Communism. There may have been others, but I asked repeatedly for such material and never found it. The pamphlet was directed rather against Communist thought than current practice, I was told.

"Has any attempt even been made to study seriously the ways in which any of the various religions are similar to or different from Communism in ideal and practice?" I asked. This sounded like a good idea to various persons to whom it was suggested, particularly to a faculty group in one Buddhist university, but no one knew of any such attempt. "Has any group or individual undertaken to study and set forth what are the resources of their particular faith in dealing with Communism?" I asked. So far apparently not, I was told.

When I asked whether the various religions, either directly or indirectly, felt a concern for the social order, the ills of which were the basis of most of the Communist propaganda, the answer was

almost universally, among those to whom I talked, definitely in the negative. On the whole, the predominant interest was upon ministry to the individual, in the faith that this would in the end solve all the social problems.

When I asked specifically if Shinto concerned itself directly with the physical well-being of the people in other ways than through prayer and ritual, one replied that this was not its concern, but someone else's business. The president of a Shinto university said that so far such problems had not been taken up, though perhaps the recent establishment in the university of a Political Science Department might be thought of as a beginning in that direction.

This does not mean that there has been no movement at all in this area, for not a few cases were found of a profound concern for the temporal happiness and well-being of man. Indeed, one Shinto professor pointed out that in that area Shinto and Communism had more in common than Christianity and Communism, for he regarded Christianity as more other-worldly in its emphasis than Shinto, which makes little of the future life, while Communism completely denies it.

But even where there has begun to be manifest an interest in such things as hospitals, schools, orphanages, medical clinics, kindergartens, nursery schools, Boy Scouts, etc., as there has in a number of the faiths, these are not thought of as in any way attempts to counteract Communism, but as the flowering of an individual faith. These activities are not, in most cases, I think, regarded as in any sense the ends of these religions, and in not a few cases they are regarded as irrelevant to religion as a whole.

In this, these faiths are manifesting no very different emphasis from that displayed in Christianity almost exclusively until more or less the turn of the present century, when a consciousness of the social implications of the Christian gospel began to receive a new emphasis, and it is by no means uncommon in the Christian faith today. When I put myself, as I did, in the position of an advocate of the relevance of religion to the social, political, and economic problems of the day, I found much the same impatience manifested by Shintoists and Buddhists that I have found so often in Christianity. When, for example, I was discussing such matters in the presence

of the president of the National Buddhist Association, the founder of one of the new religions, and secretaries of at least two of the over-all religious organizations, as well as a member of the Japanese Diet, and suggested that religion might have something to say on questions affecting the physical and economic welfare of the people, even through the advocating of legislation to secure for them certain rights, there was the greatest skepticism. How could or indeed should religion have any influence in such matters? I turned to the member of the Diet and asked: "Suppose you as a member of the legislative body knew that the 39,000,000 Buddhists of Japan and the millions of Shinto and other religions strongly supported some measure for the social good, what would you and the other legislators be likely to do about it?" "Why, we would vote for it, of course," he said. Of course, it is not likely that the Buddhists of Japan and the other religionists would give 100 per cent support to any measure, but here was tacit evidence that the voice of religion could make itself heard in legislative circles. It might help advance social standards at least a bit more than they were likely to be advanced if left to the purely voluntary action of parties whose own self-interest *seemed* to be adversely affected by the change.

I think I may fairly sum up the majority opinion of the leaders to whom I talked by saying that their concern as religionists for any such modification of the social order as would bring social and economic advantages to the people of Japan, the present lack of which constitutes a major appeal of Communism, was practically nil. In other words, in general, the religions were, or would, as some of them freely acknowledged, probably be, condemned by Communists, as religion in Russia had been, as a bulwark of capitalism, or privilege.

But it must be said that not all religious leaders took this position. I was sure there was another side to the picture and I made every effort to get in contact with those who might tell me of it. There are a few ministers who are far to the left but still maintain their standing in the Kyodan or United Christian Church.

One of them, frequently regarded as a Communist by his fellow ministers, assured me positively that he was not a member of the Communist party, since he was a Christian and his faith and the

party were in opposition at certain points. But, he said, under prevailing conditions in Japan and other oriental countries, he favors the policy of Communism. Broadly, he is on the side of the proletariat and he wishes to create a classless society. When I asked if he could justify the use of Communist methods, for example, the dictatorship of the proletariat, he replied that the majority of farmers and laborers in China favor the method, and it seems to be necessary in achieving the classless society. He does not think it is inconsistent with the Christian ideal. He himself thinks of salvation in terms of a cataclysmic end of the age, and apparently the destruction of evil. I am not absolutely sure that I got his thought just here, but it seemed to me that he was thinking that the destruction by Communism of that which delays the coming of the classless society was not morally on a different plane. The good end sought after justified the method. In his own thought salvation was ultimately independent of what happened to the body. He appears to think of it in other-worldly terms, yet as long as men live there ought to be an effort to improve their social condition.

"Is Communism then a form of social amelioration?" I asked.

"Yes," he replied.

"Is this the only way it can be achieved?"

"At least so far as the East is concerned, it is," he answered. "Just look at the situation in Japan now," he said. "We are largely dependent on America. We are becoming a military base for America and will have to produce weapons and armaments. So from a Christian standpoint the situation leaves much to be desired. But if trade with Communist China were to become possible, Japan would be able to export much machinery and other goods to the Chinese and import many things necessary for Japan's peaceful life.

"Or look at the French in Indo-China, where the conservative nations think only of their own interests. The so-called Western democracies are not achieving what they profess—they are really very reactionary; they seek to kill the peoples who are only concerned in improving their own destinies."

He believes that the entire orient may eventually go Communist. Therefore Christian leaders must make a study of Communism so they can proclaim the gospel with sympathy and understanding.

His reports from China are very different from those emanating from anti-Communist sources. (It seems not to have occurred to him that his own sources might have been influenced by Communist propaganda.) Missionaries and others who have been expelled from China were forced out not for religious reasons but because of political involvements. It is because of their political activities, he thinks, that Catholics are especially under the displeasure of the Communists. He was sure that it was no mere pretext to justify their persecution of religion.

"But," I asked, "do you think you would be able to exercise your own ministry freely under a Communist regime?" He believed he would, but if not, then he would fight for Christian principles. I had not then had the experience of talking with people out of China who had seen what happened there to those who went along with Communism as he seemed willing to go. They had learned the hard way, as will be seen in the chapter on China.

Communists believe that ultimately in a rationalistic society, such as they seek to create, religious ideas such as God will naturally disappear, but they do not attempt to suppress them, he thought. If Christianity has very deep roots and will translate its faith into action it can survive and will, as may be seen in the Eastern Church, where he thinks religious zeal and piety are much greater than in the West.

"But," I asked, "is religion really free there? Is it not only a creature of the State?"

He admitted that religion has to work within limits set by the State, but even that is preferable to the condition in capitalistic countries where the religions tend to compromise with social evils.

Here was a different outlook, radically different from what I had found in the conservative circles in which I had clearly been moving, both Christian and non-Christian. How extensive was this way of thinking?

When I put the question directly to him, as to the number of those who shared his views within the Japanese church, he thought a moment before replying.

"Oh, possibly those who recognize such a point of view and justify

it might be as much as one per cent, but those who openly advocate it would not be more than one in a thousand," he said.

This was probably not far from a fair estimate, as I discovered when I first set out to find out if there were those in religious circles who sympathized with Communism. I heard of none among Shinto or Buddhist leaders. Among Christians only two names seemed to be rather generally associated with that point of view, though occasionally others were mentioned as leftist in their views. Both these men had a not large but substantial following, I was told.

When I inquired of one as to how his advocacy of such ideas affected his standing in the Kyodan, the United Church, he admitted that most of his brethren were conservative and seldom called on him for work on important committees, or to perform other functions. This did not disturb him, but left him free to concentrate on his own church. Here he had met opposition. A block of members had withdrawn but in their places new ones had come in, and in general the exchange was good, for the newcomers were younger and more active. His church is made up for the most part of persons younger than himself. None of them are members of the Communist party, but some are active sympathizers.

"What has attracted them to you?" I inquired. "Your preaching of a social program?"

"On the contrary," he replied, "it was a purely religious matter."

"But you do preach a gospel of social action," I said, "do you not?"

His answer was a categorical No.

"But you do believe that the Church as Church should seek to achieve a better social order, do you not?"

Again his answer was No. There is a very small number of Christians in Japan, and there are few who have a deep piety. He was disillusioned by the situation in America. If Christians had acted upon the basis of the social gospel there would have been a great improvement in American life. In practice it seemed evident to him that there Christians are influenced by, rather than influencing, political and social life. Somehow he seemed to have gotten the idea that the preaching of the social gospel in America was general.

Personally he was a follower of Karl Barth, as many Christians in Japan are, but with the difference that while Barth was critical of

Communism he was sympathetic toward it. His view was closer to that of the Czech theologian Hromadka. He believes in the salvation of the body of believers, the Church, not just individual salvation. Until the Kingdom of God comes there will come a stage when Communism will prevail, so it is incumbent upon ministers to pay attention to it and to cope with the situation in a way consistent with Christian principles. The Kingdom of God is, of course, eternal, while Communism is but finite. But from the historical viewpoint Communism has better prospects for the future than has capitalism.

When asked how strong Communism was in Japan, he admitted it was not strong—as yet. Mostly it appeals to the younger generation, who support it because they feel that capitalism is evil.

Should American democracy be practiced according to the true spirit, this tendency might be checked, he thought, but looking at prevailing trends such as concluding the military treaty just through negotiation with Yoshida—such a policy makes the younger generation take an opposing attitude and drives them into the Communist camp. Yoshida he regarded as not representative of the real sentiment of Japan, since the majority in the Diet was based on the purchase of votes by money and the suppression of Communism and other liberal groups by Yoshida. The Diet members, he insisted had not had freedom to advocate the policies they thought essential for the good of Japan, and several of them had been purged by order of the occupation.

I have given this somewhat lengthy summary of an interview with an outstanding leftist, just to indicate that there is another side to the picture than that reported as the general view of the majority of the more conservative leaders of the major religions. Among the Christians this leftist view seems to be more pronounced than in any other faith I touched, though even there it represents only a very small minority, thus far.

The Kyodan, or United Christian Church, has a social commission made up of clergy and laymen, which has as its function to study social issues and advise the Church. Among its members are some specialists in economics, political science, and sociology. Recently, they have been studying the rearmament policy. In each of the seven presbyteries of the Church there are social committees, though not

organically related to the central commission. Under the auspices of these committees a professor of social ethics of the Seminary of the Church and others have been holding conferences in various sections of Japan studying some of the problems in Japanese life which contribute to the growth of Communism and making a study of Communism itself.

When the Communists increased from five to thirty-five members of the Diet, it was felt among Christian leaders that something new was needed. So a body of Christian Socialists was organized, something like the Frontier Fellowship. It has become an absolute pacifist organization. At a recent meeting speeches were made closely following the Communist line. All are bitterly opposed to the rearmament. They believe that it would bring about the economic collapse upon which Russia seems to count.

So Christians have in part become socially conscious, but war is their first concern, most of them turning to pacifism. Anyone who favors rearmament is afraid to speak. Their stand against rearmament makes them usable by the Communists, who are also naturally against it. This makes it possible for the Communists to appear to be working for peace while America is working for war. They further assert that America has to precipitate war in order to keep the capitalistic system alive.

This, the Marxists claim, is but the working out of the inevitable law of economic determinism. There is no real way of stopping it. A Christian ethic can do nothing about it. Such is the belief of many intellectuals, I am told. The general hopelessness of such a position has on the theological side pushed some into Barthianism, and on the secular side encouraged in some a tendency toward hedonism and sensualism.

In the face of this spirit it was really a tonic to meet Toyohiko Kagawa, and to talk with him at length about the whole situation. There was no hopelessness there, nor was there any failure to recognize the threat of Communism. Here was a man who knew the conditions of Japanese life, and the appeal that lies in Communist promises to the underprivileged masses. Yet still he was undaunted. He recognized the pressure of population growth, the limitation of raw materials and markets, but there was still a way out that was

not Communism. Japanese population he said had ceased to grow—that pressure was decreasing. I didn't see the figures, but he was clearly under that impression. And Japan can live on what she has, he asserted, if she but makes adequate use of her resources. This is no mere daydream. He marshaled facts to prove that it could be done. Does Japan lack sufficient food? Then there must be an improvement in the use of the land to produce more. This can be done. How? By increasing productivity of the land already in cultivation. Partly this can be done by making more readily available proper fertilizers and improving agricultural methods. One is amazed to hear this preacher and evangelist launch into a discussion of bacteria and phosphorus and other such things until one learns that part of his training in Princeton was not in the Theological Seminary but in the chemical and biological laboratories.

And there is much land that can still be used. Only a beginning of the use of the hillsides has been made. Here is almost unlimited possibility of tree culture which would greatly increase the protein food provisions for the people, so greatly needed, for not only would nuts and fruits be produced, but food for cattle, which would add to the milk supply and to the meat element in Japanese diet.

I had no way of knowing how practical these ideas were, but here at least was a man with a hopeful outlook, who did not talk simply in general terms of love and brotherhood, but who, while he was second to none in evangelistic zeal for the salvation of souls, was thinking and planning for the meeting of the major social and economic problems which the people experience, and in the meeting of which the major appeal of Communism would be counteracted. Here, while not motivated by a desire to oppose Communism, but by a genuine concern for the total life of the people, might be the clue to the ultimate defeat of Communism. I was not surprised that he reported the frequent conversion of Communist sympathizers under his ministry.

How great is Kagawa's influence in Japan? I do not know. I found some disposition to regard some of his schemes as visionary, as indeed some of them may be. But somewhere in the good book it is said, "Where there is no vision the people perish." The success

of Kagawa in co-operatives until they were destroyed by the war, his leadership in the labor movement, and his influence in advising government in social matters are by no means the record of an impractical visionary or dreamer. Until his schemes have been proved to be impractical by test, they at least offer something to work toward which has in theory great merit. At all events, it was a vast relief from gloom and pessimism to talk to him.

Thus war and Communism have had their effects upon Japanese religions. There may have been others than those mentioned here, but these were the very definite impressions of one who had an unusual opportunity of learning at first hand what at least the leaders of Japan's religions think those effects have been.

# II

# War, Communism and the Religions of China

THE story of the effects of war and Communism on China's religions can be told more briefly than that of the religions of Japan. This is partly because less is known certainly about what has happened in China. Direct access by an American citizen has of course become impossible since China is at war with the United Nations in Korea. Therefore material has had to be gotten where it could be found, from periodicals and books that are published in China, and much more importantly from persons who have recently come out of China but were there after the so-called "liberation" and can therefore tell what they themselves saw, heard, or experienced at the hands of the Communists.

Books are few on the subject—none directly on the matter of religion—but there are some stories of the way in which religion fared at the hands of the Communists, particularly Christianity. One of the most extensive stories of the coming of Communism in its earlier phases is *Enemy Within* by Raymond J. de Jaegher and Irene Corbally Kuhn. Is the book a true report of what happened? I can only report that in the main it has been confirmed over and over by the personal testimony of people with whom I have talked face to face, with every opportunity to question them closely. Some have expressed the idea that the book was written with less charity than might possibly have been exhibited, but no one has questioned the author's statements of alleged facts.

*Brain-Washing in China*,[1] by Edward Hunter, gives some pertinent information concerning Communist methodology in dealing with people who hold religious ideas. Again, my own conversations with people who have been victims of Communist methods tend to

[1] Vanguard Press, New York, 1951.

confirm his story. Then there is the Chinese press itself. Some people on the borders of China have access to certain periodicals, and from time to time translate and circulate pertinent materials extracted therefrom. A Lutheran missionary in Hong Kong does this in a kind of newsletter, some copies of which I have seen. A former missionary in the United States publishes a *News Letter* occasionally, and the *Catholic Missionary Bulletin* is a mine of direct information coming directly out of China. Also the United States Information Service watches closely the Chinese press and reprints articles now and then bearing upon religion in China.

But best of all the sources have been the conversations with persons, some of whom have spent many years in China and have but recently been able to get out, or were expelled from China. Most of what is contained in this chapter is from these persons whom I met either in Formosa, Hong Kong, Saigon, or Singapore, and they included Christian missionaries, Protestant and Roman Catholic, Buddhist monks and nuns, businessmen, politicians, generals, diplomats, and students. What stories some of them told! Many of these cannot yet be recounted in such a way as to identify the individuals who told them, lest other persons still in China be put in jeopardy by the telling.

This is one of the things that makes it difficult to get people to talk about what they have seen or experienced at the hands of the Communist regime. Their tongues are tied by fear. They have lived so long in a situation in which one never knows whom he can trust, or to whom he may dare to say what he really thinks, that even when they have gotten out of China they still cannot feel they are really free to talk. This is particularly true in Hong Kong, where Communists, because Communism is recognized by Great Britain, may come and go more or less freely. Which one of those to whom one talks may turn out to be a Communist or a sympathizer and report what he has said? Even if he then be out of the reach of Communist reprisals on himself, it is seldom true that he does not have someone still in China who may be made to suffer even death if he is indiscreet in what he says or does. This is the case with missionaries and other foreigners also, if they have anyone remaining in China whom the Communists might

hurt if it were reported back that they talked too much. Some, though not all, have had to have a definite person left in China who could be held responsible for any of their supposed misdeeds on going out of the country. Protestant missionaries have fear for the treatment that may be visited upon some of the native Christian group even when they have not been made officially sponsors. It is a diabolically clever scheme of control, and exceedingly effective, even if it is a relic of a barbaric age.

In Formosa I was fortunate in getting to talk to many of the leaders of Free China, including the Generalissimo himself. Most of these men had of course been out of China since before the coming of the Communists to power, or had been driven out by them, and saw little of their peacetime operations. But they are in close touch with what goes on in China, through their intelligence service. While one must of course recognize the possibility, and even probability, of bias in their reports of what is happening there, if they agree in general with what he hears from other unimpeachable sources he may well take them as true. One must distinguish between reports of fact and interpretations put upon the facts. It may be said categorically that nothing in this chapter is reported on the unsupported testimony of government sources, unless it is specifically so stated.

Many of the men in high places in the Free China government are deeply religious men themselves and much interested in religion, and in other religions as well as their own. Several of them are active Christians. The Generalissimo is a regular church attendant, according to his pastor, and daily sets aside a special time for his own personal devotion. Some are Buddhist in outlook, some are of the Confucian humanist point of view, and several of those with whom I talked were Moslems. One of them was, and had been for fourteen years, president of the Moslems of China. And it was chiefly concerning religion that I talked with them, though, obviously, it was seldom possible to avoid the political, since so much of religion in China at present is bound up with a definitely political ideology and organization. I am absolutely sure that what is here reported is not simply the Free China party line, for it is all

corroborated over and over again by the personal testimony of people who do not at all follow, or even favor, that party.

What then is the report on the effect of war and Communism on religion in China? Before that can be answered something must be said concerning religion in China before the Communists ever came. Unless this is done it becomes next to impossible to appreciate the present situation under Communism.

It has been customary in the West to say that there were three religions in China, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. But most educated Chinese repudiate the idea that Confucianism is a religion at all. It is, they say rather, an ethical philosophy. One may speak of Confucian teaching, and this has formed the basis of China's moral life for many centuries, but it is not a religion. Of course, what the Western scholars have meant by Confucianism generally was the whole complex of religious practices which in the older day were carried out by officials of the State on certain occasions, represented at the top by the Imperial worship of Heaven at the winter and summer solstices, and by the practice, in the home, of the ancestral cult, and including, of course, the cult of Confucius himself, practiced in Confucian temples. Rightly or wrongly these have generally been called Confucianism—I suppose, not because Confucius originated any of them, but because the regulation of these is to be found in the books attributed to him. Actually most of them except the cult of Confucius are much older than the sixth century B.C., the date at which Confucius appeared upon the scene.

Then there was Taoism. This represented at its best the more mystical strain in China's religions, which had undoubtedly existed long before Lao-tzu, an older contemporary of Confucius, according to the chronology of the older scholars, but which found its general ideas best formulated in the Tao Teh Ching, the little Taoist classic attributed to the gentle old scholar Lao-tzu, and developed by his brilliant, witty disciple, Chuang-tzu. This, on its philosophic side. The religious organization known as Taoist was brought into being in the second century A.D., by Chang Tao-Ling. It was always a minority group, though it exercised a powerful influence upon Chinese life. It brought the Chinese a more God-centered faith, and, especially after the coming of Buddhism, from which it bor-

rowed not a little, a more other-worldly emphasis than the very this-worldly, life-affirming Confucian teaching. It was much more closely organized than the Confucian teaching or even the Buddhist. It had for centuries a definite head, sometimes called the Taoist pope. Like Buddhism, it was essentially quietistic, and constructed monasteries to which men retired for meditation, and in quest of the secret of immortality, little stressed by Confucius or his followers.

Thus in the course of time there had gathered about it, in its more popular form, a vast mass of superstition and folk belief which discredited it in the eyes of the more literate Chinese, and it became very decadent. I recall hearing, some twenty years ago, a declaration by the famous Chinese scholar, Hu Shih, "Taoism in China is dead." The truth of that statement I had heard questioned by others who knew popular China perhaps better than the professor of philosophy did, but that he could make such an assertion was evidence that it had lost any commanding position in the life of China. Not far from that time the new revolutionary government of China had banished the so-called "pope," so that any effective central authority that could hold Taoism together was lacking, and its more rapid decadence was probably assured. That there are still philosophical Taoists left, there can be no doubt. That at the folk level of religion the Taoist superstitions still persist, attached to almost any other kind of religion at the lower levels, is readily admitted. But Taoism as a cohesive force, binding large numbers of people together organically, can hardly be said to exist. This needs to be taken into account in telling the story of the effect of war and Communism upon it.

Buddhism had come to China quite early in the Christian era as a missionary faith and centuries ago had made itself at home in that land. It had developed indigenous sects of Buddhism, unknown to, or hardly recognizable as Buddhism to, the Hinayana, or Southern Buddhists. Far beyond its organized institutions, its spirit had come to influence the native religions and the general culture of China. It did develop solid institutions, covering the face of China with monasteries and temples, but it never did achieve a closely knit, well-integrated, highly centralized ecclesiastical body, that

could be easily manipulated by government or could successfully resist the encroachments of government upon its preserves.

In none of the three religions had there developed, until quite lately in some segments of Buddhism, a strong sense of membership in one faith to the exclusion of the others. Worship was almost entirely individual rather than corporate. Even though great crowds sometimes went to the temples on festival days, they went as individuals, not as a congregation. Thus while they were undoubtedly affected to some extent by being together, there were lacking the strong compulsions that come as a result of groups fused together psychologically by a common purpose, and common and corporate practices. Thus in the case of none of the three was there built up a sense of group solidarity so necessary to resist aggression from a hostile force. If this be understood, it will be more readily seen why these faiths have failed, at least outwardly, to stand up against the vigorous, concentrated efforts of Communism to introduce a new philosophy and a new way of life to the Chinese people. Over against these three faiths, Christianity and Islam stand in sharp contrast, as will be seen later, owing to their much more highly integrated institutions, their clear-cut sense of difference from others, and their generally rigid claims to exclusiveness, all of which result in both the disposition and the ability to offer organized resistance to Communism. Add to this the fact that both of these religions have close links with the world-wide organizations of Islam and Christianity, and it will be seen that they enjoyed in one sense a great advantage in their resistance to Communism. Just how will appear later in the discussion.

Let us take first the Confucian teaching. What has become of it? Testimony from every quarter seems to be pretty clear. Already greatly neglected during recent years, under the impact of the modern age and Western influences, it seems to have been given the *coup de grâce* by Communism. If it is still flourishing anywhere in China in any of its aspects, inquiry has failed to disclose where. Maybe Hu Shih was right when he said more than twenty years ago that Confucianism was dead also, or nearer right than one would like to think, who associates much of China's strength of character with the teachings of the Sage.

Identifying Confucianism in Western fashion (1) as consisting of a certain body of cult practices surrounding the worship of heaven by the Emperor, a graduated series of lesser religious functions performed at lower levels, provincial and local by the proper officials, and certain ceremonies performed in honor of the Sage himself in Confucian temples; (2) with a body of moral teaching drawn from the Confucian classics, the basis, for centuries, of Chinese moral instruction; and finally (3) with that most characteristic of all Chinese religions institutions, the ancestral rites performed usually within the home in honor of deceased ancestors, we may ask how these have fared under the impact of war and Communism.

The first practically disappeared with the coming of the revolution, which swept away what had formerly been regarded as the religion of the State. Despite repeated attempts to make Confucianism the State religion, this was never done. President Yuan Shih-kai was the last to perform the rites at the Altar of Heaven. This had come to be too much a symbol of the old imperial system to be continued long after the overthrow of the Manchus. The people had had enough of emperors, so the Altar of Heaven fell into disuse. With the breakdown of the old imperial system, the provincial religious ceremonies likewise were discontinued, until there remained almost nothing of the cult element of Confucianism save the veneration of the Sage, carried out in the relatively few Confucian temples to be found in the country, and this was by no means common. People who have spent their whole working lives in China have told me that they never saw a Confucian temple. The temples never were numerous. The appeal of Confucius was always chiefly to the intelligentsia, not the masses. So his temples were comparatively few. Most of these, if not all, have been taken over as schools, or offices, or as storerooms by the Communists or by the Nationalist rulers before them.

It was my privilege to see two Confucian temples in Taipeh, Formosa, to visit one, and to talk at length with one of the priests. It was a beautiful building in typical Chinese style—graceful curved roof, the ridgepoles adorned with amazing dragons, made of mosaic ceramic work, many-colored, and shining in the sun. Underneath

the cornices were numerous ceramic objects forming a frieze around the entire building, or highly decorated, carved wood rafters. The porticoes were supported by rows of pillars, some elaborately carved of stone, others wooden and brilliantly painted. However, over all was an air of neglect. Parts of the edifice were occupied by none too tidy offices of government, or army, or what not. The grass in the courtyard was uncut, and drying clothes hung from lines strung between the more modest pillars in the rear courtyards.

The priest, a not-too-prepossessing individual in a shabby robe, his face unshaven for some days, took me into the main sanctuary and told me how once a year, on Confucius' birthday, great crowds of people thronged the temple, special rituals were conducted, and the gifts of the people for the support of the temple were received. "And is there no other use made of the temple?" I asked. At first he said, "No, that is all." But I persisted until at last he disclosed that, as a matter of fact, there is a daily ceremony performed by the priest himself. He even went through the ritual to show me how it was done. In a glass case was an image of Confucius, with his ancestral tablet behind it. Every day joss sticks are burned before it, and tea is offered by one of the attendants. Scholars and others may come at any time and burn incense before it. Once a year, on his birthday, offerings of rice, silk, corn, and wheat are made, and one or more hogs, cows, or sheep are sacrificed. This is said to be a colorful occasion. For the support of the temple the city sets aside $500, Taiwan, which, with the gifts of the people at the yearly festival, has to pay the expenses for the year.

And this was in Taipeh, Formosa, the seat of the Free China government, which is supposed really to represent the Chinese people. The temple had been more active under the Japanese than it was now, said my informant. At least the Japanese were not critical of the teachings of Confucius, as the present rulers are. Some of them regard it as the product of a feudalistic age, he said, and do not wish to preserve it. He had no information as to how Confucian temples were faring on the mainland. But I do not recall anyone with whom I talked who had come out of China in recent months who had certain knowledge that any Confucian temples are continuing to function within China proper. One Communist sym-

pathizer from Shantung, native province of Confucius, said he understood that at Chefoo, the native city of Confucius, the rites are still carried on in the Confucian temple. He had not been there personally and seen it. But his report on what was going on in respect to other religions differed so markedly from the testimony of most of my informants, and was on the whole so closely conformed to the Communist line, that I give little credence to his statement. It may be true, and at that particular shrine I would not be surprised if it were, for Confucius' home city has a historic importance, quite apart from religion, which might cause even Communists to respect it as a national monument, perhaps as they have done in the case of the Altar of Heaven in Peking.

But if the cult has ceased, or practically so, what of the teachings of Confucius, which have played so important a role in the life of China? Are they being kept alive or suppressed? The reply most frequently given, where I asked this question, was that in general they were being suppressed. They had already ceased to be central in the education of Chinese children long before the Communists came to China. In a group conference in Hong Kong in which several Chinese leaders took part, I asked how many of them had had training in Confucian lore in their childhood. Only the persons of about sixty years of age or more had had it. One had had a thorough Confucian grounding. Those under sixty had had little or no such training. The reason is that it had ceased being required in the schools very early in the revolutionary period, for these were made to follow the Western pattern, and all attempts of the older scholars to have instruction in the classics made mandatory were unsuccessful. China had turned her face from the past toward the future, and Confucius belonged to the past. The young revolutionaries believed that Confucius' political theory supported a feudalistic system of government and life. They were oriented toward democracy, and would have none of it. Madame Sun Yat-sen, since turned wholeheartedly Communist, wrote and spoke against it. At best it came to be studied only as an elective in the colleges and universities, just as in many Western schools one may elect a course in Plato, or John Dewey, or in the life and teachings of Jesus.

So if Confucian teaching has fallen into disuse, it cannot be laid wholly at the door of Communism. I was interested while in Taiwan to discover how Confucian teaching was faring at the hands of Free China. I asked the governor of Formosa, Mr. K. C. Wu. Was it being offered in the schools of the island? His reply, in effect, was that there was no settled official policy in the matter. It was under discussion at that very time among the educational authorities.

"What different opinions are being advocated?" I asked. "In general," he indicated, "there are three distinct points of view." First there are those who frankly say that Confucius' teaching ought not to be perpetuated in the schools at all. Something of it will undoubtedly be carried along in the teachings of the home and in general social customs, but consciously, the schools ought not to be oriented about Confucius' teachings in this modern democratic age. These are in substantial agreement with the position of Madame Sun Yat-sen at this point. A better basis for a democratic society can and ought to be found than that afforded by the Confucian classics.

The second group would definitely include Confucian teaching in the schools, but not necessarily identified as such. They would rather seek to incorporate the best of Confucius' teachings, perhaps especially the ethical teachings, in schools, but indirectly rather than directly. By which, I suppose, they would mean to inform all the teaching with the outlook and spirit of the Master. For example, in learning to read, the pupil would be given well-selected passages from the classics; or in a class in social studies, the Confucian attitude toward the topic under discussion would be brought out; or in a class of poetry some of the best of the Odes would be included. The important thing for this group would be the perpetuation of the teaching for its own intrinsic value, without regard to its particular origin. Such an attitude is not infrequently found among educators in the West who would solve, to their own satisfaction, the vexed question of religious education in the schools by permeating the whole curriculum of the public school with the spirit and ideals of Jesus and the prophets without ever identifying their source.

The third group would not only include the Confucian teachings but would identify them as such, believing that there are values in

keeping alive a reverence for the Sage in the oncoming generation of Chinese. "May I ask which point of view you personally take?" I said. "The last," he replied. Yet he is a Christian by training and conviction, an active member of the Episcopalian Church. What the relative strength of the three points of view is, he did not say. The matter is still currently (1952) under active discussion, and will probably have been decided one way or another before this book can be issued.

Not that he would preserve everything in the classics. He recognized the presence of both the definitely dated material, which has no relevance in our age, and the timeless. This latter ought to be preserved. He would have it introduced progressively from the very earliest grades. Perhaps this could best be done, he thinks, by training teachers thoroughly in the classics, so that the essential values found therein might be passed on through them as persons, if not as specific matter of formal instruction. This will be understood by those who are willing to have formal religious instruction left out of the schools if the teachers are themselves religious, and good examples of their faith.

As to what he would leave out he said, "I would be willing to have left out anything to which any objection can be made. For there would still remain a central core of teaching that would be of very real value."

He does not believe, with many others, that Confucius was necessarily a conservative. His principle of *renovation* precludes that idea. He thinks that Confucius' frequent reference to the past was not so much to glorify the past, but rather to say, "See, it has already been tried." He finds in Confucianism a strong individualism, which is a basis for democracy. If this be the case in Free China, it could hardly be expected that in Communist China Confucian teaching would be perpetuated.

Professor Chakravarty, of the China Good Will Mission in 1951, asked Premier Chou En-lai about Confucius and his teachings. His reply was: "There may be elements of value in the philosophy of Confucius, but it was formulated more than two thousand years ago and is no longer valid."[2]

[2] Sundarlal, *China Today*, Allahabad, 1952.

Communism does not lightly come to terms with any phases of culture which are found to be in contradiction to its own fundamental philosophy. It is ruthless in its destruction of persons or institutions which stand in the way of its total acceptance. It brooks no rival authority. Is there a fundamental opposition between Confucian teaching and that of Communism? I think there is, though I have heard it said that there are some ways in which Communism and Confucianism are alike. Two things one American political scientist pointed out especially: (1) The habit of self-examination in both. When I miss the mark in archery, says Confucius, in effect, I do not blame the bow or arrow but look to myself. Two of the chief techniques used by Communism are the enforced keeping of a diary in which one is encouraged to examine and record his innermost thoughts, and the compulsory confession in which he is to search out and express, either in writing or even in public, the points at which he has failed to follow the proper course of conduct, which is of course dictated by Communist belief and practice. (2) The regarding of the ruler as in a sense a parent to whom respect and obligation are due. This he thinks to be the case in Russia, where Stalin was looked to as in some sense the father of his people, and it certainly was a factor in Confucius' teaching regarding the king or Emperor. In both cases authority rests with the head.

Whether these are true likenesses is disputed by others, who doubt especially the latter. They find the ruler-subject relationship to be quite different in spirit, and doubt that on any such basis Communism can find any support in Confucianism. I have never heard any Chinese even suggest this as one of China's ways of coming to terms with Communism.

Indeed, in talking with Chinese themselves, I have more often heard the suggestion that it was precisely the age-old ideas of family solidarity, across which Communism cuts so sharply, that might eventually be the rock upon which Communism would break itself. Other foreign invaders have found it so. No one has so far been able to break through the close-knit ties of family to establish a government to which the people would be loyal if loyalty meant a sacrifice of the family relationships. It has often been remarked that

it was precisely this loyalty to family interest, as over against loyalty to the central political authority, which brought about the failure of the Nationalistic Chinese government. It always seemed more important to secure the fortunes of the family than those of the nation.

Can Communism succeed where others have failed? Certain facts indicate that so far it is succeeding remarkably well, and that if it can hold out for a few years more it may be able to overcome this deep principle completely. More than one of the top leaders of Free China said once and again to me, "Time is on the side of the Communist. Unless we can get back and drive them out within the next two or three years, we have no chance of ever doing so." They, of course, associate China's redemption from Communism with a return of the Free China government to power.

Many had said, and I among them on more than one occasion, that the strong sense of filial piety or respect for and obedience to parents would make it difficult if not impossible for Communism to win China. We had seen what unprincipled and ruthless power could do to the children of Germany under Hitler, when children were made to hate their parents and often to denounce or accuse them to the authorities, even when it would mean arrest, imprisonment, or even death for them. But Germany had not had twenty-five hundred years of Confucian teaching in which this was the most outstanding virtue of all.

However, the testimony of many people to whom I have talked and reports I have read proceeding from China reveal very clearly that we were wrong, at least for the present. What the future may disclose to be the long-time result, we cannot of course foresee. What we do see in the immediate present is that the Communist methods are quite successfully breaking down the sense of family solidarity and erecting in its place respect for the central authority, which is represented presently in Mao-Tse-tung. Probably some of us had overlooked the effect that the modern age and war had already had upon the family system before Communism became a serious threat to China. As causes of the gradual breakdown of the family system one would have to list the failure to maintain Confucian teaching in the schools; the changing economic system which tended to the dissolution of the patriarchal family system;

the greater mobility of the population, made possible by better railroad and highway networks; and the enforced breaking up of old family associations caused by war—first the Japanese encroachment in north and central China, which left millions homeless and caused them to flee to the western provinces, leaving behind old family influences, shrines, and associations which had held them together. All this, plus the Western educational ideals and methods, had gone far to weaken family ties before Mao Tse-tung began his determined attempt to win China to Communism. With the total control of mass means of communication, the schools, the press, the radio, there has been a consistent effort to change China's old ways of thinking into new channels. Anyone who has observed that children, and adults too, can be made to believe almost anything which government authorities want them to believe if they are told often enough and forcefully enough, should have been prepared for what has happened in China. Apparently family loyalties have already been pretty well destroyed and a new loyalty has been erected in their place, interpreted of course as a higher loyalty. Sons and daughters in China are now doing just as they did in Germany, denouncing their parents as capitalists, or landowners, or reactionaries, all of which constitute crimes against the higher authority, that of the State.

It may be said, and possibly truly said, that many of the accusations and denunciations are the price of personal survival, that it is either repudiate parents or subject oneself to severe measures—imprisonment, brain washing, torture, or even death itself. Under such conditions many of us may well wonder what we would ourselves do.

Was the son of Dr. Hu Shih, famous Chinese philosopher and statesman, father of the Chinese renaissance, and later Chinese ambassador to the United States, sincere when he denounced his own father? In this case the father was out of the country, enjoying the security of residence in the United States, and so beyond the reach of at least physical harm. The son might, under the circumstances, reasonably enough conclude that no serious consequences could come of his denunciation, and so be led to accuse his father, in order to escape personal misfortune. In such a case

it is not difficult to understand how the son could do such a thing. I was told by one of the priests I met that before the mass trial, at which he had to be judged, his Chinese friends came to him and asked: "What can we accuse you of, Father? We have to make some kind of accusation." And they begged his forgiveness for accusing him at all. But what can be said in the case of the daughter of the president of one of the great Christian colleges? He had been one of the Protestant Christians who had apparently thought it was possible to go along with Communism and still remain a faithful Christian. But the time came when he could not conscientiously go farther. He was ordered to make a public confession before the whole student body of his university. It was not satisfactory. Then his own daughter was either forced to denounce or voluntarily denounced her father, bringing about his arrest and imprisonment. Here are excerpts from her accusation: "In the past I recognized you as a clear and well-educated teacher, who was wise and able. I had looked upon you as the model, feeling that your education was good and your political understanding far above mine. Because I looked upon you as an honored example—you had an influence upon me." At the time of the accusation of her father and his confession, she had felt it was sincere and the judgment upon him too severe, but the following day (March 12, 1952) the school paper raised many factual questions. "And," she continued, "I wakened to see that you were not my respected father. I had looked upon you as an educator, pure and above politics, but you truly are a Christian who is without political feeling for the Communist Party. We all thank the Communist Party for bringing us these days of great glory and blessing. But you have turned this blessedness into a time of bitter self-examination.

"Afterward when I consulted my classmates they broke down your devilish confessions with actual facts. I seek to progress. I have already joined the Youth Group (stepping stone to the Communist Party membership). The fact that I have been unstable in my political standing is because I have always sought your viewpoint. I have been affected by the father-daughter relationship. . . . I want to stand with the great masses to fight for the Communist principles.

"I have discovered that under the Communists whoever has a respect for American thinking cannot be tolerated. Your type of 'claws and teeth,' you Lu Chih Wei, why should I not feel like the Volunteer—determined to fight you and not to protect and to plead for you, believing your devilish talk. Do you think that your false tears are able to bribe my conscience?"

A Chinese with whom I talked in Indonesia had been a student in Shantung Christian College. He seemed very fond of his former American teachers, but he had accepted the Communist line and sought to justify this betrayal of parents by their children. "China," said he, "is now divided into certain classes, landlords, reactionaries, students, etc., and of course the members of the Communist Party. One who is a member of the latter has to be loyal to that above all other loyalties. If a son knows that his father is a landowner or a reactionary, both of which are hostile to and stand in the way of the program of the latter, why should he not denounce him? A new relationship has replaced the old and he must be true to it."

If the old parent-child relationship is no longer to be maintained, then everything that supports it must be done away with. This explains the suppression of the Confucian temples and the attack upon the age-old institution of ancestor worship, which has often been regarded as the most basic element in Chinese religion, practiced whether one was a Buddhist, Confucian, Taoist, or even Roman Catholic Christian. By its practice were knit together in an indissoluble unity the family of the past and that of the present and the future. Probably it has been more influential than any other one thing in the preservation of the family system. Even in death the family is unbroken.

"Is the ancestral cult still practiced in China?" I asked everyone with whom I talked. The replies were sometimes contradictory. Some said yes, within the home, but not at all in the clan or regional temples. Some said not at all. The truth probably is that conditions vary in different parts of China, somewhat in proportion to the length of time Communism has been present in the community. Communist strategy definitely is to destroy it. It is fairly easy to do this in the case of the public cult, but not so easy to control what goes on in the home. It is ridiculed by Communists, and held to be

one of the superstitions that are to have no place in the Communist society in the making. I get the distinct impression that ancestral practices are much more faithfully observed now among the Chinese who are resident in the countries of southeastern Asia, whither millions have migrated, than in the old homeland. This situation is due, undoubtedly, first of all to the freedom they enjoy in these lands, and perhaps, too, to the fact that within a foreign nation which seeks to assimilate them this is a most effective defense against the loss of cultural identity. So one finds the ancestral cult everywhere in the Chinese communities in this area. They tend to change less than mainland Chinese, in language also, I am told. I saw the ancestral tablets everywhere in Indo-China, in Malaya, in Indonesia, and in Thailand. In the latter I visited a regional ancestral temple for people from the Swatow region of China, one of the most beautiful temples I have seen. It exists solely for the preservation of the ancestral tablets, and the periodical cult that goes with it three or four times a year, when offerings are brought and presented before the tablets. Here seemed to be a very commercial arrangement. One pays for the location of the tablet, those at the very center commanding thirty times as much as those in the row farthest away from center. I was told that other clan and family associations also maintain like temples. A novel touch in the one mentioned above is that just in front of the temple there is an excellent basketball court, with some three thousand seats for spectators, where interregional and international basketball tournaments are held, probably to help support the temple.

In all southeastern Asia that I visited the Buddhist temples are also repositories of ancestral tablets. In a number of them a picture is set in a small frame fitted within the tablet. In the one mentioned above in Bangkok, many tablets had been bought and placed, though the owner is still living. These are covered by a red velvet sheath on which the owner's name is written.

When he dies the name and date will be written on the tablet itself, which in this temple was of natural gold color. Many of the tablets were for several members of the family. For example, it was explained to us that one contained the name of the head of the

house and four of his wives. Two of the wives were still living, so a red ribbon covered their names, to be removed when they pass on.

The basis, in writing, for the family system and all that it means is, of course, the Chinese classics. These in Communist China are faring badly. To be sure, a pro-Communist Chinese visitor to China in recent months boasted of how great care is being taken of certain precious ancient editions of the classics and other Chinese literary treasures in the National Library at Peking. This is in the best Communist tradition. The Communists do have a regard for the value of certain national treasures, and have preserved many in Russia. But to preserve the classics in a library, especially one which is seldom used by others than scholars, is one thing, and to use them as a basis for education and the regulation of daily living is quite another. The latter is definitely discouraged in various ways. One hears everywhere of the destruction of the classics. This does not mean burning, of course, for that is destructive of precious material. Rather they are used, like thousands of other volumes, as old paper, to be employed in paper manufacture, or as wrapping paper, or for any other practical purpose for which they are suited. A recent report indicated that of 140,000 volumes in a Christian university 120,000 were disposed of in some such ways, simply because they were regarded as incompatible with the new Communist ideas. That all copies of the classics will be destroyed is not at all likely, for some will go to almost any length to preserve them, as they did during the attempt of Emperor Shih Huang in the third century B.C. to rid China of Confucian writings. But they are being relegated to a place of practical ineffectiveness in the life of the rising generation of Chinese. And this fact is of great significance. One of my pro-Communist informants in Indonesia explained it this way. He said paper is very scarce in China, so the people use old books and documents which have fallen into disuse for practical purposes such as wrapping paper in the stores and markets. He saw nothing reprehensible in this. If the classics have ceased to be used as before, why not make them serve a useful purpose of another sort?

So, in summary, the impression that I got concerning what is usually known as Confucianism in the West is that under Com-

munism it tends to disappear as a result of a calculated determination to destroy what might prove, in the end, if left alone, to be the downfall of the new political faith. While there are some recognizable similarities which might be exploited, the fundamental differences are too deep to tolerate, so it must be destroyed. Can it be destroyed permanently? Only time can tell, but I recall a statement by a highly placed member of the Free China government in Formosa. "They cannot permanently destroy it, because there is a moral order in the world to which Confucianism itself abundantly witnesses, and ultimately whatever goes counter to that order will destroy itself." That is a faith that is held by many Christians with reference to Communism. In its fundamental denial of and disregard for the moral order of the universe are the seeds of its ultimate destruction.

I wish it were possible to say more about Taoism than I have to report, but I could find out very little about it. Most informants knew of no Taoist temples still functioning in the areas from which they came, nor did they know anything certainly about Taoist monasteries. They are normally in rather isolated spots in the mountains and are not under easy observation even in peacetime. I gathered that there are still some Taoist priests who continue to be consulted concerning auspicious days to do this or that, and on the occasion of funerals, but the information about them has been so meager that I hesitate to say anything more about that faith. My impression is that, if it still exists, it is probably either as some element of the folk religion, which is likely to go on despite Communist propaganda, at least among the illiterate masses, or at the top level among a few genuine mystics, followers, not religiously but philosophically, of the teaching of the gentle Sage, Lao-tzu. Probably the Taoist classics are undergoing much the same fate as the Confucian classics, but this is personal speculation, not a factual statement, based upon reports from actual persons recently resident in China.

When one turns to Buddhism the picture becomes clearer. Fortunately, I was able to talk with a few Buddhist monks and nuns who had escaped from China. We have already observed the generally loosely organized character of Buddhism. One might almost

say that Buddhism was rather an influence than an institution in China. Yet there were temples and monasteries scattered over much of China. In recent years save for a few regions where a mild renaissance was undertaken two decades or more ago, Buddhism has been rather decadent. A member of the China Good Will Mission from India, 1951, reported concerning Buddhism, "Buddhism in China, in the Mahayana form, was never more than a system of rules. It disappeared with the grandmothers of the present generation. The whole of China is studded with Buddhist temples and images of the Buddha. They are preserved as monuments of art."[3]

Monks and nuns were often lacking in education and without much influence on the life of China. Already the revolution, the war lords, civil war, and the war with Japan had deeply affected Buddhism. Temples had been requisitioned time and again for housing troops, for storing war material, or for government offices. So even before Communism "liberated" China they already well knew what it was to have their properties at least temporarily confiscated. But Communism has been very systematic and thorough in its attack upon Buddhism. Reports from various sections reveal that the methods of dealing with it have varied considerably, but the result has in the end been about the same.

Buddhism, in its more philosophical aspects, is less objectionable to Communists than other faiths, because at this level there is no belief in a personal god, or indeed any. Nor would it be too difficult to work out some likeness between the Buddhist doctrine of Karma and that of the inevitable working out of the dialectic materialism which is central in Communist ideology. But the general level of Chinese Buddhism was by no means of this more philosophical character. Rather the Buddha and Bodhisattvas had become quite indistinguishable from the polytheistic divinities of Chinese popular religion. Indeed, they tended to fuse in the minds of the people, who were never exclusivists in religious matters. The result was that there was a great deal of what Communists regard as superstition in the faith, and of course they were opposed to that. A second objection was to the monastic character of Buddhism, which took a

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 529.

great many men and women out of what Communists regard as productive work. They were rated as parasites who made no significant or positive contribution to the common life of China. This could not be tolerated by a nation of *workers*. So they have been practically suppressed.

At least some temples are allowed to remain open. It will be recalled that the new People's Government claims to extend freedom of religion to its subjects. At least some appearance of freedom must be preserved. But it is only a limited number of temples that continue to function, and most of the monks and nuns have been forced into some so-called productive employment. They have been reported frequently as being seen in the processions organized to march through the streets, carrying placards and shouting slogans they could scarcely have believed sincerely, open witnesses to all and sundry as to the general acceptance, by religious persons, of the aims and claims of the People's Government. Whether they believed what they cheered for, or in the banners they carried, was of little consequence. There they were, bearing witness to their welcoming of the new doctrines. This must have had some effect upon the minds of the people who respected the religious vows of these monks and nuns.

Monks and nuns must do some productive work. For many this meant working on farms or in factories. In a few cases monasteries were converted to what was regarded as constructive use. For example, a large temple and monastery in a section of Shanghai where there were insufficient eating places became a restaurant, the monks and nuns serving as cooks, waiters, dishwashers, etc. The temple worship hall was permitted to remain, a place for people to come and worship the Buddhas. Stories were told of nuns being forced to marry, and even of monks and nuns being married under pressure, but I was unable to find anyone who could vouch for the truth of the stories on the basis of certain knowledge. That the nuns were impressed into service was told me by some nuns themselves, when the convent in which one of my informants was mother superior was taken over by the Communists. It was in Manchuria. She and one other nun managed to escape and make their way to a northern city by ship, using as fare the one piece of silver she

possessed. They had nothing with which to pay for food, so when they reached Shanghai they were so weak from hunger they could hardly stand. Given temporary relief there, they managed to work their way southward, riding freight trains, or walking, until they reached Canton and were finally able to get out into the leased territory where it was my privilege to talk with them.

Having little inner cohesion, and being rather passivist in outlook, Buddhism has been quite unable to withstand Communism, even though many Buddhists are convinced that they cannot be at the same time both Buddhists and Communists. In one western province the method of attack upon the faith was quite the opposite of the ruthless suppression experienced in some places. Here the approach was one of interest in purifying the faith. The Communists came and, with the greatest sympathy, undertook the study of Buddhist literature, with which, it should be said, many of the monks are not too familiar. Presently the Communist students began to find fault with the teaching and activity of the monks. What they were doing and saying was not in accord with the sacred texts and was therefore violating their scriptures. Obviously they were not fitted for their ministry. Some of the practices were not warranted by scripture, so of course they should not be perpetuated, and so on, until, in the end, Buddhism was practically eliminated, and all in the name of protecting the purity of Buddhist doctrine. But whether by one means or another, it was the testimony of most of my informants that, aside from some show places, Buddhism has been practically suppressed by the Communists. That this means Buddhism has been destroyed cannot be asserted. Should Communism suffer reverses within a few years, it is of course probable that Buddhism would once more assert itself; but for the present it has been reduced to impotence as a functioning force in the life of China.

Islam has fared better in some respects than either of the three religions thus far discussed. Three facts account for this. First, Islam, although a minority religion in China as a whole, is very strong in some of the northwest provinces. Its followers are simply too numerous to be dealt with as summarily as the other religions. No one knows just how many Moslems there are in China. Estimates vary from as low as twelve million to fifty million. General Pai

Chung-hsi, whom I met and talked with on several occasions in Formosa, gives the latter figure. He is and has been national president of all the Moslems of China for the last fourteen years. Since, especially in the northwest, some of the Moslems are racially different from the Chinese, they constitute not only a minority religious group but also a minority ethnic group, and as such must be dealt with. This causes them to be treated with more consideration than they might otherwise be given.

It is perhaps for this reason that a special concession is made to the Moslems in respect to ownership of lands by mosques, under some circumstances, with the consent of Moslems residing in the place where the mosques are situated. Such concessions are not made to temples, monasteries, or churches of other faiths.

A second factor is the fact that the Moslems are a fairly closely knit body of believers, in sharp contrast to the Buddhists, Taoists, and Confucianists. There is a definitely self-conscious, and sometimes almost fanatical, local group, with a clear-cut theological orientation, quite distinct from Communism and easily so recognized, even by the ordinary individual. Much of the Moslems' social and educational life centers about the mosque. The local groups are then organized on a representative basis into regional conferences, these into provincial groups, and finally, there is a national Moslem organization with its elected officers. Regional or provincial assemblies meet annually or oftener. The national conference meets every second year. Thus there is a sense of cohesion among Moslems that is quite lacking in the other religions. This makes it impossible simply to wipe out local groups without the rest knowing about it. Whatever happens to one segment of the Moslems is quickly reported to the remainder, and opposition of formidable character can be quickly mobilized in areas of Moslem concentration. This the Communists are forced to take into account in dealing with them.

Furthermore, Islam is a world religion. It is becoming increasingly self-conscious as such. Repeated conferences at the world level have been held in recent years. Whatever happens in any one section of Islam becomes a matter of concern to Moslems of the rest of the world. A tremendous weight of world public opinion can be aroused,

and the Communists are not wholly indifferent to world opinion. Every propaganda effort of Russia and China indicates clearly that they desire to have world approval upon their acts. But in this case there is more involved than just approval. Russia badly needs the resources of her Moslem neighbors to the South, Persian and Arabian oil in particular, but also she wants the good will and trade of Moslem Pakistan, and India, which still has some forty million Moslems in its population. It behooves her therefore not to arouse the hostility of these nations against her. They are, with the exception of India, almost wholly Islamic, and the solidarity of the Moslems is to be reckoned with.

Still another factor might be mentioned, namely, that Moslems are by no means the passive, unresistant folk that Buddhists are. They will fight to preserve their faith, and they have fought. Communists who attempted at first to ride roughshod over Moslem religious sensibilities found that they could not do this with impunity. The Moslems fought back. This did not prevent the destruction of many Moslems. General Pai told me that he had definite account of at least fifty-nine thousand Moslems who had been killed because they resisted Communist aggression. But the Communists know that Free China, at present poised on Formosa, is hoping to come back to the mainland. And they know that there is no more effective opposition force that could be used against them than the Moslems. Certainly the Free China government is counting strongly upon them as a major support, if and when they are able to return to China proper.

For these reasons Moslems have been less roughly handled than the other non-Christian faiths. Yet, even they have not been able everywhere to carry on as before. Mosques have been closed, mullahs mistreated and persecuted because of their refusal to submit to Communist control. Treatment has varied somewhat in proportion to the degree of concentration of Moslems.

If the testimony of interested parties in Formosa concerning the status of Islam is called in question, then an occurrence in Pakistan during the past year may be indicative of what is happening to Islam in China. A delegation of Moslems set out from China to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. They reached Lahore in Pakistan

before they discovered that they could not get a visa for entrance into Arabia, so could not continue their journey. What a chance to win the sympathy of Pakistanis for China's Communist regime by giving first-hand testimony to the freedom of religion which they supposedly enjoy in China, and so set at rest the rumors concerning the restriction upon religious freedom which were common. But was this done? Not at all. Newspapers sought diligently to get into communication with these pilgrims. But they were never successful. Always they were under the surveillance of the Communist diplomatic authorities, and never permitted once to speak to the newsmen save through an interpreter furnished by those authorities.

No wonder the editor of the *Gazette*, the leading Moslem paper in Lahore, took occasion to question openly just how free religion was in China. Is it likely that if all had been well there would have been any hesitation about letting them speak freely? Certainly Communism is not usually slow to take advantage of a propaganda opportunity.

Christianity appears in three forms in China: Greek or Russian Orthodox, Catholicism, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism. I was unable to learn anything concerning the Orthodox churches at first hand. The fact that in Russia the Church has come to terms with the State in a subordinate relationship, i.e., toleration under strict controls, would lead to the belief that it follows this lead in China. In any event it is not a very numerous segment of what is after all a very small minority faith, even when all Christians of all kinds are included. The total number is little more than one per cent of the total population. But owing to the fact that Christian schools educated a substantial number of the leaders of China, and that many of these became Christian, or were strongly influenced by Christianity, this minority has wielded a disproportionate influence in the development of China in modern times.

Protestantism has probably fared better, on the whole, than Roman Catholicism. The explanation is simple. The Communist government of China came in, promising religious freedom to all. An advisory council on religious matters was set up including representatives of all the ethnic faiths, though Roman Catholic Christianity was not represented, probably because of the known hostility of

the Vatican. But it soon became apparent that the freedom to be allowed to religion was by no means complete. It was only freedom within limits, the limit being willingness to accept government control. Religion must conform to the requirements of the State, which meant that many of its former freedoms were curtailed. Religion, to function acceptably in China, must submit to the Three-Self Movement, that is, self-support, self-propagation, and self-rule. To the Protestant missionary this was an ideal for which he had long striven. He had always, theoretically at least, worked toward the day when the Chinese Church would take over completely its own support, its own propagation, and its own government. He would remain as a helper only at the invitation of the Chinese and, under their direction, make what contribution he might to the ongoing life of the Church. Here was indeed an ideal to which he could heartily give support. To the Chinese leaders who had been steadily taking over from the missionary very largely the direct responsibility for carrying on the propagation of the faith, and who had been developing their own support from local sources, it may have seemed needlessly rigorous to cut off at once the sources of financial aid from abroad. But they had known that the missionaries were working consciously for just such a goal. So it was not wholly unwelcome that the Communist government should insist upon such a program. Many, therefore, went wholeheartedly along with it. When a group of outstanding and representative leaders were brought together, and for a period of some weeks were subjected to a constant attack upon their former missionary leaders, teachers, and spiritual fathers, as emissaries of capitalistic and imperialistic America, some of them sought to draw back. But by that time it had become difficult to do so. Some, under the skillful barrage of propaganda, coupling every unfortunate occurrence in Chinese history with, and, directly or indirectly, making it the result of the missionary enterprise, became sincerely convinced that there was something in it all that they had not seen before. These, because themselves highly critical of the foreign connection of the Church, turned to denounce their former missionary leaders.

Typical of the response of some Christian leaders to this propaganda are statements to be found in various publications coming

out of China. One of them by the chairman of the "Oppose America —Aid Korea—Three-Self-Reform Movement of the Church in China" is in part as follows:

"Thirty years ago I was a practical pacifist, and twisted the teachings of Jesus, by interpreting his 'Love Your Enemies' to be love without limitations and that there was never to be resistance. I had forgotten Jesus' love for his motherland, and his jealousy and hatred for its enemies, and his fierce struggle against the enemies of his people." The writer was a Gandhi follower, leader in China of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and believed in Isaiah's dream of a warless world (Is. 11:6-8).

"That is a beautiful dream. Now thirty years afterward I have completely wakened from daydreaming. . . . As a Christian I feel a righteous indignation because, under the banner of the church, American Imperialism invaded and corrupted the beautiful name of the church. She has sold the Prince of Peace whom we worship, and has made armaments and dollars, intrigue and lust to be their God. . . ." When he hears of American inhumanity in Korea he writes, "My heart is filled with hate, and like furnace fires, burns against the savagery of American Imperialism."

In an article in *Kwang Ming Daily* of Peking, June 30, 1952, Mr. Nu Yao Tsung wrote:

> Under the leadership and Thinking of Mao Tse-tung there is a Step Forward by the Three-Self-Reform Church of Christ in China. . . . The church has awakened! Earlier it did not understand what the Communist Party stood for. Had there been no Communist Revolution the Church could not have progressed to the place where it is today. Therefore, many Christians who harbored thoughts and misgivings and wrongs against the Communist Party have now changed. . . .
>
> The face of Imperialism forced upon the church in China during the past hundred years has been torn away by the masses. Many Christians are as though awaking out of a dream and will never again suffer under Imperialism. The Three-Self Reform is the only road for the Church of China. . . . The Three anti- and Accusations Movements have revealed things that were undreamed of, such as the effort of Imperialism in the use of the church. When the church had gone through these, it was as if a great stone had been lifted from their body. . . . In the past

Imperialism has twisted the Christian concepts. . . . Mao Tse-tung's glorious Thinking aims to liberate the old China. To the Christians of today, this is a glorious guiding light. His most important thinking, the "way of the masses," becomes the power of the church today.

When the government began to insist upon public confessions on the part of Christian leaders of their own failure to see in it all the hand of imperialistic America, and they were brought to public trial before a people's court, some felt that the true spirit of the Christian faith was being violated and drew back, or tried to, only to discover that this was no longer possible. They were placed under house arrest or imprisoned, or, in some cases, simply dropped out of sight and no one knows what has become of them. Some very distinguished Christian leaders persisted long in the attempt to come to terms with government, believing that somehow out of it would come a better day, only to discover finally that there was no limit to which the Communists would hesitate to go. In the end they had therefore to refuse any longer to co-operate with them. One, a president of the World Council of Churches, found himself in this situation, and finally was put under arrest and deposed as a leader. Another famous educator, president of a well-known Christian university, even went so far as to appear before his own student body and faculty and make a confession of his misdeeds. But his confession was unsatisfactory. His own daughter, either sincerely or under irresistible pressure from without, denounced him formally before the student body, as indicated above. As a result he was deposed from his presidency and placed under arrest. What will be his final fate is not yet clear.

When the churches have accepted the control of government, have carried out the proper confessions, denunciations, etc., they are permitted to carry on. Missionaries have withdrawn voluntarily or been expelled. They have gone reluctantly, but still they have gone, because their remaining put in jeopardy the liberty or, in some cases, the lives of national pastors and other workers, and even members of the church. They do not dare correspond with them, lest this be held against the Chinese Christians. Many of the latter, before the missionaries left, besought them not to believe the things

they would hear as coming from Christians concerning the guilt of missionaries. Keep us in your prayer and interest, they said in effect, and try to understand the conditions under which we are trying to carry on. The day will come when our fellowship can be resumed under happier conditions. No one knows how many Protestant Chinese ministers are in prison or have suffered a worse fate, but there are stories of martyrdom for fidelity to their Christian faith. Some missionaries have been imprisoned. One had been in fifteen months when I met his wife in a border city. She could get no word from him nor communicate with him. No one knew if or when he would be released. He was freed at last after twenty-three and a half months, having undergone during that period the "brain-washing" treatment.

Complete subjection to the control of the Communist government is the price of the Protestant Christians' survival, and apparently they have, to a considerable degree, accepted the price, and so continue to function. But less and less freedom is accorded them, and daily the growing intolerance of government is revealed.

The Protestant Christian Church is passing through difficult days. Until quite recently the bulletin of the National Christian Council was published and allowed to circulate outside China. Now it may not be sent abroad, so a chief source of information as to the state of the Church has been cut off.

Roman Catholic Christianity has not fared so well at the hands of the government. It, too, could quite heartily agree to two of the elements of the Three-Self Movement: to assume self-support and self-propagation. A very considerable progress had been made toward elevating native Chinese to the highest posts of influence in the Church. Altogether almost one-fourth of the bishops and archbishops were Chinese. Clearly, Chinese Catholicism was moving rapidly in the direction of self-government, or at least government in all local matters, by Chinese nationals. But accept absolute self-rule the Catholics could not, for that would be to do violence to a cardinal belief of Roman Catholicism, namely, that final control of the Church in all moral and spiritual matters is vested in the Pope. He is not alone the supreme head of the Church but the very voice of God Himself when speaking ex cathedra on these matters. To cut

themselves off from Rome would mean to sacrifice their direct relationship to God, whose vicegerent the Pope is. The Church would in such a case be only the Chinese Church, not the Catholic Church.

This attitude was of course unacceptable to the Communist government. The connection with the Pope meant an imperialistic connection, and imperialism, whether the American or the Vatican type, could not be tolerated. Indeed, repeatedly, informants of Belgian, French, German, Austrian, or Italian origin told me that Roman Catholic imperialism was confused directly with American imperialism, and Catholics were, therefore, although citizens of European countries, charged with being emissaries for the American imperialists. It may help American readers to appreciate this if I say that in China to call one an American imperialist is tantamount to calling an American a Russian Communist in the United States. The terms evoke almost exactly the same kind of emotional reaction.

Therefore strong pressure has been brought to bear upon the Church, either to submit to the reform or be closed. An attempt has been made to get the native clergy to submit, even if the foreign priests do object. One Catholic bishop was specifically offered the post of head of the Chinese Catholic Church, but refused it. Most of the churches have been closed. Only occasional ones in large cities have been allowed to continue functioning. Some of the medical and social and educational work is allowed to continue, for it is needed. Monks and nuns have been often put out of their own living quarters but compelled to go on with their social work. I heard of only five or six priests who had accepted the Chinese Church idea. A few students in theological schools had decided to co-operate with government, but the great majority have faithfully refused to accept the reform. And they have paid dearly for this refusal. I talked with three priests recently out of China when I was in Singapore. They had come from the northern and western provinces. Each testified that no more than one church in the larger cities was continuing its services. These were show places and designed to prove the claim of freedom for religion. One said that six priests of his area were known to have been put to death; another knew of five, and the other of three. How many in the whole of

China have paid such a price, no one can say certainly, but the number must be considerable.

The *China Missionary Bulletin*, published in Hong Kong at the Catholic Center, through which a continuous stream of priests pass as they are expelled, carries in every issue stories of what is going on in this respect. According to the June-July, 1952, issue, out of a total of over 140 bishops or archbishops in Communist China six were outside the country and not allowed to return, forty-two had been expelled or forced out of China, twenty were in prison, eight were under house arrest, eight had died, and but fifty-nine were still in residence. By December it was stated that five had died in prison, fifteen were in prison, three were under house arrest, and forty-three had been expelled.

Twice a week a train comes down from Shanghai, through Canton, to the border, about twenty-five miles out from Hong Kong, in the leased territory. Here the train stops. Everyone must pass through the outgoing police and customs offices before he is taken to the gate, released from his bonds, if he has, as is frequent, been brought as a prisoner to the port of exit, and allowed to walk across the bridge out to the British free soil of Hong Kong. First the Chinese and other orientals are processed. The white foreigners, long the favored in such cases, are now the last to pass through the gate to freedom.

It is a fascinating sight to stand on the British side of the bridge, where the Union Jack flies, and watch the outcoming refugees leave Red China. Some, of course, are coming out on business. They are citizens of a country recognized by Britain, so they have free access to the Hong Kong area. But others are really refugees, fleeing from Communist China to the freedom of the "free world." Sometimes people are dazed as they come across. A Catholic priest who meets every train that comes out, just to look after anyone who may have no one awaiting him, told us stories of some of his experiences. One, I recall, came across the bridge clearly in a daze. The padre met him on the free side, led him toward the Hong Kong customs house. The man was talking rather incoherently. "You're free, man," said the priest. "You're all right now." "No, no," cried the other, "I can't be." And all the way on the train he kept struggling to clear his

mind and to grasp the fact that he was free. He was one of the many whose stories thrill the listener as he hears them told in the safety of the Catholic Center, or elsewhere about the city. One man, said Father Poletti, was so weak that he was barely able to stagger across the bridge, when the shackles, which were loosed only as he was about to go out through the gate, fell from him. He had to be physically supported as he walked across.

In Formosa, Hong Kong, and Singapore, I heard tales of imprisonment, mistreatment, psychological torture from Belgian, French, Dutch, German, Austrian, and other European priests, some of whom had been under arrest less than three days before I saw and interviewed them. Some had been out longer, but none more than a few months. What stories of petty persecution, public trials, accusations of the most ridiculous sort! One French priest who was also a doctor and had had in the exercise of his profession to sign many death certificates was accused of wholesale murder of Chinese citizens. Nuns likewise fell under such absurd charges.

I remember particularly Father Drueto. He showed me pictures made before and after the eight months' prison ordeal through which he was made to pass. He was incarcerated in a small room about six by eight feet in size for all that time. There was almost always water on the floor. His food was never sufficient, consisting of a half-glassful of thin and unsavory rice gruel twice a day. Water was given him only at long intervals and then only a limited quantity, which had to suffice for washing as well as drinking purposes. He fell ill, had a long and bad case of dysentery. His only toilet facility was an open bucket emptied every other day. He had to live, eat, sleep in the room with it day after day. "How did you stand it, man?" I asked. "The stench must have been horrible."

"Oh you get used to it," he replied, laughing, "and you don't notice it much." He was always laughing as he told me his story. I have seldom seen a more radiant spirit. He got little, or very inadequate, medical attention. But he survived. He had lost fifty-six pounds before he got out, and he was but a smallish, slender man to begin with. His picture showed an unkempt black beard which somewhat concealed the gauntness of his face, but the deep-set eyes

looked out of cavernous eye sockets, a clear index of the state to which he had been reduced.

With him was an Austrian archbishop who had been months in prison. He was just as jolly and high spirited as the other. "I suppose," said I, "that being an archbishop, you were treated with greater consideration than the ordinary priests." He broke into hearty peals of laughter. "Ho! ho! ho!" he laughed. "The higher up you are in authority the worse they treat you." It all seemed a great joke. What can be done with spirits like these? Then there was the case of a young monsignor, hardly as old as my own youngest son, who was still convalescing from the long period of imprisonment he had undergone. I talked with him in Hong Kong. His case physically was no worse than that of the others, but the psychological torture to which he had been subjected might well have unnerved the strongest mind. The amazing thing is that men can undergo such experiences and preserve the deeply Christian spirit these men exhibited.

I had the distinct feeling as I talked with person after person, Protestant and Catholic, priest and lay worker, that I was living once again in the first century of the Christian Church. Christian heroism is no monopoly of the early Church, or the medieval Church. It is being practiced today. Right now men and women are suffering, even to martyrdom, for the faith they cherish, in more than one area of the world—nowhere more than in China. Faced with a spirit such as these people exhibit, it is not hard to believe that Communism must ultimately lose in its struggle for the control of men's minds and spirits.

Dark indeed are the days through which Chinese Christians are passing and they may yet be darker. But anyone who cherishes a faith in the moral order of the universe, which lies at the heart of Christianity, can hardly believe that the materialistic philosophy of Communism and its brutal and inhuman treatment of those whom Christians proclaim to be the children of God, not mere automatons, lacking individual dignity and worth, will finally triumph in China or anywhere else. In it lie the seeds of its own destruction and that destruction may not delay long in coming.

Until it does come Christians, perhaps not all, of course, but many, will go on suffering and witnessing for their faith at whatever personal cost. One cannot fail to observe that the cross is an integral part of the Christian faith in China as it faces the vigorous, dynamic faith of Communism.

# III

# War, Communism and Buddhism in Southeastern Asia

I HAVE already written of the effect of war and Communism on the Buddhism in Japan and China. We now follow it to southeastern Asia, and pause first to look at it in French Indo-China. Buddhism came thither chiefly from China and so is predominantly Mahayana in character. Actually, here, as elsewhere in this part of the world, there is little that can be regarded as pure Buddhism. It is largely a mixture of one or the other of the Chinese Buddhist sects with local native religions. In the Buddhist temple in Cholon, the Chinese section of Saigon, I found besides the Buddha image, a goddess of the sea which was much worshiped, also a "giving-baby goddess" to which suppliant mothers appealed in large numbers. Among the Chinese ancestor worship is also practiced, probably more faithfully than it is now observed in China proper.

Buddhism in Indo-China seemed to me to have little vitality. At least 50 percent of the Buddhists of the country, I was told, are not organized at all and have nothing to do with the temple. There is a fairly active Buddhist Association in the north, but in the south it has little strength. Only a very small percentage of the Buddhists belong to it. The secretary of the Southern Association told me that while small in numbers, it has recently become quite active, in social work, the maintenance of schools, and various charities, and particularly in helping those who come out of Communist territory and have nowhere to go. Here, then, was one effect of Communism on religion. Although the secretary did not agree that it was so, I more than half suspect that the impulse to do social work was from Communism. Here, also, religious leaders are seeing that something will have to be done to meet the needs which drive people into Communism, or they will become Com-

munists. In a sense it is a defense reaction, though not always consciously so, I am sure. Fortunately there is a basis in Buddhism for social concern, but it has not always been apparent. A crisis situation has once again made some leaders conscious of it. And that is all to the good.

Two new religions have arisen in recent years, both having elements of Buddhism in them, which are deeply involved in the political struggle going on in Indo-China. They are Hoa-Hao and Caodai. Hoa-Hao is definitely Buddhist in background. The prophet who founded it was born, he taught, as the reincarnation of a celebrated healer who lived a century earlier. He announced that he had received a divine message to restore Buddhism, and gave forth prophecies, verbally and in writing. His reform of Buddhism was centered about four demands. They were to remember: (1) always the ancestors, (2) the fatherland, (3) the Buddha, his law and community, and (4) always their compatriots and the whole human race. He also revealed three sources of evil and there were ten things of the body from which they were to abstain. Thus was elaborated a fairly simple cult which seemed to meet the needs of the people and the movement grew rapidly. By 1940 it had over sixty thousand followers.

When the Japanese came in 1941 they found it to their political advantage to use these people, and they became anti-French. Later they supported the Viet Minh group against the French. The Viet Minh people sought to use them, but the founder distrusted Communism. In 1947 he was assassinated and his followers turned to the Vietnamese loyalists who were fighting against the Viet Minh forces. The movement has become less and less religious and more political in its outlook. It was said to number nearly a million members in 1951. A number of informants no longer regard it as a religion at all. It is an illustration of one of the effects war has upon religion. I sought opportunity to interview the head of the movement, a military man, but was discouraged from trying to do so. Government people particularly were reluctant to try to arrange a meeting. Some of them simply said categorically that it was no longer a religion, and that hence, if my interest was in the investigation of religion, I would be wasting my time. The fact

is that there was a great deal of uncertainty as to just where the leader stood. He had, I was told, changed sides twice, and no one felt too sure of what his real sentiments were. The movement seemed to have an army of its own. But then so did a Roman Catholic bishop in the northern part of Indo-China, and a very effective one.

I also heard of the Caodai army. Indeed, I saw some of its soldiers. But the present head of Caodai was quite unhappy about it. The movement was, he told me, essentially pacifist in its outlook. But under the extremely unsettled conditions its members had felt obliged to defend themselves from the terrorists. Their headquarters is at a distance of some ninety kilometers from Saigon. I made a trip out there in a car, accompanied by a uniformed officer of their so-called army, and had a long interview with the present head of the faith. It was a most interesting trip. Every quarter of a mile along the road there was a fort, with armed soldiers always on the alert to protect the road from sudden attacks by the Viet Minh forces. These held a great hill only a few miles from the Caodai headquarters, and from it pretty well controlled the surrounding area. No one can travel on the road after seven o'clock, when road blocks are put up at all the bridges in order to keep these from being blown up.

Caodai is a syncretic faith honoring Jesus, Confucius, Lao-tzu, Buddha, and other great prophets. Curiously enough, Victor Hugo, Sun Yat-sen, and an ancient Vietnamese were the guides through whom the founder received his knowledge. Members of the faith belong to the White Lodge, which those who are familiar with theosophy, or the I Am movement, will recall plays an important role in these movements. War had had a disrupting effect upon the community, but it was still increasing in strength. It is largely rural in character but has a sense of universal mission. It has a building already under way to house the administration of its foreign missionary program, and actually has a resident missionary in San Francisco, California.

The movement is quite active in social work, maintaining schools, orphanages, hospitals, etc. It is definitely opposed to Communism, but attempts to give its followers security, both spiritual and eco-

nomic. It is one of the more active organizations in French Indo-China that is concerned about the economic and social welfare of the common people. It is strictly vegetarian and believes in taking no life—that is, its leaders do, but its members as citizens do enter the army. When the Japanese occupied the country the leaders of Caodai were banished to Madagascar, and it was during this period that the leaderless people were formed into an army. The present head deplores the fact that they are involved in a military struggle though he does not rule out defensive war. They long for the return of peace when they may once again give themselves up wholeheartedly to the extension of their faith. From references I had heard to the so-called pope of the movement, I had formed the impression of something like a charlatan engaged in exploiting the people. I was quite surprised to learn, over various cups of delicious tea and cakes, that he was a high-minded, intelligent man, with apparently a deep and, I thought, sincere interest in spiritual matters, and one with a good deal of common sense. Caodai is certainly performing a constructive task in its social ministry, whatever may be said concerning the validity of the doctrines which it proclaims. There was a vitality and a down-to-earth practical side to it that could teach Buddhist leaders something. I would think it much more likely to keep its followers from going Communist than Buddhism, at least as it is in French Indo-China today.

I kept meeting Buddhism in its Mahayana form as I went on to Singapore and to Indonesia. There is a large Chinese population in all these southeastern Asiatic countries, and wherever the Chinese go they carry something of the Buddhism which developed in China.

But in Siam or Thailand, Burma, and Ceylon one finds himself in a different atmosphere. These are the lands of the Hinayana form of Buddhism. For those who are not familiar with the different schools it may be desirable to state briefly some of the differences. In general, it may be said that the Hinayana represents much more nearly the original type of Buddhism as taught and practiced by Gautama, the founder. Theoretically, there is no one to help one on the way to salvation as he explained it. It is to be

won by stern self-effort, and ordinarily is not to be won until one becomes a monk and gives himself up wholly to its attainment. Belief in reincarnation makes it quite possible for one to hope that in another life there will be opportunity to do what this present existence makes difficult or impossible. Attainment is only delayed, and time is long. In Southern Buddhism or Hinayana, it is the one Gautama Buddha who is chiefly thought of, not as a savior in any sense, but as the one who through enlightenment discovered the way, the four noble truths, the eightfold path, and founded the *Sangha*, or order. He is venerated, and worshipers contemplating his serene features find themselves helped. At least this is the theory. One suspects that at the mass level Buddha is looked upon much as are the gods of other religions. Northern or Mahayana Buddhism has not one Buddha but many, and in the more popular sects there is a confident belief that the particular Buddha worshiped not only can but does help one on his way. There is much less belief in Karma and reincarnation, and a much more highly developed system of worship. Also there is much more of the devotional character connected with at least the popular sects. This is doubtless an oversimplification of the case, but it may aid in an understanding of the way in which Hinayana, to which we now turn, actually functions.

### Thailand

It seemed apparent that the war had not greatly affected Buddhism in Thailand. A number of people remarked that the thing which had affected it most was the shift from the old absolute monarchy to a more democratic constitutional government. Certainly the war did little physical damage. I learned of only one temple of importance that was destroyed. During the Japanese occupation there was some attempt to require that Buddhists pray facing the sun, as the symbol for Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess of Japan, but it was not taken very seriously. Nor did the fact that Japanese Buddhism was Mahayana seem to have any effect on the people. If Japanese Buddhists were sent to work among the people it made little impression.

As to Buddhism's attitude toward war, it seems to have been gen-

erally held that for the laymen it presents no problem of a moral nature. Man is a Buddhist, but he is also a citizen, and a citizen's duty, it is assumed generally, is to fight if his country requires it. I pressed this question on several occasions. Did Buddhism have no moral leadership in the matter? Must the State be given the right of decision on moral questions? Was it ever licit for a priest to bear arms or kill? "Never," was the categorical reply. In Japan priests had done so, it was said, but never here. Did Buddha justify a layman in killing? Laymen generally rather thought so. Not so, said a very intelligent abbot of a large temple. It would bring bad Karma, said he. Whether all priests would so declare I do not know, but at least this man confirmed my own impression gained from reading Buddha's sayings. There is, therefore, a very definite pacifist basis here. But how are laymen to be made conscious of the fact that Buddha so taught? There is little indication that such teaching is being given, if one may judge from what he hears among laymen, but perhaps the same could be said also of the Christian world. Most laymen regard war as necessary so long as men are evil, and think that pacifism will work only when all men are good. Which seems to postpone it indefinitely! Little thought had been given to the subject by any layman with whom I talked. Prince Dhani seemed to wish it were practical. When asked what really is practical, he wasn't quite sure. He had a very great admiration for Gandhi. Not having suffered as Japan did from war, and not being in quite so dangerous a position as Japan, the Thai people are not so keenly oriented in the direction of peace. At least, it is not an obsession with them, as it was in Japan. I had expected a rather more hearty acceptance of the proposal for an interreligion peace congress than I got at the Buddhist Association meeting I attended. The members finally expressed informal agreement to participate if one were called, but obviously they would not take the lead in any such movement.

I heard conflicting views expressed as to whether there was anything like a Buddhist revival in Thailand. One man declared categorically that there was a growing decadence. Most thought that there was at least a mild revival. Little concrete evidence was produced until my last important interview, with the editor of one

of the influential Thai dailies. Up until then the statements had been to the effect that more young men were entering the monasteries than before, but no figures were produced, or perhaps even available. Some said the aggregate number was larger, but proportionately to the population there were fewer. Other evidences were the growth of the Buddhist Association, which, originally confined to the capital, now has branches in other parts of the country. It conducts lectures and discussion groups and publishes pamphlets and periodicals from time to time. There had been a well-attended lecture in the headquarters just before I met with a group there. Some schools for the teaching of Buddhism were being formed. One headmaster told of the deliberate inclusion of an hour a week in Buddhist studies in his school, which was a technical one. Buddhism is being rather generally taught in the government schools. The attendance at temples was reported as greater than before, but no statistics were available. It might be so at some particular temples. No concrete evidence that this was true generally was forthcoming.

The most specific evidences came from the editor alluded to above. He based his assertion that there was a genuine renaissance of interest in Buddhism on the fact that there has been a great increase in the publication and circulation of books and literature. It has risen by 300 per cent within the last ten years, he declared, and includes publications of all sorts, from books of simple rules of the faith to those dealing with its deeper philosophic aspects. He cited one book, a beginner's manual for novices, but also containing a good deal of material of a general nature. Five years ago it was selling around five thousand copies a year, mostly to young men entering the monasteries for their traditional three months' stay. This year fifty thousand copies were sold. Since this is far in excess of the number of boys entering the monasteries it seems clear that laymen must be buying it in considerable numbers. The publishing house, a nonprofit organization issuing this and other Buddhist literature, has now become the biggest publishing business in the whole country. Also, a Buddhist organization in South Thailand, which published certain books and pamphlets a few years ago in small editions, is now being called upon to reprint these editions.

Here indeed was clear evidence of an upward swing in interest in Buddhism.

It was not wholly clear just what this means. It could mean simply that more people are becoming thoughtful about religion and want material to read about it. Again and again it was remarked that one definite difference between the present generation and those who preceded it is that the former simply took for granted what was told them. The present generation is more disposed to question and to think things through for themselves. What the effect of the study period is, it is not so easy to say. I asked some young people whether those who go into the monasteries and get instruction are thereby made more religious. Some answered that on the contrary they were less religious. Somewhat puzzled by the reply, I spoke about it to an intelligent abbot of one of the large temples of Bangkok. His explanation was that the answer was probably correct in this sense, that after getting instruction in Buddhism, which they had known only by seeing it as practiced in the temples, where it is surrounded with a good deal that is not strictly Buddhistic but a survival of folk religions, they became more intellectual in their attitudes toward it, and perhaps less attracted by the cult side of it. That could very well be the case.

Increased use of the radio for Buddhist sermons or lectures, as well as more frequent sermons in the temples, was also cited as evidence of a greater activity in Buddhism. All this may have little to do with war, but I suspect that indirectly it may be partially a result of the impact of Communism. I found no one who considered it directly so.

As to Communism, I found a greater awareness among Thai Buddhists than in Japan, which is closer to it. To be sure, Burma on one side and Indo-China on the other side are hotbeds of Communist intrigue and infiltration, while to the south in Malaya there are also terrorists at work, not wholly Communist, of course, but serving very well the purposes of Communism. There are some Communists in Thailand. I got the impression that they are not numerous. I heard various persons say that a major source of Communist influence is to be found in the schools, through Chinese teachers. There are Communists in the Chinese community. I

inquired among a group of university students with whom I talked if there were any Communists among their fellow students. No one said a word. I repeated the question. No answer. Then I pointed directly at one student and said, "Do you know any student who is a Communist?" "Yes," he answered. Pointing to another I repeated my question. He also admitted that he did, and so on around the group. But some of them, of course, knew the same persons. They were agreed that the number was not large, and none could openly profess Communism without inviting trouble. Thus the student group, usually one of the places in which Communism acquires a following, is to some extent already infiltrated, though not to an alarming degree as yet.

There is also a group of intellectuals who, if not Communists, are fellow travelers and carry on some propaganda. They are said to be, perhaps, not so much real Communists as persons who are dissatisfied with present political conditions. They have not been successful in making for themselves the place to which they feel their education and training entitles them. They are at least a sufficiently dissatisfied group so that Communists are able to use them for their own purposes. So far as I could discover there is no considerable organized labor group; whatever there is has not been seriously infiltrated as yet by Communism.

But Communistic propaganda is being carried on. Certain periodicals are believed to receive subsidies which enable them to continue to function when their small circulation would seem to make their continued publication unprofitable. One of the fruitful sources of dissatisfaction with the present government was the great amount of corruption. This was so widespread that it was not at all unlikely that something drastic might be done. I heard dire predictions of a *coup d'état* by the end of the month. While the dissatisfied are not necessarily actually Communist in sympathies, dissatisfaction creates a fertile field for the kind of propaganda which Communists have learned so well how to use. Any confusion or unrest, for whatever cause, plays into their hands.

Generally it is urged that, if Communism comes to Thailand, it will be from without rather than from within. Indeed there was not a little complacency manifested with reference to internal con-

ditions. The land problem does not exist as in other countries, it is said, for already the great majority of farmers own the land they work. Thus a major cause of disaffection found in China, and until recently in Indonesia, is almost absent there. There is little industrialism, so there are few union laborers, and these are relatively well paid, by oriental standards. Few people in Thailand go hungry. There seems always to be plenty of food. But I traveled about the city and saw the congestion, thousands of people being forced to live in the ubiquitous houseboats, which jam the city's canals. These canals serve as latrine, washtub, and bathub and even provide water sometimes for cooking and drinking. Bad enough when, at high tide, they are full from bank to bank, at low tide ill-smelling, muddy bottoms are left exposed. All these things made me, a stranger, wonder if such complacency were justified. But relatively, I suppose these people were more favorably situated than most orientals of the lower economic classes. The people are not really hungry, and that is something.

But some Buddhists were concerned about Communism, for Communism had sometimes attacked Buddhism. On the whole, a good deal of propaganda designed to undermine the national faith had appeared in recent months. There had been two different approaches, both of which can be paralleled in other countries where Communism is at work. There was first of all the frontal attack, primarily at the point of Nirvana which is attainable, according to Buddhist teaching, through study and meditation. But this requires withdrawal from the world. It is impossible for the man who has to work to earn a living for his family. It thus makes salvation possible only for the idle rich who exploit the people, say the Communists, or for those who live parasitically in monasteries at the expense of those who toil, unproductive members of society, who act as a drag upon the economy of the people. Published statistics for 1950 reveal that there were over 750,000 monks and more than 70,000 novices in Thailand, which has a population of only eighteen million, or one for only a little over each two hundred people. One who does not know that a large number of these are young men who only spend a matter of three months in the monasteries, and during that time are provided support largely by their own families,

may think the monastery system a greater burden than it really is. Also not a few of the priests do perform a very real service in the educational life of the country. So it is not as unproductive as it superficially may appear to be. Yet some may well be influenced by this complaint.

Generally, however, the frontal attack seems not to be very effective. The high regard for the priests held by most people makes them resistant to any kind of propaganda that tends to depreciate the priests. Furthermore, the belief that the offering to the priests confers merit upon him who makes it lends an importance to the giving of the small offerings that are made. After all, to one who believes devoutly in the necessity of acquiring merit, in order to progress in the next birth toward the final goal of release, the priest serves a very useful function. What other means of building good Karma is so easily available? Until the whole belief in Karma itself is destroyed, the Buddhist is likely not to fall too easy a victim to the Communist propaganda. For the doctrine of Karma disposes the average Thai Buddhist to accept whatever his lot may be as the just retribution for what he has done or left undone in his past existences.

The effectiveness of this direct attack has not been great. It has rather tended to provoke a vigorous reaction. Periodicals which have supported this kind of attack have paid for it in loss of circulation. One particular weekly paper was reported to be currently experiencing this, according to a well-informed publisher. Once a leading paper, it has fallen recently to fifth or sixth in order of importance.

The more indirect approach was along the line of the similarities between Communism and Buddhism. Buddhism, at the intellectual level at least, and this appeal was mainly for intellectuals, does not believe in a personal god, or any dependence for salvation upon the supernatural. Man depends upon his own intelligence and effort. By his scientific understanding and control of the physical forces of this world and the manipulation of the social forces he must work out his own salvation. The intellectual Buddhist does not pray. He is above the superstitious folk beliefs with which religion is surrounded. Buddhism, at the priest level, is, indeed, a form of Com-

munism, a society in which distinctions of class are not permitted. And so on. There are not a few superficial likenesses between the two systems. But this, while probably having some "softening up" effect upon the people, has not seemed to be very effective. It too has brought about a reaction. It has caused thoughtful Buddhists to consider the matter and to point out the fact that there are fundamental differences which are much deeper than the similarities.

When I asked one after another of my informants, ranging all the way from high school students to high-ranking princes, from run-of-the-mine laymen to the directors of the National Buddhist Association and some of the most influential abbots, whether one could be at the same time a Buddhist and a Communist, they were unanimous in insisting that such a thing is impossible. Some were careful to assert that one might be a Socialist and a Buddhist. Indeed, not a few people were both; but to be a Communist and a *good* Buddhist at one time was an impossibility. They readily admitted that all Buddhists were not good Buddhists. Many are only nominally so, and for these some reconciliation between the two might take place.

When I asked, further, whether Buddhists, as Buddhists, were doing anything to oppose the spread of Communism, the answer was not so clear. Usually it was pointed out to me that priests were rigidly excluded from any participation in active propaganda against it, because that meant to enter the political arena, which for priests is strictly forbidden.

I discovered, however, that that was not strictly true. One afternoon I interviewed an abbot of one of the big temples of Bangkok. He was, he said, a member of a committee made up of Buddhist priests, laymen, and government representatives set up to promote a number of activities of interest and concern to Buddhism and the nation. It is organized into five subcommittees, each with a specific responsibility. These are: (1) A committee on the teaching of the Dhamma. Of this my informant was the head. It sought to perform its task through the preaching of sermons, the use of the radio, publication of pamphlets, etc. There are several weekly broadcasts over the three Bangkok stations, all designed to call attention to and teach the central content and meaning of the Dhamma, or

the teaching of Buddhism. (2) A committee on general Thai culture, its history, art, etc. (3) A committee on education of government officials, with a view to elimination of corruption from their practices. (4) A committee on the health and well-being of the people, which among other things concerns itself with the people's living. (5) An anti-Communist committee whose responsibility it is to fight against the infiltration of Communism into the country.

When I inquired what methods were used in the fight against Communist propaganda, he replied that a chief means was the circulation of literature opposing it, or putting forth positive values which would serve as a counteractive to Communist propaganda. "Have you at hand any of your literature?" I said. He called to a young novice who had sat listening quietly as we talked, and he handed me five pamphlets which the committee itself had produced, and three more which had been produced by others but which they were active in distributing.

"How," I asked, "are these distributed?" "Through the temples," he replied. "But the priests are not supposed to engage in any political activity," I thought, aloud. "Nevertheless, they distribute them, and where the people cannot read, they read the material aloud to them," he said. How many do this I have no way of knowing, but the pamphlets are published in large editions. Thus it appears that Buddhism as Buddhism is not wholly inactive in the fight against Communism.

The individual who has written most about Communism and Buddhism in Thailand is a physician, a lay Buddhist who has a background of European training. He came rather late to active participation in Buddhism, having been the son of a diplomat and lived abroad during his childhood and youth. Not all he has written has yet been published, but I was permitted to read in manuscript form a number of articles. One of them has been printed by the United States Information Service and furnished to the abovementioned committee for wide distribution. Since his writings represent perhaps the best Thai thought on the matter, it will be of interest to see what he says about it.

In *The Lure of Communism* he asserts that, while Communism is absolutely incompatible with any of the great religions, it seems to

exercise a lure upon many peoples who are followers of these religions. He attempts to analyze this lure. He defines Communism as a concentrated physical, though brutal, effort, a drastic short cut for undeveloped and backward people to attain, in the shortest time possible, the same measure of wealth achieved by others after many centuries of hard work and spiritual effort. Its avowed aim, he says, is the achievement of a classless society through revolution of the proletariat all over the world. It is a "poison which many people are willing to take in the false hope that it will cure all their sufferings." But, he continues, "This deadly poison, in the hands of a few powerful dictators, has become the instrument of vast imperialistic expansion and of enslavement of entire peoples, solely for the benefit and aggrandizement of its inventors and instigators."

His analysis of its lure is as follows:

It appeals first of all to the lowest instincts of man, hatred, greed, jealousy, telling the poor and underprivileged and ignorant that they have the "right to claim an equal share in the unequal earnings" of those who are more fortunately situated. "Let's put in a penny and fork out the shillings of others."

It "openly attacks and suppresses morality and encourages immorality and animalism by denying that there is any life hereafter, and that there will be any consequences of good and evil acts after death." It does not take into account the spiritual needs of mankind to attain lasting peace and happiness.

It aims at "leveling down" all those who are "socially or economically or intellectually superior to themselves," but refuses to level up those who live below their standard of living. "They show no respect whatever to the masses but hold them in ruthless servitude and by the help of this mass-slave labor build up the material well being of the Communist State."

Communism "relieves the individual of all responsibility to himself and to his kindred. . . . All he has to do is to obey orders from above, blindly and without questioning."

It gives comfort to the weak not to have to be responsible for their deeds, as they are taught there is no life after death, nor any such thing as Karma. "But can anyone find peace or security under such slavery, in a police state where no one can trust anyone, not

even his own kindred, for fear he might be a spy of the State?" he asks.

He is less successful in analyzing the lure for the more fortunate. He thinks that the rich who follow Communism may have gotten their wealth in such ways as to have earned the ill will of society and they are resentful of this. And their grudge against society is exploited by the Communist, who offers them posts of leadership and thus the opportunity to strike back at the society that scorns them. In the end, however, they too will be liquidated, or have their wealth taken away.

For intellectuals, he suggests that many are frustrated by their inability to earn a living commensurate with their ability and training, and Communism offers them quick advancement. "They want short cuts to power and fame." ("To God the people creep; to the devil they leap.")

Summing up, he says: "Communism is only capable of appealing to the basic instincts and sentiments of man. It encourages immorality and animalism. It levels down, not up. It incites hatred, greed and jealousy, and aims at a revolutionary overthrow of all the moral values of mankind and of justice. It is indeed a destructive force."

In contrast to this he presents Buddha, who renounced kingship, etc., to become a humble monk. By his sacrifice and pure life, and through insight, he attained Supreme Wisdom and freedom from all sufferings, eternal peace and happiness, and for forty-five years taught his doctrine, "Seeking to lift up men from ignorance and evil to goodness and enlightenment towards a freer life on earth, full of compassion to all sentient beings, full of happiness and lasting peace."

In another place he sums up the Buddha's World Order as "an ideal human relationship, where each member of the Society has his particular duties and responsibilities, where all classes are harmoniously and happily inter-related by a fair and just give-and-take on all sides. It is a true Democratic Social Order, practical and applicable to all peoples, regardless of creed, race and nationality, and suitable at all times." But the Buddha laid down one fundamental condition that must be fulfilled, namely, that one must acquire Knowledge and Wisdom, and establish first of all peace and happi-

ness in his own heart, before he can bring them to his fellow creatures.

In other words, it is absolutely necessary that we become master of our own selves and be democratic right down to the bottom of our hearts, before we can hope to transform the world into a democracy.

## Burma

Burma presents a different picture from Thailand, although both are Theravadin Buddhist to the extent of 90 per cent or more of the population. Though nurtured in the same faith, and each claiming to represent pure Hinayana Buddhism, they are, while fundamentally alike in their basic thought, quite different in many respects, even religiously. No one could confuse a Thai temple with a Burmese one, architecturally. Each has art forms of its own. Each has the conical shaped pagoda, though Thailand has also the cylindrical type. But Thailand has also ornate temples, lavishly decorated in gold and multi-colored mosaic work, having roofs with variegated ceramic tiles, graceful upturned rooftrees and corners, and many gables rising one above the other. Inside there are rich mural paintings, peculiar Thai Buddhas with royal parasols, elaborate flower decorations on the altars, rich-patterned tiled floors. None of these things does one find in Burma. There the massive gold-encrusted Shwe Dagon pagoda, lifting its graceful jeweled umbrella top hundreds of feet above the surrounding temples and trees, furnishes the model for numerous others less pretentious but still of considerable size. In Burma the temple is surrounded usually by clusters of smaller pagodas, a veritable forest at Shwe Dagon, and numerous shrines and chapels filled with Buddha images of brass or marble, decorated in gold, all of a form quite different from the Thai. Yellow- or saffron-robed priests are to be seen in Thailand, especially in the early morning, with their begging bowls in almost any street. In Burma they can be seen at any hour of the day, and their robes vary considerably in color, from almost brown to light yellow. In Burma also they are often seen around picture shows, or other places of entertainment, even at night, a thing never seen in Thailand.

In both countries it is traditional that all young men spend a period of some three months in a monastery. In Thailand a boy enters when he attains his maturity, though there are younger ones also. In Burma one may enter at any age; a great many do so as mere children. Also one may enter for a week, or a month, or for life, and may return again and again to the robe. It is quite customary for men to assume the robe for the period which corresponds to our Lent. They need not, however, enter a monastery, but only keep the monastic rule, while carrying on their regular work. One gets the impression that discipline is stricter in Thailand, and that the period is used to better educational advantage there.

Politically their backgrounds are very different. Thailand has never been a subject or colonial country. The people have a long record of self-rule, under an unlimited monarchy until in quite recent times, but now under a constitutional monarchy. Though comparatively democratic, they love and revere their king and react bitterly against anything that threatens the royal house. Some expressed themselves as believing that Thailand would never go Communist, because that would mean to abandon their king, and the people would steadfastly refuse to do that. Burma, on the other hand, has had a long history of subjection to foreign rule. Brought under British control and exploited largely by British capital, the Burmese were already aspiring to independence when World War II came and they fell under Japanese sway for a period. Armed by the British to fight against the Japanese, when the latter were defeated and obliged to leave, the Burmese were in a position of strength to demand of Britain their freedom. The British, seeing the handwriting on the wall, acquiesced. Thus without any loss of life independence was won, and Burma began the long, hard task of assuming self-government. She has written quite a democratic Constitution and is seeking to implement the enlightened democratic and social program envisioned by her leaders. In a measure she is succeeding.

But she has serious internal troubles. Though the government is avowedly Socialist, and espouses the Marxist philosophy, it is beset by armed Communists who using the arms that had been given them with which to drive out the Japanese, now terrorize the coun-

tryside as so-called Communist groups in Indo-China and Indonesia are doing. Though government is gradually gaining ground against them, it is still unsafe to travel outside the cities in a considerable part of Burma. The situation is further complicated by the revolt of the Karens, who, living as a minority in Burma proper, and nowhere, save in a small area, sufficiently concentrated to form the majority, seek statehood within the Union of Burma on much the same basis as the Kachins, the Shans, and other ethnic groups. The Karens, often accused of being Communists, are in no sense followers of Russia or Communist China. Indeed, they have often fought against the Communist forces. But, under the circumstances, they have sometimes made common cause with the Communists simply because they were fighting the same enemy. There are undoubtedly some Communists among the Karens, but on the whole they have no sympathy with Communism and its aims, for the greater percentage of them are either Buddhist or Christian.

During 1952 the Information Department of the Union of Burma was still circulating a booklet, *The Burmese Revolution,* containing a speech delivered late in December, 1951, by U Ba Swe, secretary-general of the Burma Socialist party and president of the Burma Trades Union Congress. In it he sets forth clearly the ideology underlying the revolution. "Let me be plain," he says. "Marxism is the guide to acting in our revolutionary movement, in our establishment of a socialist Burmese State for workers and peasants. Our revolution can only be achieved with Marxism as a guiding principle. Only Marxism can pave the way for the attainment of the goal to which we look forward." Our revolution is impossible without Marxism as a guide. We must understand this once and for all.

But Marxism has been badly misunderstood, he declares, and there has been much misrepresentation of the facts concerning the acceptance of Marxist ideology as a guide to action. He does not mean that in accepting it as the guiding ideology for the revolution Burma should slavishly follow the example either of Russia or of China. In every case the environment in which the revolution is to occur must be taken into account. What Stalin and Lenin accomplished for Russia was indeed an achievement from the standpoint of the economic and social conditions there. But it would not

be appropriate for Burma. Nor would the revolutionary methods of Mao Tse-tung in China be suitable for Burma. Not that he would "throw Russian or Chinese or other methods to the winds. No doubt they are worth studying." And doubtless lessons should be learned from them, but "only a revolutionary movement which is entirely Burmese, conforming to Burmese methods and principles can achieve any measure of success."

Admitting a Marxist ideology, is the revolution therefore to be called Communist? "Not at all," he declares, "for there is a vast difference between becoming Marxist and becoming a Communist. Most people confuse the two, but this is a mistake." The acceptance of Marxism does not necessarily make one a Communist. The so-called Communists believe that to become a Communist one must unequivocally accept Soviet leadership. This he categorically denies.

Then, recognizing that Burma is strongly Buddhist, and that many Buddhists affirm that it is impossible to be at the same time a Buddhist and a Communist, he attempts to square the Marxism he espouses with Buddhist philosophy. Communism may be anti-religious, but Marxism is not. To be sure, it rejects the theistic theory of creation, just as Buddhism itself does. But "Marxist theory is not antagonistic to Buddhist philosophy. The two are, frankly speaking, not merely similar. In fact they are the same in concept," he declares. "If the two are to be distinguished at all, then Marxism occupies the lower and Buddhism the higher plane. For Marxism deals with mundane affairs and seeks to satisfy material needs in life. Buddhist philosophy, however, deals with the solution of spiritual matters with a view to seek spiritual satisfaction in life and liberation from this mundane world."

In himself he sees the two joined in one person. "I declare that I have implicit faith in Marxism, but at the same time I boldly assert that I am a true Buddhist. In the beginning I was only a Buddhist by tradition. The more I study Marxism, however, the more I feel convinced in Buddhism. Thus I have become a true disciple of the Lord Buddha by conviction and my faith in Buddhism has grown all the more. I now believe that for any man who has deeply studied Buddhism and correctly perceived its tenets there should be no obstacles to become a Marxist."

Marxism is necessary for the satisfaction of material needs, and he boldly outlines his party's program under five fundamentals, the people's democracy, economy, education, health, and social security. But there are still spiritual needs to be satisfied. For these Marxism does not have the answer, nor can science fully satisfy them. "Only Buddhist philosophy can provide an answer for spiritual liberation. Only where there is a satisfaction of spiritual needs can solace in life be found, and only then can liberation from this mundane world be found."

Here is joined an issue of the greatest importance. Are Buddhism and Communism compatible? Is there an effective difference between Marxism and Communism? What methods would Marxism use to achieve its ends? Would they differ from those of Communism? A hint of this is found further on in the same speech. U Ba Swe hopes that the revolution may proceed by democratic rather than dictatorial methods. But if it cannot be thus won, what then? "We Socialists and Marxists are not bloodthirsty. We are fighting for world peace. If a problem can be solved by peaceful negotiation we shall certainly solve it in a peaceful way. But if it can be solved only by force, we do not have any qualms about using it." But this could hardly be squared with Lord Buddha's teaching. What then of his claim?

Do Buddhists generally accept U Ba Swe's contention? I inquired diligently among both laymen and priests, some of them of highest rank in either the government or religious life of Burma. I found none of them agreed with him. One distinguished priest did refuse to condemn Marxist philosophy wholly, saying that there might be some value in it. But most were quite definite in declaring that the two were incompatible, and most of them refused to distinguish between Marxism and Communism. One pamphlet is being circulated under the title *Marxism and Buddhism* in which it is shown quite clearly that simply on the philosophical basis alone the two are in violent contradiction.

Francis Story, an English Buddhist, founder of the Burma Buddhist World Mission and very highly respected among leading Buddhists with whom I talked, has been publishing serially, in one of the Rangoon English dailies, a study of Buddhism. In it, while

admitting certain superficial similarities between Buddhism and Communism, such as nonbelief in a creator god and the fact that the *Sangha* or monastic order is a kind of Communism, he affirms categorically that the two look in quite different directions. His arguments are too long and involved to report here, but they are being read by large numbers of thoughtful English-speaking Burmese and will soon be published in Burmese translation. There is, he asserts, a basic philosophical difference between the two that makes them impossible to mix. If one is a Buddhist in the true philosophical sense, then he is not a Marxist, dialectical materialist. On the more practical plane, the distinction between the Communism of the *Sangha* and that of Marxism is very obvious. The former is wholly voluntary, and designed to aid in the extinction of craving; that of Marxism is one of compulsion. One may leave the *Sangha* at will; one may not escape the imposed Communism of Marx with impunity. Furthermore, the idea of a classless society, the Marxist ideal, he asserts, imposes an artificial limitation on the living and developing organism which is in opposition to its function as an instrument of evolution.

Can Buddhism serve as a major deterrent to the growth of Communism? I asked numerous leaders, lay and priestly. Almost all of them said yes. But the difficulty is that Communism wins, usually not at the ideological level, but by promising the poor and the exploited a better life, not in another world which religions may assure them exists, but here and now. They are not acting primarily as Buddhists, but as hungry, oppressed people whose eyes have been opened through propaganda, whether false or true, to a possible better existence than they now enjoy. Unless it comes to them in the form of an overt attack upon their religion, they are not likely to consider religion one way or another.

I stressed this in talking with high-placed leaders. What were they doing about it? The first part of the reply was the promotion of a revival of Buddhism, an awakening of Burmans to a conscious recognition of the values that lie in their historic faith. I can witness to the fact that in Burma there are clear indications of a Buddhist revival that goes far beyond the rather mild revival noted in Thailand.

The most notable evidence of this revival is the creation by government authorization, and indeed at the suggestion of government officials, of the Buddha Sasana Council in 1950. This is made up of representatives of the monastic order, the *Sangha*, elected representatives of the religious organizations of the country, and others nominated by the government. The Council operates through four committees to effect its purposes and has already launched upon an exceedingly active program. This includes encouragement in the study of Pali, the language of scripture and therefore of scholarship in the field of Buddhism. In 1950 a Pali University was set up by law with 22 constituent colleges throughout Burma, 114 teachers, and more than 500 students. It should be said that only students who have passed the Highest Degree Examinations are eligible for entrance to the University. Meanwhile, more than three hundred nonuniversity teachers are being given government aid. These are given instruction in Pali, preparing students for university entrance. A substantial and well-situated tract of land has been purchased and buildings will be erected to house the activities of the local Council and World Council to be convened in 1954-56. At the close of this world meeting the land and buildings will be used permanently for a great Buddhist university.

I visited the headquarters of the Sasana Council and found it a veritable beehive of activity. The first number of a new Buddhist quarterly in the vernacular had just been issued and an English-language quarterly was about to appear. The co-operation of Buddhist scholars all over the Hinayana Buddhist world was being invited in the scholarly work of revision of some versions of the Tripitaka or Theravada canon, and new translations into other languages. The World Council will be in session 1954-1956. The entire Buddhist world will be invited to a meeting of the World Fellowship of Buddhists to be held in 1954, but only the Theravadin Buddhists will be involved in the scholarly work of translation and publication, for only they hold the Theravadin canon as authoritative, the Mahayanists depending primarily upon the Mahayana Sutras.

Why is the government concerning itself in these matters? Does not Burma grant freedom to all religions? Yes it does, but the Con-

stitution specifically states that Buddhism, the religion of 90 per cent or more of the people, enjoys a special status. Besides, government leaders pointed out to me, Burma makes financial grants to other religious groups for the maintenance of schools and other public services, so its subsidy of this Buddhist activity, only at a higher level, reflects no departure from its principle of religious freedom. No religion is discriminated against.

The real reason for the very vigorous government support of this program, and indeed it was people high in government circles who first proposed it, was the felt necessity of something positive to oppose to the Communist ideology which was being urged upon Burma and which force had not been able to stop. These men, seeing the futility of opposing an idea merely by force, came to the sensible conclusion that ideas have to be overcome by better ideas. What better, or more conveniently at hand, than the religion of 90 per cent of the people, to which there was already a national loyalty that could be intensified, if that religion were given new life and practical meaning for the people. Thus it is a definite reaction to Communism that has inspired this Buddhist revival. It is recognized that it is, from the standpoint of the leaders, only instrumental to the purpose of counteracting and defeating Communism. Whether this kind of revival, from the top down, and really from lay, not clerical, leadership, can effect the purpose they cherish, may be questioned. It will depend, no doubt, upon other factors, chief of which will be the extent to which it finds a genuine response from the masses of people among whom Communism is making its gains. Probably this will be conditioned by the degree of success which government has in implementing its very elaborate and well-planned schemes of economic and social reorganization of the life of the people.

Other activities of the Sasana Council include a plan for promoting the Buddhist habit of meditation. Accordingly it has made provision for meditation rooms at the headquarters and elsewhere about the country. Here individuals who desire to give themselves up wholly to a disciplined life of meditation for a time may come and separate themselves from their ordinary tasks and surroundings. Scores of cubicles large enough to accommodate one person have

been made available, some in concrete one-story buildings which are just a long row of narrow rooms, each opening on to a covered walk. Some are less permanent, built rather cheaply of wood, and still others are quite temporary bamboo huts, built to serve until more adequate buildings can be put up. All comers are furnished free accommodation and food, but must cook their own meals, wood for fires being also allowed. One substantial building for foreign guests is available. In addition laymen are encouraged to don the monastic robes for a period of disciplined living each year.

I saw also a new Buddhist college, still in its first year, but destined, I understand, to be the nucleus of the university. It is situated at the edge of Rangoon and seemed to me to reproduce, more nearly than anything I had seen in Buddhist lands, the conditions under which the original Buddha carried on his teaching during the rainy season, and so gave rise to the *Sangha*. This was in a grove. The students and teachers were housed in simple bamboo huts with thatched roofs, their sandy floors being covered only by mats. An occasional chair and tables or benches in the worship hall probably distinguished it from the surroundings of Gautama's early teaching, as did also a substantial marble image of Lord Buddha. Before it some simple decorations and floral offerings were visible. It was flanked on either side by two modern bookcases filled with standard English books and translations of Buddhist literature as well as texts in the vernacular. Not a few books on the history and philosophy of religion were also there, including books by Bertrand Russell and other nontheistic Western writers. The president of the college told us that this was to be the first university to approach the Tripitaka in a scientific spirit and was not approved by the orthodox. Only twenty-eight first-year students were at present in residence but it would become eventually a full-fledged university granting even postgraduate degrees.

Two other organizations of more than local significance have appeared in Burma in the postwar years. (1) The Burma World Buddhist Mission was founded by an English Buddhist, Mr. Francis Story, already alluded to above, who established it in Burma because he believed that a World Buddhist Mission should proceed from a Buddhist base, not Christian. The society is active in pro-

ducing and distributing Buddhist literature, both at home and abroad, and Mr. Story has come to be well known and influential among Burmese Buddhists, who eagerly read his articles in the local press and take counsel with him. (2) There is also the International Buddhist Association, a non-government, non-foreign-supported institution designed to extend and promote Buddhism both within Burma and beyond. It is another sign of the times.

A rather surprising fact observed was that among the most influential monks, even listed as directors or co-operators in the abovementioned societies, are several who have been considerably influenced by the Moral Rearmament Movement founded by Frank Buchman. They have, at least some of them, visited Caux in Switzerland and Mackinac Island in the United States, both great centers of M.R.A. to which men come from all over the world. They seem to have caught from this contact something of the spirit of witnessing for which M.R.A. is noted. This may prove to be an important factor in the Buddhist revival now in progress.

The anti-Communist pamphlet, *Buddhism and the Personal Life*, published by the Buddhist Society of London, was compiled by a group of Western Buddhists under the nominal chairmanship, at least, of a prominent Burmese Buddhist, U Thittila, whom unfortunately I did not get to meet. The fact that a group of Pongyis with whom I talked were interested in publishing and spreading anti-Communist literature and asked that I have samples sent them of the pamphlets being circulated by Thai monks led me to think that they might get actively behind an anti-Communist drive.

## Ceylon

One hears that Hinayana Buddhism at its purest is to be found in Ceylon. There is some disposition to dispute this claim both in Thailand and in Burma. It is true, however, in both these countries, particularly in the latter, that a certain deference is paid to Ceylonese Buddhist scholars. In Ceylon there are legends to the effect that the Buddha himself was once in the island. Are not his footprints still visible on famous Adam's Peak in the north of Ceylon? And a guide in an important temple near Colombo solemnly told me of a visit Buddha made to the precise site of said temple. Indeed, the

very throne chair on which he sat is enshrined in the large dagoba alongside the temple. Of course there is no access to the dagoba, but it is said to be hidden away at the center.

But my own very limited observation of the various temples of Colombo and Kandy would lead me to believe that there is a great deal beside the pure Buddhism of the founder in contemporary Ceylonese Buddhist thought and practice. All sorts of Hindu elements were visible in the temples and statues. For example, in one temple there were images of Vishnu, Lakshmi, Rama, Ganesha, and other lesser figures of the Hindu pantheon. In the same room with a huge reclining image of the Buddha there was a small section in which, behind drawn curtains and scarcely visible in the very dim light, were three Hindu divinities which the worshipers invoked for certain purposes. The dimness of the light in contrast to the brightly lighted golden figure of the Buddha was meant to symbolize the fuller light which the Buddha had brought to mankind. On the floor of the selfsame room was a specially sacred bronze image kept covered by a metal shield to which mothers brought ailing children for a blessing. Hindu guardian figures also are found in front of some of the temples.

I found no evidence of a Buddhist revival in Ceylon such as I had found in both Thailand and Burma, particularly the latter. Some said that there was such a revival, but I failed to get any clear evidence to support the view. Others specifically affirmed that none existed. It is true that a number of the leading Buddhist figures including Professor Malalasekara, the dynamic president of the Buddhist World Fellowship, were absent from the country when I was there, attending a World Buddhist Congress in Japan. Nevertheless, I did talk with some leading priests and some very distinguished lay Buddhist leaders who were surely in a position to know what was happening in Buddhism. And from these I got certain impressions.

War did not affect Ceylon as much as some other Buddhist countries, for it did not suffer actual armed attack. Nevertheless the economic disturbances caused by war were a factor indirectly influencing the religious and moral outlook of the people. There was a marked breakdown of economic morality, the black market

flourished, and the general level went definitely downward. Whether or not directly a result of war, there has been a loosening of religious controls. Even among women this has been true. Certainly family life in the home has been affected. The younger members are often in conflict with elders, because they acquire new ideas which are different from those held traditionally. There is a revolt against parental inhibitions. This is of course true to some extent everywhere, just as a part of the maturing process, but it seems to exist on a far more noticeable scale in Ceylon. The newer secular currents of thought, particularly made available through moving-picture films (many of which come from America) in which religion seldom appears to advantage, when it appears at all, eventually have their effect. More often they represent a materialistic emphasis. They exalt pagan virtues, and exhibit quite frankly pagan vices in extremely attractive forms. The norms suggested by the majority of them have as little relation to the traditional spiritual heritage of Buddhism as to that of Christianity or any of the other great religions.

Then there is the insistent propaganda waged by Communism. Communism is not numerically strong in Ceylon. There are actually thirteen Communist members in the national legislature, divided between Stalinists and Trotzkyites, out of a total of one hundred, and the number has decreased from what it was in 1947, I was told. These, with nine members of the Lanka Freedom party, a kind of Democratic Socialist party, form the opposition. The U.N.P. has a majority, fifty-four members, and other smaller party groups and some independents generally go along with U.N.P. Buddhism is regarded as the national religion, and religious education is required in all the schools, unless exemption is asked by the parent. Instruction may be Buddhist, or Christian (Catholic or Protestant), or Hindu, but religion must be offered as a part of the training of the child. Naturally the greater part of it is Buddhist.

There was a group of somewhat fanatical Buddhists who, probably influenced by the strong feeling of nationalism which was developing even before the war years but was accentuated by the war, sought to make Buddhism the State religion. But this move was strongly opposed by the more liberal forces and came to naught.

Had this occurred, all State aid, which has been freely given to schools maintained by Christians, Hindus, and others, would have been withdrawn and only Buddhism subsidized.

As in the other Buddhist countries, there are those who do not find it incompatible with their Buddhism to embrace Communism. I was told that there were several Buddhist monks who were Communists. Though I sought to do so, I was unable actually to make contact with any monk who was willing to admit more than a sympathy for some of the more worth-while things that Communists propose doing. The one monk who probably was a Communist was inaccessible at the time of my visit. I am convinced that very few monks are involved in Communist effort. Most of those to whom I talked were definitely opposed to it. The ablest Buddhist leader among the monks whom I interviewed seemed not disposed to take Communism very seriously. He had the impression, he said, that the Communists were weak because of serious division in their own ranks between the Stalinists and the Trotzkyites and two other groups. They lacked the strength that a united front would produce. Communism, he thought, did not make much of an appeal and many of those who are influenced by it soon drop out. It offered a way of expressing dissatisfaction with the actual government and did not represent for most a deliberate choice of Communism as a philosophy of government and a way of life.

A leading editor pointed out that a number of younger priests had signed a pamphlet, *Asia Needs Peace,* which was a part of the Peking Peace Conference drive. But that does not necessarily signify that they were Communists. They may not, when they signed it, have known that it was a Communist-engineered conference. Buddhists are in general for peace. It is a fundamental emphasis in their faith. Should someone come along and ask, "Are you for a movement to bring about world peace?" most Buddhists would say yes, just as many Christians would do and actually have done, only to find that the whole thing was probably only a part of Russia's persistent propaganda drive to create the impression that she is the champion of peace in the world, while the Western powers are for war. And, parenthetically, that impression is quite widespread among the Near and Far Eastern peoples.

The leader of the Communist party in Ceylon is a young man, son of a Dutch Presbyterian father and a Methodist mother. He does not profess any personal religious faith, but asserts that he has a respect for all religions. He was elected to his political post on the Municipal Council of Colombo, by a 90 per cent Catholic constituency, though he stood frankly as a Communist.

He too asserted that several priests were active in Communism. But when I asked for definite names, he gave none. He said also that a number of Christian pastors, particularly Methodists, were sympathetic. He could personally see no reason why a Buddhist might not be a Communist, though he recognized that there were deep differences in their basic philosophies. Most Buddhist Communists, he admitted, were such, not on ideological grounds, but because of the practical social and economic program Communism offers.

When I asked him specifically concerning the attitude of the party toward religion, he said that in Ceylon, at least, it asks no one about his religious profession and permits every man to follow his own particular faith if he so wishes, so long as it does not interfere with the purposes of the Communist party. When I asked what it would mean to interfere, he said, "Oh, such things as supporting the capitalist system, insisting upon the rights of private property, etc." This could, of course, take in a good deal of territory, as has appeared elsewhere. Only reactionaries, he said, would be interfered with, but of course the definition of what constitutes a reactionary would be determined by the party. In case of reactionaries there would be no hesitancy about restricting religious freedom. That is, religious freedom would not exist in the accepted Western Protestant meaning of that term, but only within well-defined limits, fixed by the Communist party at will. And these might change overnight, as the party line has been known to change the world over at a nod from the Kremlin.

When I inquired concerning the relationship of the local Communists to Russia or China, he replied that there was none. I was to hear this reiterated by Communists in every country I visited. They receive no subsidies from the outside, he declared. It would be contrary to Communist principles, he avowed. Since the dis-

solution of the Communist International this was not being done. I am prepared to believe that there is a measure of truth in what he said regarding subsidies, at least direct subsidies, though I continued to hear of substantial subsidies to various daily and weekly papers, it was claimed, from Russia. I do not for a moment doubt that the papers were subsidized, but it is not certain that the money came from outside the country. I am completely satisfied that much literature is provided from outside sources at prices much below the cost of production. But that the local Communists pay *something* for it is quite likely. One finds too many expensively and well printed and bound Communist books being sold for a song, to believe that the Communist parties in the poorer Eastern countries can afford to import and sell them at such ridiculous prices. But even when saying this, I am haunted by the fact that Communist leaders in Asia are people of great personal conviction, living austerely, many of them, and sacrificially giving themselves and their substance to the cause which for them is a veritable passion. It is not popular to be a Communist anywhere that I have been. One is definitely going against majority opinion, and in several areas he becomes a Communist at the imminent risk of the loss of personal freedom or even of life itself. One has to have powerful convictions to do that. It is this wholehearted commitment to something that sometimes makes an appeal to persons who have been left with little or nothing to believe in in this modern secularist age.

Naturally, this Communist leader, an exceedingly attractive and able young man, an intellectual, not a worker or one who came to it through any sense of personal frustration economically, thinks that Communism will win out in Ceylon eventually. He thought Buddhism, or indeed religion in general, would not be a serious deterrent, though it might slow down its coming.

The leader of the opposition in Congress, himself not a Communist but a member of the Lanka Freedom party, nevertheless believes with the Communists that capitalism has about run its course, clearly so in Europe, not quite so clearly as yet in the United States, and will eventually have to be replaced by some other system. His arguments sounded very much like those of the

Marxists. Societies arise, develop, and decline. Neither war nor Communism is fundamental, but only symptomatic of social disease. We are in a day of vast social change. Feudalism had its day. It was monopolistic economically, and religion went along with it, in its Roman Catholic form in Europe. The Reformation was one mark, in the sphere of religion, of the breakdown of the feudalistic system, out of which capitalism was born. Now that system has had its day. New social currents are running that require a new political and economic framework. As so often happens, the pendulum has swung to a far extreme as in Russia, but will probably come to rest, for a while at least, in some middle position, some kind of democratic socialism which will, unlike Communism, have regard for and give a place to religious and social values, i.e., a kind of religio-democratic socialism. The task in Asia, as he sees it, is to keep aloof from both capitalism and Communism, and if it is accomplished, the light of Asia will again shine out over the world.

Religion has accommodated itself to capitalism. Protestantism with its individual emphasis was the religious expression of capitalism. The Church has become largely a capitalist affair, but we are coming into the "Age of the Common Man," and religion, keeping pace with the changing age, must become meaningful for the Common Man if it is to survive. Communism is a profound challenge to religion at this point, not alone to Christianity, but to Buddhism as well. Owing to the desperate economic situation of the masses in Asia, there may be a drift toward Communism as in China unless Buddhism manages to keep pace with the demands of the age.

To suit the conditions of the feudal age and capitalistic society, the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of Karma and rebirth have been misinterpreted, and used to reconcile man to his status, whatever it might be, as the inevitable result of the working of the Karmic law. But, he says, that is not the true doctrine. Now it has to be retaught. Karma does not refer to any inequality created by man himself, but only to such natural defects and misfortunes as being born blind or deaf or with some physical deformity. These cannot be helped, though their results may be greatly minimized. But such things as poverty through exploitation of one man by another is in quite a different category of evils. There is nothing inevitable in such condi-

tions. Man has within himself the power to co-operate with others to change them, and religion ought to recognize this not only as a possibility but as an obligation. Otherwise it will eventually be rejected by the suffering masses, who learn through Communism or other social revolutionaries that these things need not be.

He recognizes within Buddhism certain beliefs and practices which stand in the way of achieving a prosperous life. For example, one of the greatest needs of Ceylon is an increase of farming and food production. Poultry keeping is an important element in farming. But the Buddhist principle of non-killing, as applied to subhuman as well as human beings, leads some of them to oppose these forms of livelihood, even the selling of eggs. But religion, he insists, can be molded to the needs of the modern age. Buddhism because it is a very rational religion can be so molded. It is a way of life. Follow its precepts and you get benefits, not in some far-off age, or in another life, but here and now.

Religion he believes must survive. There is no real hope without it. Communism is offering something more fundamental than a mere changing of the social order; it offers an alternative to religion itself, which is a much more serious matter. This must be fought. One may have sympathy, as he does, with Communistic economic theories, but their disregard for spiritual values is a fatal defect. It is this that makes him, while leading the opposition in the Congress, including the Communist bloc, nevertheless a stanch opponent of Communism itself.

No one that I talked with except the Communist leader himself thought that Communism could win out in Ceylon, unless it came through outside pressures which the people could not resist. Should India and the southeastern Asiatic countries fall under its sway, Ceylon could hardly stand out alone. Reasons given for this faith were various. One educator affirmed that the people were not easily excitable and could only with great difficulty and under great provocation be organized to take part in a violent revolution. Several put religion, meaning chiefly Buddhism, well up on the list of deterrents, specifying the doctrine of Karma as a definite Buddhist factor in preventing violent change. Others were doubtful of its effectiveness. It might slow down the coming of Communism, but

it would not alone be sufficient to avert Communist domination. Some activity has been manifested, not by Buddhist monks so much as by Buddhist laymen, to expose the fundamental differences between the outlook of Communism and that of Buddhism. A university professor has written critically of the philosophy of Marxism and exposed its weaknesses, but so far as I could discover, the amount of such writing is very limited, and had dealt with it largely at the academic level. There is, to be sure a group of Communist intellectuals in Ceylon, but Communism makes its major appeal there as elsewhere to the people who have been long the victims of exploitation.

Here the most effective deterrent to Communist advance has been a real effort on the part of government to right some of the more crying inequalities. Some attempt has already been made at land reform. The help of the United Nations Organization, the F.A.O., and the partial implementation of the so-called Colombo plan have not, to be sure, solved the economic problems, but they have made a start at it. There is abundant evidence that at one time, hundreds of years ago, there was an elaborate system of dams for preventing floods, and for providing irrigation to fields that are now overgrown with forests or jungles. Much of this land can and will be reclaimed, thus making available extensive areas to provide more food and to allow many who are now but landless peons to have their own farms. One of the sources of deep dissatisfaction among the Indian peasants is the fact that they were promised so much by the Congress party which it cannot, or at least has not yet been able to, fulfill. Communists make much of this failure, but do not themselves hesitate to promise things they too are not likely to be able to fulfill. Ceylon peasants, never having had their expectations raised so high, are not so readily open to the appeal of Communism.

Catholics in Ceylon are as elsewhere very actively anti-Communist, and so do not hesitate to publish articles and pamphlets warning the people of the sinister character of Communism; yet it will be recalled that largely Catholic votes elected the present Communist leader, running frankly as a Communist, to his present political position.

By way of summary, thus, it seems, on the basis of what I was

able to learn from a very outstanding group of leaders in Ceylon, and found confirmed as I talked with the man in the street as well, that Communism is not a negligible factor in Ceylonese life, but that it seems to be losing rather than gaining in strength. It is not the active menace there that it is in other parts of the Orient, but it is not to be shrugged off too lightly. Religious leaders, chiefly Buddhists, do not seem as actively concerned about it as they might well be, for while popular Buddhism may be something of a deterrent, it will have to become much more socially conscious, and throw its influence on the side of a better social order if it is to have any very marked effect upon the situation. At present Buddhist leaders of Ceylon lag well behind those of either Thailand or Burma in their concern about the matter.

# IV

# War, Communism and the Religions of India

It is not easy to write about India, because there are so many Indias. It is very difficult to make any generalization about all of them. There is, for example, the India of the highly cultured, deeply spiritual group who live apart from or above the world, even while they live in it. They are in a sense a timeless people, to whom the passing circumstances of a given life span are of only relative importance. They are comparatively indifferent to the external world about them—who governs them, how society is organized, whether they are poor or rich. For them values are not measured in terms of time or space, or things, but only in terms of the spirit. Obviously this is not a numerous group, but it is a very real one and in popular esteem stands highest of all the numerous distinctive groups in India. This is a significant fact.

Then there is a much larger, extremely worldly-minded group. Despite the assertions of Eastern spirituality as in contrast to Western materialism, these people know well enough how to turn an honest dollar—or many of them a dishonest one. Nor are they any less eager in their pursuit of material goods than the Babbitts of the West, though in their pursuit they may follow the more leisurely tempo of the East, as indeed they do in the enjoyment of that wealth. The method of acquisition may differ and the peculiar modes of expenditure may differ, but the fundamental motivations do not differ significantly from those of the West. There are those in India who know well enough how to corner a grain market, though this puts the price of grain beyond the reach of those who must have it to live, and so they starve. There are politicians who sell their souls for power, and the opportunity to enrich themselves and their families at the expense of the people, just as in the west. One can't see

much difference between the vast pulsing cities of Bombay and Calcutta and those of Western lands, except in the complexion of the people who rush about, though maybe they don't rush quite so madly in the Eastern cities. They are definitely slowed down by deference to the cattle wandering through the streets, because of a belief in the sacredness of the cow, and by human- or animal-drawn vehicles which slow up auto traffic. But he needs to step lively who would thread his way through the busy business districts of the greater cities. And he needs also to be wise in his bargaining with these so-called spiritual-minded people of the East lest he pay two or three times the value of what he is purchasing—certainly at the level of the small shops and market places. There is the India of business and commerce which bears little resemblance to the India of the books on religion and philosophy.

There is the India of the villages—where the masses of India are found, the silent millions who live at or below the level of subsistence, and do the hard work of the country. They live in wretched thatched mud huts, undernourished, ill clad, exposed to filth and disease. They are quite unlettered, except a very small percentage who get the beginnings of an elementary education, and often lapse again into illiteracy for lack of anything to read, because they are too poor to buy books or papers. There are some in the villages who are more fortunate than others. I visited several villages and was shown where the wealthy people lived, and then the poorest quarter. They all looked very poor to me, even the better houses, where the residents owned animals and maybe even a wagon, or cart, and land, some of them five acres or more. There were in undivided India some 750,000 of these villages. They form a world apart from the India of the larger cities and towns.

Then there are the Indias of the various language groups, unable to communicate save through the medium of a foreign language, English usually, though now an effort is being made to require Hindi as the lingua franca. There is a strong pressure being exercised upon government to form separate linguistic States, e.g., the Tamil. But there are so many languages, and those who speak them live so intermingled, that one wonders if such a division could ever be satisfactory. There is the India of the temperate north, and

the India of the torrid south. There is the India that is Moslem; there are still some forty million Moslems in India, despite the separation and creation of Pakistan, the Moslem State. There is a Sikh India; and a Jain India—both separate religions, variants in one degree or another of Hinduism; a Christian India; and a sophisticated, secularized India.

To generalize about all these Indias is of course quite impossible, for there are so many radically contradictory religious and linguistic elements in this vast heterogeneous mass of over 300,000,000 people that every statement must have some exceptions. All we can hope to do is to indicate some of the dominant attitudes and more generally prevalent conditions, noting the more significant exceptions that may exist. It is an endlessly fascinating country to visit. Its people are wonderfully likable, and were most kind and considerate at every level. I experienced the utmost courtesy among India's highest-placed leaders and her humblest village folk. Some occupying seats of power were interviewed, usually in English, amid the splendor of palaces, which provided a veritable Hollywood setting, with liveried lackeys serving us tea or lunch or dinner. Some I found in the humblest mud huts, where, through an interpreter, perforce, I tried to discover what was in their minds. I only hope I have done justice to them and their points of view as they were revealed to me in personal conversation.

I asked them all essentially the same questions. How had war and Communism affected religion, and their attitudes toward it, with, of course, endless other questions to bring out greater detail. Here I have tried to put together as well as possible the answers I received after traveling over the greater part of India, touching certainly most of the significantly different areas and groups.

First with reference to war: India was not as directly affected by actual physical warfare as Japan. It is true that she lived for a time in imminent danger of an invasion of Japanese troops. One remembers how Gandhi, then living and a great power among the people, in contrast to the nervous apprehension of the military people who were charged with stopping that advance, advocated meeting them with the proved invincible power of nonviolent non-co-operation. There were those, of course, who accused him of Com-

munist sympathies and therefore of being an enemy of the Allies. But the test never came, actually, for the Japanese were stopped in Burma. A few bombs fell in Calcutta and other Indian coastal cities, but India was fortunately spared the ravages of actual military attack.

The losses, therefore, of a physical nature, in terms of buildings, and property, and leadership were negligible. But these losses do not represent all or perhaps even the most important ones due to war. Actually World War II left deep scars upon the moral and spiritual life of India, and if to these be added the actual physical and human, as well as moral and spiritual, losses incurred in the struggle for independence and the subsequent partition of India by the creation of Pakistan, the score is a heavy one.

If India was not herself under direct attack, she was, nevertheless, an armed camp, and an arsenal for the military forces. Many soldiers from Western lands were quartered there. They were, especially the American soldiers, so highly paid, in comparison with Indian standards, and were so free in their spending that the economic differences between East and West were powerfully emphasized. This tended to create dissatisfaction with their own status, among the people who came in contact with Western representatives. Because these strangers had so much money, comparatively, and paid whatever was asked uncritically, at least at first, the temptation to take advantage of the situation was great, and dishonesty and cheating were encouraged. This was but one manifestation of a breakdown of moral standards. As rationing and currency controls were established, black-market practices sprang up and became common. There was an increase of violence and crime. Particularly the Indian criminal practice of dacoity flourished, and still does. This had been pretty well under control before the war. A loosening of sex morality occurred, as it almost always does where large numbers of young men are thrown into the community with no normal outlet for social activities. There was nothing new in all this. It is the normal accompaniment of war conditions, and India was at war though not under immediate attack.

The social disorganization occasioned by the war was perhaps most notable in the gradual breakdown of the age-old joint family

system of India. It had already been affected by the urban trend and the increase of industrialization, but it was greatly accentuated by the conditions of war, and the joint family system was a major fact in the maintenance of the solidarity of Indian society. Increasing living costs made it difficult for the family to live on the wages of the father only. This, together with a demand for workers in factories and offices, led to an increase in the number of young single women undertaking employment outside the home. The daughter now became a source of income rather than an expense to the family. There was no longer the urgency about getting her properly married. Indeed, delay in marriage became an economic asset to the family. But at the same time it introduced other problems; the increased sense of independence which the girl felt when she was earning her own way, and the accompanying refusal to accept parental authority as before, led her to the abandonment of some of the inhibitions in social relations which had been accepted before, with consequent exposure to new ideas and other types of mores, foreign to those of the family. Thus family conflict was brought about, and frequently a new freedom in thinking, and in morals, and in religion. All this has occurred in India with very profound social effects which involve both moral and religious attitudes. India has suffered a real change due to these facts.

In addition, the economic disturbance caused by the war brought about a lowering of living standards, already distressingly low, and put a severe strain upon the people. One of the effects was the abandonment of children, or perhaps worse yet, the sale of children, particularly daughters, in extreme cases, for a meager sum. This was reported to me again and again, by people whose integrity one could not question. It was the result of desperation. Many of these children were picked up off the streets and fed and clothed and educated by various missionary or other eleemosynary institutions.

It was partly as a result of war, but also of natural calamity, and human stupidity, and a great deal of human cupidity, that the famine occurred in Bengal, which caused the starvation of probably 3,000,000 people in 1943-44. Although it is difficult to fix the blame for this huge loss at any one point, it is common belief that while these people were dying like flies in the streets of Calcutta certain

Indian people were profiting enormously by the cornering of grain in the market. Most of the people need never have starved, but they did.

Hiroshima, I was told by a distinguished journalist in south India, was a great shock to the people of India. The snuffing out of a whole great city by a single atomic bomb struck India with terrific force. They had read enough of the bombing of cities in Germany and England and Japan, of block busters, and incendiary bombs, and napalm, with horror. But Hiroshima was something more terrible. The potentialities of atomic force unleashed in the service of destruction were shocking in the extreme, in India as elsewhere. But even more shocking was the rationalization of its use by the Bishops and religious leaders of the West—not all of them of course, for there were exceptions. Here were Christians, supposedly followers of the Prince of Peace, finding justification for the use of this terribly destructive force. It seemed the ultimate in the repudiation of the principles of the Christian faith and did irreparable harm to that faith in India. It appeared to millions, particularly of the followers of Gandhi, as something monstrous in the extreme.

But it was less international war than the struggle for independence and the subsequent partition of India which most affected India's religions. This too was war, though the winning of independence from Britain was carried on as war never had been carried on before. It was a war without violence, and was led by the great apostle of nonviolence, Mahatma Gandhi. If ever a war had ennobling effects upon people, this one did. Here was no appeal to hatred and ruthless violence. There was resistance, to be sure, resistance which neither imprisonment nor persecution nor violence nor denial of economic opportunity nor even death itself was able to overcome. But it was nonviolent, non-co-operative resistance. It wasn't always perfectly maintained. Now and then human nature, so long accustomed to the way of violence, gave way and sporadic outbursts occurred. But the "little brown man," Gandhi, a spiritual leader as well as an extremely astute politician, by a fast or some other like technique, the effect of which was spiritual, succeeded amazingly well in holding back the floodgates of passion and hatred, and in the end won a bloodless victory, and India became free, free

without the entail of hatred and desire for revenge on either side. One finds, it is true, a disposition, now that the moment of greatness is past, to blame Britain for about everything that is bad in India—her poverty, her illiteracy, her lack of sufficiently well-trained leaders, her oversupply of educated people for whom employment cannot be found, all these and much more. Britain has become the scapegoat which every people seems to require, or at least usually has. But I was told that there are more British businessmen actively doing more business profitably now in India than before independence. And India is one of the Commonwealth nations, sitting in with the other members, independent, yet functioning within the framework of that successor of the British Empire, free to leave it any minute, free to accept or reject what it will of Commonwealth policies. And so far as I was able to discover, Indians were quite content that it should be so. Of course, there were exceptions, the Communists; but of this, more later. The great majority of Indians seem to have come through this nonviolent war of independence spiritually uplifted by it. Such a fact could not fail to have consequences for religion. For one thing, it made all of India conscious of a phase of its religion which had been a part of it certainly since the sixth century B.C., namely, the doctrine of *ahimsa*, or non-killing, or as Gandhi preferred to think of it, of nonviolence. It had never played the part in Hinduism that it did in either Buddhism or Janinism, but it had always been cherished by some Hindus, and in a minor fashion by all Hindus. Now it came to full flower in the greatest mass demonstration India or the world had ever seen, and with startling results. This was brought to pass, as most great movements of the spirit are, by the incarnation of the principle in a towering human figure, Mahatma Gandhi, who was able by the sheer force of his great soul to move the people.

Given the peculiar framework of Hinduism, which is absorptive to a remarkable degree, and puts no limits upon the number or kind of divinities which it can embrace, it was not at all out of character that the people should venerate, and many of them enshrine, this human manifestation of spiritual greatness. I have in my possession a brightly colored lithograph, like so many which circulate among the people of India depicting the gods and their life stories,

which pictures Gandhi from infancy through childhood, youth, manhood, as *satyagrahi*, and finally with a halo around his head at the end, clearly an object of *puja* or worship. This might reflect, at a more enlightened stage, merely an extreme form of respect and admiration. At the level of the masses it reflects worship. Over and over again one hears of him as an incarnation of Vishnu, one of the great Hindu gods. His pictures are everywhere and statues very common. A hero in India easily and quite frankly at the lower intellectual level becomes god. This will be the almost inevitable fate of Gandhiji, assassinated at the very moment of prayer.

One of the high moments I experienced in India was when at Sevagram, where Gandhi had his Ashram, I stepped in the simple hut, built out of the same materials as village huts the country over, mud wall, thatched roof, and with no modern furniture as we of the West know it. There was a simple pallet on the floor on which he sat with his back to the wall, against which a pillow rested. Beside it was a low table with a few books, writing materials, and by it his spinning wheel. That was all. Here he sat and wrote or dictated to his secretaries, and interviewed the great and humble who sought his counsel and help on political or personal matters. As I stood there, deeply moved by the simplicity of it all, which so truly breathed the great spirit of the man, an old man and a woman and a little girl about four years old entered. The man was a nephew of Gandhi and was crippled. All three of them dropped to their knees and then prostrated themselves, the woman and child touching their foreheads to the pallet on which Gandhi had sat and worked so many hours. What was in the minds of these people in this simple act of veneration, I do not know, but it was a deeply moving scene, not to be compared with anything I saw in dozens of temples, mosques, and churches on my whole trip around the world. The simple naturalness and sincerity, and I would say also, I think, the spontaneity of it were exceedingly impressive. I felt myself in the presence of religious reality, as I have on few other occasions.

It would be pleasant to report that, once glimpsed, this high spiritual value made its way permanently into Indian life and became India's preferred way of dealing with her problems, great

and small; that enshrined along with Gandhi was his high principle of *ahimsa.* But fidelity to the facts does not permit any such report. Frankly, while India for a little while rose to Gandhi's spiritual challenge, perhaps only because she saw that, strangely enough, under his leadership it worked, she was not long on the mountain-top but was soon again, even before the assassin's bullet laid her leader low, resorting to violence, even in the name of religion, or, perhaps better, religious nationalism.

In India, as already noted, there are several different religions. Hinduism itself, a term used very loosely indeed, and quite incapable of exact definition, is the dominant one. It embraces everything from the utmost in the way of sophisticated intellectualism, including even groups denying the existence of God, pantheists, monists, polytheists, all the way down to the simple animistic faiths of the as yet unassimilated tribal groups. All this is a part of Hinduism. It is extremely diverse in belief, in practice, and quite lacking in any closely knit organized form. It is split into innumerable sects, mostly quite tolerant of others, but still distinctive in some respects. It is perhaps better described as a congeries of various religions and sects, all of which, in some rather undefinable fashion, constitute a kind of unity which is Hinduism.

But over against this loosely conceived national faith there stands a constantly growing, aggressive, well-defined, closely knit religion, not native to India, but for a thousand years or more a part of Indian life. Over considerable periods of time, because of its political character, it even ruled the greater part of India. Shorn of its political power by foreign invasion, it has remained an aggressive religious force, and not without political power in certain areas. Many States, down to the time of independence, were ruled by Moslem kings or princes. About one-fifth of the population had become Moslem and the faith was steadily increasing. By reason of its congregational organization Islam had a cohesion lacking in Hinduism and so was influential beyond the proportion which it formed of the population.

There had always been rivalry between the faiths. Each had religious practices which annoyed the other. Moslems are strictly nonidolatrous; Hinduism makes much of the use of idols and images.

Hinduism regards the cow as sacred and will not kill cattle. Moslems are beefeaters, Moslems are in general probably more fanatical than Hindus, but both could be easily stirred to the defense of their religion where they felt it was affronted. So Hindu-Moslem riots were quite frequent, often involving loss of life.

To religious rivalry there was added a new element when, with the granting of ever larger democratic privileges to Indian citizens, election to the legislative assemblies was based upon the religious communities. Done in the first place, doubtless, to insure some representation of the various minority communities, such as Moslems, Sikhs, Christians, etc., it tended to emphasize communal differences and of course gave an overwhelming majority to Hindu representatives. Now political rivalry was added to religious rivalry.

On the international scene the treatment of the Arab or Moslem countries by the Western powers aroused in Indian Moslems an increasing sense of solidarity with the Moslems of the Arabian Near and Middle Eastern Moslem countries, and despite the fact that Mr. Gandhi on this occasion took the side of the Moslems, the wedge was driven deeper into the split between Hindus and Moslems. There began to be heard suggestions that the time had come when the Moslems of India should separate themselves from Hindu India and form a separate state. Nevertheless both Hindus and Moslems were led unitedly by Gandhi and the Congress party to final independence.

But the Moslems were restive. They had more confidence in fair treatment as a minority under British rule than under the Hindus, so agitation was set up for a partition of India. Jinnah, the Moslem leader, while throwing himself wholeheartedly into the campaign for partition, apparently had little idea that it would be actually granted, or so I was told. But Gandhi, rather surprisingly, supported the idea. Britain, we are now told by both Indians and Pakistanis, for her own purposes, following the old principle of "divide and rule," favored it, so in due time it came to pass, and some fifty million Moslems, the largest single Moslem group under separate rule, were given independent status, though divided awkwardly into two parts a thousand miles apart, with no communicating corridor.

But the bitter agitation leading to this end had deeply stirred religious passions. Religious nationalism became a tremendous driving force. When religion and nationalism coalesce there is a twofold fanaticism joined, and anything is likely to happen. It did religion no good in either case, for it led to the unleashing of violence, which, before it had run its course, had resulted in the slaughter of millions of Hindus and Moslems and Sikhs, for these latter who have a kind of half-way-between religion, neither Hindu, nor Moslem, but something of both, were likewise involved.

The physical loss of life and property was tremendous. No one knows quite how many were killed, but the number who lost their homes and property and had to flee from one section to the other ran into many millions, and they are still one of the problems that call for solution. Probably no more serious problem confronts either India or Pakistan than the resettlement and rehabilitation of their own nationals who have been, or are still being, forced out of the other country. I saw, in Calcutta alone, literally thousands of persons still living on the platforms of the railway stations, sleeping on the streets or in hastily constructed thatched or bamboo huts along the country lanes, living in the utmost poverty and neglect. I saw the same thing in Pakistan, especially in Lahore and Karachi, and was told that almost 15 per cent of Pakistanis are refugees. Who can estimate the amount of human suffering that all this has entailed? And who can estimate the effect that it has had upon the religions? In a separate section I have attempted to recount what it meant to the Sikhs (see pp. 165 ff.).

To the Arya Samaj, a modern Hindu sect, which had flourished chiefly in the Punjab, in the areas which became Moslem, it meant the complete abandonment of all their institutions, including temples, schools, hospitals, etc., and they were very active in such matters, being one of the more socially minded segments of the Hindus. Their membership in the Pakistan area has had to withdraw and has become a serious problem for that part of the Samaj which is in India. The loss in membership was small, but that of property was very great. This would be true of Hinduism as a whole as it existed in the now Moslem area, but fortunately the Hindus were not such a large percentage of the population, since

the vast majority were already Moslem. Very few Hindus have remained, for on both sides of the line of division the remaining minority is in a precarious position and has a feeling of great insecurity. How many Hindus there are in Pakistan no one knows exactly, but it is certain that between thirty and forty million Moslems are still living in India. Something of how they felt could be gathered in some Moslem centers I visited, especially in Hyderabad and Lucknow. Hyderabad had been governed by a Moslem ruler. Although the population was more Hindu than Moslem, fully nine-tenths of the government posts were held by Moslems. The Hindus were farmers and tradesmen. The Moslems went in largely for government service. Now that the State has become a part of Hindu India, Congress has ordered that government posts shall be held in proportion to the number of each faith in the total population. For Moslems this means that only 12 per cent of the posts are now open. The other government servants have been dismissed, but they were trained for that work, have no other skills, and most of them have no capital with which to engage in business. What shall they do? Former cabinet men who had spent two years in prisons, and had been but recently released, were being paid a modest and temporary salary by government, with nothing else to depend on. The sense of disillusionment and frustration which such people experience is likely to have deep influence upon their religious outlook. As we shall see later, it has moved many of them, despite their religious faith, to look to Communism as a possible way out. It has, of course, caused them to cherish a deep hatred and resentment against Hindus, just as, among displaced Hindus, bitter hatred and resentment are felt toward Moslems. This is, of course, an unhealthy state of things, and poisons the religious faith of both groups. Hatred is always a corrupting factor, regardless of the religion in which it appears.

One of the sinister effects of all this has been an abandonment of Gandhi's nonviolent faith, until one looks for it in vain in much of India and hardly finds it at all in Pakistan, though many Moslems had followed Gandhi's lead during the struggle for independence. As a great admirer of Gandhi, and a personal believer in his method as approximating what one finds at the heart of Jesus' teaching, I,

personally, felt something of a shock to see how little of the Gandhi spirit lives in India, despite the fact that his name is known to everyone and his pictures and statues are in most public places. Instead, there is talk of arms and armaments, of armies and navies and the necessity to be strong. All the old shibboleths of a dependence on military might as the ultimate guarantee of man's security and freedom are constantly everywhere heard. How quickly man forgets! Will *ahimsa* ever come back? No one knows the answer, but it may be that after passing through the blood baths which almost certainly lie ahead, if the way of violence is chosen, there will be a recovery of the idea, and India may still be the land which will teach man the utter futility of war and violence as a means of attaining peace and security. What a chance she is missing now in following the pattern of Western militarism for which she is so ill equipped, forsaking the way of Gandhi, for which her background and basis are unequaled by those of any other people in the world.

I could discover no general agreement as to the possible effects of war on religion. Some said there had been something of a revival of religion, but I could find no very tangible evidence of it. I did note a tendency, under the impulse of national feeling, to exalt everywhere what was native to India, a tendency to emphasize the ancient cultural heritage of India, which of course includes her religion. But it seemed to me rather more of a formal prideful recognition of the greatness of that heritage than a reversion to its fundamental principles in modern practice, or, shall I say, a lip service rather than a wholehearted attempt to incorporate its values into present-day Indian life. On the contrary, I heard everywhere of a growth of the secular spirit. One finds it among the intellectuals and those who enjoy a superior economic status, very much as it is found in the West. I heard, I think, more often, the complaint that religion in India was decadent, or decaying, that it lacked the moral and spiritual qualities necessary to the support of a democratic government or way of life. One man, who had had occasion as few others have to taste the bitter fruitage of the system, declared that it could not furnish the social principles of justice which must underlie any democratic structure. He characterized the religious situation very

succinctly by saying that he observed three general religious attitudes in India. There were, he said, good religion, bad religion, and no religion at all, and the great majority of Indians held the last. That this was prejudiced opinion many will declare, because it came from India's greatest "untouchable" leader, Ambedkar.

I sought diligently for the sources of Hindu strength. I looked constantly for evidences of vitality. Somewhere it must be found, I thought. I had found it in Japan's new religions—tremendous vitality. I simply did not find it anywhere in Hinduism. What of the reform movements, the Brahma Samaj, the Arya Samaj? I was told bluntly that the Brahma Samaj, once a powerful reforming group, though never large in numbers, was dead. As Mark Twain once remarked concerning his own reported demise, the report was greatly exaggerated, but I found little vitality there. The impression was that it was a group that had played its role out, and had little or nothing to contribute in a day of great need for vigorous religious leadership.

The Arya Samaj, once a powerful, numerous, and aggressive reform group, suffered enormously from partition, and lay licking its wounds rather than actively engaging in the formerly aggressive prosecution of its purpose to revivify Hinduism by returning to the Vedas. Clearly it does not have the vitality to provide needed leadership in the India of today.

The Mahasabha, the extremely orthodox wing of Hinduism, which like the Arya Samaj laid a great deal of stress upon the reconversion of Hindus from Islam and Christianity, has declined in strength. Somewhat political-minded, and a watchdog to see that the sacred principles of orthodox Hinduism were not traduced by the modernization of India's legal system, it has no practical program for the modern age. Its face is toward the past rather than the future. Much of the vitality it once had has evaporated.

And so one might go on recalling the role of the various reform movements of one kind or another, but without finding any in which there is great vitality or promise. Perhaps the *Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh*, usually known as R.S.S., is as vital as any, but it is at present under the ban, for it was out of this group that Gandhi's

assassin came. They are suspected of Fascist tendencies. Clearly they do not seem to be the key to India's religious recovery.

The one movement that holds out any great promise, that manifests any considerable awareness of the complexity of the problems of modern India and has any marked social consciousness or conscience, is the Ramakrishna movement. It operates in a number of centers, at both the intellectual and the philosophical level, and at the same time carries on a wise and useful social program of education, healing, care of orphans, etc. Its publishing activities and its conduct of open forums on live questions of the day, attempting to bring to bear upon them the resources of religion, are altogether admirable but at the same time extremely limited in comparison with the vast extent of India and her enormous population. Here I found, I think, the greatest vitality that I discovered anywhere in Hinduism. But there was nothing here comparable to the pulsing life of the new religions of Japan, to which I keep referring.

The one most insistent impression I received as I visited one section after another of India was one of a progressive abandonment of an other-worldly emphasis in religion, and an increasing emphasis on the world that now is, and along with that, though not as a necessary accompaniment, I thought I saw a definite growth of the secular spirit. This will appear as we go on to inquire what, if any, effect Communism has had on India's faiths, and what attitudes religion has taken toward this vigorous movement that now seeks to win over the East.

When I asked leaders of all sorts, religious, educational, business, literary, and others, what, if any, effect Communism has had on religion, particularly Hinduism, I got a great variety of answers. There was no clear-cut view upon which there was common agreement. Here are some of them:

"Communism has had no effect at all on religions." "Communism has thoroughly undermined religion." There could hardly be a greater difference of judgment. A very keen editor, one of the ablest with whom I talked, said, "Communism simply hasn't made a sufficient impact upon India to provoke any religious reaction." Several men, one in high government circles, another a distinguished editor, and still another a well-known figure in the educational world, said:

"Religion has nothing to do with Communism." Others said "Communism is not a problem for Hinduism." One distinguished university professor said, "It has made necessary a reappraisal of Hinduism." Said another, "It has made India more humanistic, given people the idea, this is something man can do for himself." Another said, "It has brought about a feeling that man can be better than he is," by which I think he meant that man can himself better his own lot (humanism). A college president said, "It has awakened a feeling that ancient religious values must be preserved." He was not himself a Hindu by religious belief, but an Indian. Another declared that Communism had broken down old traditions that badly needed breaking. Still another said it had led to the loss of their bearings among the middle classes. It was partly responsible, declared one of India's greatest scholars, for Hinduism's loss of its hold upon the Indian people.

"The political party comes to take the place of deity," asserted an anthropologist of high standing. "The blessings it brings are secular, but very real." It has destroyed, claimed several, the sense of Karma, once perhaps the most powerful factor in Hindu religious faith, certainly at the mass level. Others asserted with equal emphasis that the one thing that had not been affected was the strong sense of Karma which is felt among the people.

What is one to make of all this variety of opinion? How shall one evaluate it, and what generalizations can one make in the face of such diverse ideas, all held by thoughtful people in some part of India or other? It must first be pointed out that India has not been equally affected in all its various sections by Communist activity. Most of the above-quoted statements represent what is probably a fact in the particular area in which the person quoted lives. Whether by design, or because of peculiar local conditions, or otherwise, there are certain areas of intense Communist activity in India and other sections where it is hardly known at all. Most of the political strength of Communism is to be found in three sections, Bengal, the Telingana area, and Travancore-Cochin in South India. There is a substantial amount of Communist propaganda emanating from Bombay, for example, the weekly English-language paper *Blitz*,

which has a national circulation, but Communist political representation from that section is very small.

There are five main groups in India among whom Communism has taken hold. The first are the intellectuals, a relatively small group who hold to dialectical Marxism as a philosophy, superior on purely rational grounds to the prevalent philosophies of Hinduism. These are mostly to be found in the universities, among professors and students. Many of them hold themselves aloof, especially the professors, from the actual political struggle represented by activity of the Communist party. There is, next, a very substantial number of educated persons, products of the national educational system and trained for intellectual rather than manual vocations, for whom there is simply no opportunity for employment at present in India. The numerous universities continue to graduate them in large numbers, but they are doomed to frustration and disillusionment at finding nothing to do that is in keeping with their educational background. Indians bitterly blame the British for this misplaced emphasis upon higher education as opposed to the widespread introduction of elementary schools, but the independent Indian government has shown no notable disposition to effect any change in the system. This group, numerically large, of unemployed educated youth is a fertile seedbed in which Communism is diligently sown by clever propaganda. Out of this group come Communist leaders of outstanding ability. I heard it suggested over and over again that they sometimes become leaders, not primarily because of Communist convictions, but because they are thus afforded a job and status. But there is reason aplenty for dissatisfaction with things as they are. So Communism grows among students and at least the younger unemployed graduates. While I was in Calcutta, the university student body elected a Communist president running frankly on a Communist platform.

A third group is the industrial labor body, which with the gradual industrialization of India became increasingly strong. There are four national labor organizations, three of which are frankly Marxist in outlook. Two are definitely Communist but divided on a personal leadership basis. One is definitely Marxist, but not Communist. The fourth is ostensibly loyal to the Congress party, though even this

one has embraced the principle of technological industrialization, in contrast to the Gandhian idea of cottage industries, as a basis of building a proletariat. Obviously the area where the major industries are found is likely to be strongly Communist. And most of this is in Bengal where the great jute mills are concentrated.

The fourth group most susceptible to Communist influence is the great body of refugees who have been forced by the partition of India to leave their homes, and largely their possessions, in Pakistan, and find a new home in India. These folk are in wretched circumstances; most of them are completely without personal resources and dependent upon government for their very lives. The difficulties and delay in the solution of this grave problem make this group peculiarly vulnerable to Communist propaganda. For Communists can and do promise land and security, not in some distant future, when by the democratic process some decision has been reached by which landlords can be forced to divide their large holdings, but by quick direct action. This makes its appeal to people in a desperate economic plight right now.

Fifth is the peasant group, the people of the villages, the poorest, most put-upon of all India's millions, who live perpetually at the very margin of subsistence. To these folk Communism comes offering quick relief by the simple process of taking the land away from the big landowners and dividing it among the village folk. That there was promise of immediate action by the Communists in the 1952 elections was abundantly evident. Stories abound of votes secured for Communism by the promise of a sum of money and a certain number of acres of land if the Communists won the election. When it was won, peasants appeared immediately after the election results were announced, asking for their land. That the peasants may have misunderstood is a possibility, but there is little doubt that hopes were held out for immediate action. It may have been in part the nonfulfillment of pre-election promises which led in a number of cases of by-elections either to the defeat of the Communist candidate or to a very substantial reduction of the Communist plurality.

A great deal was made of the fact that in two agricultural areas, the Telingana area and Travancore-Cochin, so large a number of Communist candidates were elected. Many feared because of this

that the people there had gone Communist. I spent some time in South India, particularly in Travancore-Cochin, trying to discover just how strong Communism was in that area. I became more and more convinced, as I talked with all kinds of people, that the vote represented not so much a vote for Communism as a vote against the Congress party, largely for two reasons: (1) the nonfulfillment of the Congress party promises and (2) the increasing evidence of corruption in the ranks of the Congress party, now that it is in power.

Communism was, then, a definite factor to be reckoned with. When all the explanations have been made, it still remains true that it has won a substantial support, and that it constitutes a serious menace. Leaders in Travancore-Cochin were conscious of it, but on analysis the Communist gains were not as large as is sometimes thought. While it is generally reported that the Communists won thirty-two seats in the legislative assembly, it is not true that that many were elected as Communists, standing on a Communist platform. As a matter of fact only ten candidates stood frankly as representatives of the Communist party, and of these only eight won election. Thus really only eight out of the thirty-two seats claimed by Communists are legitimately claimed. Of the remainder of the thirty-two, some, it is claimed, are Communists by personal conviction, though not elected as such. While, therefore, they add voting strength in the legislative assembly to the Communist side, their presence does not properly reflect the percentage of popular support for Communism found among the people. Just how many are actually Communists I was unable to learn. Testimony on the matter varied. Among the thirty-two, who do constitute a united front opposed to the dominant Congress party, there are representatives of several more or less leftist groups who would deny being Communist. Furthermore, in by-elections here and in the Telingana and Bengal areas, where Communist candidates had been elected before, the Congress party candidates either won the seats or cut heavily into the plurality received by the Communists in the first instance. So the picture does not look as dark as it has sometimes been represented as being. Two possible factors contribute to the situation in this area, I was told. First was the fact that Travan-

core-Cochin has the largest percentage of Christians to be found anywhere in India, running to almost a third of the population. It will be recalled that this is the part of India which has had a Christian Church since, quite certainly, the third century A.D.—some claim its establishment by Thomas, a disciple of Jesus, one of the twelve. It has been known as the Mar Thoma Church. Now there are Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and many kinds of Protestants as well. Second, this area has the highest percentage of literacy of any of the Indian States. Could there be any correlation between these facts and the greater prevalence of Communism?

The evidence is not clear. It is true that there is a fairly large number of unemployed educated young men and women, who have, as indicated elsewhere, come to feel bitter resentment against government. Some of these have become Communists. No one knows just how many. A more significant fact is that they are furnishing a well-educated leadership of the Communist party, whether as a matter of personal conviction or, as several there insisted, because it gave them something to do and a certain prestige as leaders. As is well known, there are personal satisfactions that come from leading almost any kind of cause. It gives one a sense of power, and of importance.

I could discover no correlation between the facts of being Christian and voting Communist. In the first place, Christians are not concentrated sufficiently in any given areas to enable one to say which way they voted, with one exception. Two districts voted heavily for Communism. One was a constituency that was very largely Christian, but at the same time economically one of the areas of greater distress. The people were largely employed either in fisheries or in the coir industry, that is, the making of fiber ropes, mats, etc., and both of these were in a fearful slump. So the factor of economic urgency could easily explain the vote rather than any religious point of view. Furthermore, most of these people were Catholic, many of them Roman Catholic under the direction largely of the Portuguese Church. A vigorous priest of another nationality declared that the Church there has done strictly nothing to affect the economic life of the people in hundreds of years, and that it was no wonder they voted Communist.

The other group to go heavily Communist was the Ezhavas, a former untouchable group, chiefly employed as toddy tappers, and not at all Christian. Now prohibition has come to the area and these people have suffered the loss of the toddy market and are in a desperate plight. Thus it appears that it was the practical quest for better economic conditions that determined their vote. The plain fact is that there is not enough land in this section for the increasing population. Even if it were more equitably divided, the problem would not be solved, because the three thousand square miles of arable land are not sufficient for so many people. Industrialization must increase in order to absorb a larger percentage of the people, and for this to be possible, capital and markets must be found and developed. One informant remarked that if only every American would buy five cents' worth of coir from Travancore, it would relieve a great deal of the distress of the coastal area. There is great need for the co-operation of American and other foreign powers to discover and develop fresh industrial uses for coir, a palm fiber, which the people are prepared to produce in greatly increased quantities.

It will not do to say that Communism is found nowhere except in these three areas. There are small pockets of it here, there, and everywhere, but not in great strength. People are most conscious of the problem in these particular areas. What, precisely, is it that makes Communists of people? I asked that of many of my informants and got a great variety of replies.

The most commonly, indeed almost universally, reported cause was the economic distress of so many people. This was broken down into many detailed statements, such as: (1) Large industrial masses are underpaid, and working and living conditions are bad, not everywhere, to be sure, but in many places. (2) The ownership of the land to a distressing degree is vested in a relatively small group, while the mass of farmers are landless, or little more than serfs on the landed estates. (3) There is a large group of educated unemployed, for whom there simply are no jobs, and out of sheer disillusionment and desperation they seek a way out through Communism. (4) Millions of refugees are homeless and helpless. (5) Teachers' pay is so low they cannot live decently on their incomes. They are paid less than porters at some levels. (6) Heavy taxes are

paid to government, but there are no adequate returns. (7) There is great waste in government. (8) High salaries are paid to government executives; they drive about in expensive cars, live in luxury and ostentation, quite out of keeping with the general level of Indian life. This latter complaint was heard over and over again. The ostentation was resented on the part of the British when they ruled, but allowance was unconsciously made for the fact that they came out of a land of different living standards. Not so for the Indians, many of whom "never had it so good." I don't know how many times it was pointed out to me that in China it was not so. There the leaders were men of austerity who shared in much greater degree the common lot, and did not "live high" at the expense of their fellow citizens. (9) Congress has only paper schemes; they are not put into effect. (10) Communism can operate much more expeditiously.

But economic distress is not the whole story. One very acute observer remarked that as a matter of fact Communism has not generally come to people on a falling scale of living, but precisely when there is some improvement, or there is prospect for it, which delays in coming. I am not wholly convinced of the truth of the observation, but it fits in with the remark of another profound student of Indian economic affairs, the editor of the *Eastern Economist,* who listed it as one of the reasons why he thought India would not go Communist. Said he, "Low as they are, India's living standards could be considerably farther lowered than they are before she would resort to violent revolution in the attempt to better her condition."

One of the major causes of political unrest, extending in many instances to the embracing of Communism, is the fact that the Congress party promised so much if only India were independent. Now she is independent. That the party never could overnight make good on these promises ought to be understood, and is by large numbers of people. But the masses looked for an immediate improvement which simply has not come, and they resent the failure of the Congress party to redeem its pledges.

I personally have the feeling, as an outsider, that under all the circumstances an amazing amount has been done, against great

odds, in a comparatively short time. Think of having to take over the government of over three hundred million people, largely illiterate, quite deficient in many of the necessities for a prosperous national life, badly overpopulated, short of capital, with a very low national income and little experience in self-government, and in a period of less than five years having to go through the distressing experience of partition and the slaughter and resettlement of millions of people. Add to all this that they have suffered repeated famines in some areas; for example, there has been a five-year drought in parts of southern India. An outsider does not wonder if at points they have failed to make good on promises which were too rosy to begin with. But to an insider whose hope has been aroused for something better, there is less objectivity of judgment. His hopes have been raised. He has had a glimpse of something better. Now government seems to him to have forgotten its promises. Maybe Communism could do better what Congress has failed to do!

A tremendous amount of propaganda is being carried on by Communists. They are active at many levels. It was the generally expressed opinion that the Communist literary output is far more effective than that put out by the Americans, who are bearing the brunt of carrying on an active counterpropaganda. Communist literature is well written, well printed and bound, and either given away or sold at ridiculously low prices. For example, I saw in Delhi men with literally armloads of clothbound copies of the life of Joseph Stalin which they were selling for the equivalent of about twenty cents. And the people were buying them, right and left. I saw whole bookstalls filled with books, periodicals, and pamphlets brightly illustrated and on good paper, at prices the people could pay. And they were buying. That this literature is a gift of Russia and that the profits of its sale are an indirect subsidy from Russia is the commonly held belief, though denied by local Communists, who say they pay something for it, though not the cost price. It is openly charged that such periodicals as *Blitz*, which follows the party line 100 per cent, is heavily subsidized. And many others. How otherwise, asked several informants, could they continue to exist, when their paid circulation is known to be small and their advertising is so little in amount? They play constantly upon the greed and cruelty

of capitalism and imperialism, charging them indiscriminately with every crime against humanity, and exalt Communism as the people's friend. The imperialists seek war; Communism seeks peace. The imperialists protect privilege and exploitation. It is by this alone that they live. Communism seeks the good of the common man. Imperialists talk much of democracy; only Communism is real democracy. And so it goes. And the people see enough of truth, in much that conditions their own lives, to cause them to lend a ready ear to such claims. Unhampered by the necessity of adherence to truth or facts, the Communists have little trouble in manufacturing stories that make the blood of exploited peoples boil. Little by little their effect is felt, and Communism comes nearer.

Other factors have been suggested as leading some persons into Communism. Even sex frustration was suggested as a cause of it. There is a real problem among educated Indians of finding a wife who is educated and can share their life. Many are wed to illiterate women, who offer no companionship, yet escape from the situation is difficult as society is at present organized. Communism with its looser view of marriage, and the sex relations in general, seems to offer a way out. Not a few young people are attracted to it by the freedom from sexual inhibitions which it offers. Someone suggested that, in Freudian terms, Communism offers to youth the resolution of the father complex. There is a psychological side to their turning Communist. The father authority is resented. Communists approve this. They too overturn authorities. So the youth feels at home among them. The resentment felt toward the father is transferred to resentment against the society which controls him. Communism offers a way of practical expression of this feeling in the political sphere.

Add to all these factors, personal and social, the example of China, an oriental country like India, which has, according to report, found a new life and a new prosperity under Communism. Delegations have gone to China and returned with glowing accounts of the improvement in living standards there. Take such statements as these, for example: "The new government took charge in 1949. The year 1950 was the turning point in the country's economy. The same year the production of food grains increased to such an extent that after

feeding the 255 million people in their villages, 80 million in the city, and 40 million in the so-called famine areas of the previous year, the country had a surplus of food grains which could feed another 45 million for one year. The total produce in 1950 was fourteen per cent higher than in 1949, and in 1951, eight per cent higher than that in 1950. It was estimated that in 1951, after feeding its entire population and reserving ample grain for food until the next drought, China will have surplus grain sufficient to feed 100 million people for one year."[1] Might not such a report, from a country backward like India, of progress made under the new Communist regime make hungry Indians wonder if Communism ought not to be tried in India also?

Add such other reports as that concerning redistribution of land: "Already the land reform has liberated over 300 million Chinese peasants from centuries old serfdom."[2] Might not this sound good to the land-hungry peasants of India? Or this: "Land tax comes to about 13% of the produce, and is collected in kind."[3] To peasants who pay half or more of the grain they produce as rent, this would make a definite appeal.

And it doesn't greatly matter whether the report is a true one or not. It comes from people who claim that theirs was no conducted tour, that they were given a large measure of liberty to move about, visit where they wished, and ask what questions they desired. The people of India are inclined to believe the reports and are influenced favorably toward Communism by them. Consider that there is reported a complete emancipation of women in China, that there is no permission of polygamy, or concubinage, or prostitution, or any subjection of women, and there is a tremendous appeal to the feminine half of India's vast population.

Nehru, by his commendation of China, has, it is said, greatly aided the cause of Communism though he has expressed himself formally as opposed to Communism. I talked with several of the delegates who had recently been in China on a good-will mission. They reportedly saw no Russian control of China. Chinese Communism was

[1] Sundarlal, *China Today*, Allahabad, 1952, pp. 588-589.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 446.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 483.

not Russian, but something distinctly Chinese, they said. Russia had even found it wise to modify some of her own setup in view of what China had done. Some observers were genuinely convinced that, while Communism was not the thing for America or England, it was exactly what was needed in India. And many people are accepting that view. They have a pathetic faith that they can take from Communism what they like, mold it to their own local situation, and thus achieve what otherwise is not possible. Over and over I was to hear that there was no evidence of Russian imperialism in China. I also heard that religious freedom existed.

For example, in the published report of the Indian Good Will Mission of 1951 the categorical statement is made: "There is complete religious freedom in New China." The report goes on to declare that in various places the committee saw mosques, and temples, with the people freely saying their prayers or worshiping according to the tenets of their respective faiths. Since there is much misunderstanding concerning the matter of freedom of speech, religion, etc., the report chooses to quote Article V of the provisional Constitution of the New China, which says in part: "The people of the People's Republic of China shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly . . . religious belief and holding processions and demonstrations."

But from my own close contact with those who were bearing the brunt of persecution for religious faith, I knew they were wrong at that point. Might they not be equally wrong in their reporting of the economic and political situations as well?

Among the many other reasons alleged for the success of Communism in making its way in India, one, given by a thoughtful anthropologist, was the breakdown of caste. That caste has largely broken down, particularly in the urban industrialized centers but also to a considerable degree all over India, is very evident. But how could this lead to Communism? His explanation is this: When caste functioned everyone was taken care of. To be sure, he had little individual liberty. He did not choose his vocation, he was used to being ordered around, but if he didn't have freedom he did have security. The breaking with caste had given liberty, unknown before, but it had at the same time lessened the sense of social re-

sponsibility and therefore contributed to the insecurity of the individual, which would be necessarily felt in time of economic crisis, even if not in times of prosperity. Now economic crisis has come. The feeling of insecurity drives the individual to seek some source of security upon which he can depend. Caste is no longer able to provide it, but Communism comes onto the scene and offers to supply the need. To be sure, *it* does not allow much individual freedom. It tells people largely what they can do and what they can't, what they may think and say and what they may not. But the one thing the people most desperately seek, it does offer, and they are used to being ordered about, or were, so the lesser need or desire is sacrificed to the greater, and they embrace Communism. They do not know that Communism also has failed, over many years of trial now in Russia, to provide the good life which it promised and still does, but they do know that now they themselves are terribly insecure. This is the situation where caste has largely broken down, but in areas where caste is still strong, and there are such, I heard it argued with equal force that caste offered the most effective barrier against Communism. Because there exists in such areas a profound belief, not in the equality of man, but in his very definite inequality, Communism, which has as its ideal a classless society and its equalitarian emphasis, makes little or no appeal. We shall revert to this at a later point in the discussion.

Two other factors enter at this point as of at least minor effect in the growth of Communism. I have already suggested that unemployed educated people furnish leadership for the Communists, but it is also not infrequent that some, defeated for Congress party leadership, turn to Communism and become leaders though they are not Communists by conviction. But, in all fairness, it is probably true that this is only a minor matter. One of the very strong influences making for Communist success is the zeal and self-sacrifice displayed by Communist leaders, who live austerely and sacrificially in order to put their ideas across. Opportunists do not easily fit into this mold. Nor do they submit easily to the rigorous party discipline which Communism imposes.

Half-facetiously, but also half-seriously, one university professor blamed the British for Communism, as they are blamed for so many

other things. During the period when many Congress party leaders were in prison for non-co-operation during the Independence Movement, they were not allowed to have books to read, but they were permitted to read Communist leaflets and pamphlets, and not a few leaders were thus led to embrace Communism. I am unable to evaluate the truth of the statement. It may only be on a par with a somewhat similar statement made about the Americans in Japan, to the effect that it was the American Occupation forces that made Communism respectable in Japan; or the other statement, that American aid in India furthers Communism by creating greater income gaps between those so aided and the common people, thus increasing the dissatisfaction upon which Communism thrives.

We have already referred to the wide and lively circulation of the Communists' printed propaganda. But this is not their sole or even their main reliance. Communists are like Jehovah's Witnesses, inveterate literature and tract distributors. They also make a great deal of use of posters, of painting slogans on walls, and other types of visual appeal. In all the cities, at least, Communist films are shown frequently, many of them not ostensibly as propaganda, but as simple entertainment, for which people pay prevailing prices. But in the films the unmistakable Communist ideas and ideals are presented over and over again. Of course, definite propaganda films are also used. The use of drama and dramatic organizations is common, in the putting on of Communist-slanted plays. In the villages, where the storyteller has played a very significant role in public entertainment and enlightenment, in places where no cinema films penetrate, the storyteller is used to bring the gospel of Communism to the people.

But at the village level, particularly, the method of quiet infiltration through the performance of friendly social service is one of the most compelling influences. This technique has been borrowed from the missionary, who has gone to the villages with schools, and healing, and child care, and all sorts of community services. Now, I heard missionaries and Indian pastors who work in the villages telling of Communists who were doing the identical things they themselves were doing, but all in the name of Communism. And it was having its effect. Friendship was being won, and sometimes even among

the very members of the Christian churches. Indeed, I was told more than once that when Communists had come into a village and begun their ministry of helpfulness, the people had said, "Why, this is just Christianity." And as Christians they had joined up with the Communists, seeing no essential difference in their approach.

But how does Hinduism react to Communism, or better, perhaps, how do Hindus react, for there are so many varieties of Hinduism? Do they welcome it, embrace it, assimilate it, modify it, reject it, neglect it? These were questions I wanted answered. And I found some Hindus reacting in one or the other of all these various ways. When I asked the question, "What is Hinduism's attitude toward Communism?" they almost invariably asked, "What do you mean by Hinduism and what do you mean by Communism?" I had generally to end up by throwing the question back to them and saying, "What is the attitude of Hinduism, as you understand it, toward whatever you regard as Communism?" I usually found I could sharpen the issue by putting it more concretely thus, "Can a Hindu be a Communist without doing violence to anything fundamental in Hinduism?" Or, "Do you regard Hinduism as being a deterrent to Communist advance?" Putting the questions thus in various forms I found three points of view represented among my many informants. (1) There is no fundamental incompatibility between Hinduism and Communism. (2) There is much that is common to both Hinduism and Communism, and Hinduism might well absorb many things Communism offers. (3) There are such fundamental cleavages between the two systems that they cannot exist together. A good Hindu cannot be a good Communist, and Hinduism ought therefore to be active in opposing Communism. It is true that some held overlapping views, but the three positions were clearly represented by some among those to whom I talked.

In general, I would estimate that those who held the first were a distinct minority, those who held the second position were a much larger percentage, but the third position was held by much the greatest number. The first was held by a few intellectuals who were familiar with the whole history of the development of Hinduism and Hindu thought. On the basis of what Hinduism had held at some one time or another there was nothing essentially new or dif-

ferent in Communism. They pointed out that there had been schools of Hindu materialism, of atheism, and that Hinduism in its caste system had made allowance for the use of violence by those of a particular caste, the military. Hinduism had accommodated itself to every kind of government through the centuries and had managed to come to terms and live with all of them; why not now with Communism? To such men, I had a feeling that the discussion was rather an academic than a practical one. It did not, I think, mean necessarily that they personally, as Hindus, would also be Communist, but that they could not properly sit in judgment upon Hindus who were at the same time Communists. Hinduism, historically studied, has been very absorptive. It has no particular criterion of judgment by which it includes or excludes. Why not then take Marxist Communism in also?

What is there in Communism which the middle group finds harmonious with Hinduism or at least not in conflict with it, and which is considered a good to be embraced? One distinguished editor said, "There is a good deal of idealism in Communism," without further specifying forms the idealism took. A college president said, also in general terms, "So much in Communism is needed and applies here." Several pointed out that Communism does not recognize caste; that it stands for a classless society; that it stresses equality; that it takes care of everyone (except the reactionaries, should have been added); that it has a care for the underdog; and that the Communists are willing to sacrifice personal comfort and well-being for a cause. All these belong to Hinduism, or at least are found in Hinduism at one or more of its levels. For example, Hinduism, in its Vedanta form, stresses human equality and the unity of all mankind, though Hinduism as a whole supports caste. Hinduism at its higher levels regards nonpossession of privately owned things as a virtue. Renunciation of possessions is a necessity if one is to attain to the ultimate goods of high Hinduism, but at the ordinary popular level private property is recognized as perfectly proper. Some extreme forms of Hinduism discard the belief in God, as is done in Communism, but 99 per cent of the people of India traditionally cherish a profound faith in some one or many gods and would be likely to resist, to some degree at least, a system which

denied belief in God. But a substantial number of those who recognized these values as inhering in Communism, and constituting a challenge to Hinduism, felt that there were other points at which the two were not in agreement but indeed in open conflict.

Points at which they were diametrically opposed were pointed out over and over again. Some put it very broadly: "Their basic philosophies differ." "Communism can't be integrated with Hinduism." "There is a moral order in the world which will destroy Communism." "The social structure which is upheld by religion is opposed to it." "Communism is contrary to the social philosophy of India." More specifically, an eminent Hindu professor of philosophy declared, "Communism is frankly materialistic, Hinduism is spiritually oriented; economic determinism clashes with the freedom posited in Hinduism. Man is a free spirit, not an economic machine. It is true there is nothing man cannot control—but it is God working in and through man. While there is a principle of Karma in Hinduism which is sometimes construed as determinism, actually there is a world of difference between this and economic determinism. An untouchable may have been born as such, but he can, and indeed has become a statesman."

This principle of Karma and the belief in reincarnation that goes along with it and gives it scope was mentioned over and over as a chief point of difference. In Communism there is no life beyond this. To be sure, there is the survival of social values and goods which the individual may have produced, and these carry on in society. But the individual, as such, has no continued existence. Hinduism, on the other hand, believes in a continuing round of rebirth at different levels, determined by the law of Karma until *moksha*, or salvation, is achieved, which, in intellectual Hinduism, at least, is defined as the state of birthlessness. To be sure, except for specially gifted souls or through clairvoyance, it is not given to the individual to know into what previous existence he has been born, yet there is a continuity of births based on Karma or the moral law, and the acceptance of this belief has been of enormous moral significance in India, historically.

Indeed I was told, over and over again, that this belief has been one of the strongest stabilizing influences in Indian Society. If my

birth into a given situation as untouchable or low caste is the just moral fruit of my past lives, then I must accept it as given, and make the best of it, hoping by my faithful fulfillment of the *dharma*, or requirement of my present existence, to merit a better birth next time. That this has been true in the past nearly everyone recognizes, but there was the greatest difference of opinion as to what the interpretation of the idea, or of its present-day force, is in society. One of India's great statesmen regards the force of Karmic belief as the bulwark against Communism. The alternative, he insisted, was stark revolution. Because they know this, the Communists, he says, try to destroy it. The belief in Karma, they tell the people, is a device of capitalists and landlords by which they hold you in fear of uprising and so are able to exploit your labor to their own advantage. Your fate is in your own hands. You need not remain poor and destitute. Arise, assert yourselves! It must be admitted that this kind of doctrine has its appeal to hungry people. It is the old technique of getting rid of the religion that promises "pie in the sky, by and by" by offering an abundant life here and now.

I found the utmost variety of opinion when I asked how strong the Karmic belief is in India, and how it is being affected by Communism. A great Hindu scholar said, "The belief in Karma is there, but it has no effect on practice." Others declared: "Karma belief is fast going." "Karma belief is getting weaker." "Whoever says the Karmic ideal is still strong is an armchair student." "The uneducated masses still hold to Karma." "Karma is only a theory, acted upon only by informed and convinced men, but not by the ordinary man." "Karma is fast diminishing. There is a tendency now to question why this or that happens."

A tendency toward reinterpretation is evident. One says it has been wrongly interpreted. It can just as well be interpreted to mean that one is a determiner of his own destiny. "Karma works both ways; it opposes change but at the same time it disposes man to accept the new." "It may be interpreted as favoring the cause of Communism, i.e., it must come." One of India's most distinguished philosophers interprets some Karma as not yet mature, and some Karma as matured and bearing fruit in this life. But there is also the Karma belief that what we do now can cancel out not

yet matured Karma. It is clear that here is a matter upon which agreement does not exist. My own summary of the matter is that at the higher intellectual level Karma has little meaning practically, that it is under serious question and reinterpretation, that at the mass level it is by no means the powerful force that it once was, and that it is being attacked by and is vulnerable to the attacks of Communists, in view of the extreme poverty and distress from which people suffer. When Communist propagandists point to Russia and China (the latter particularly, as an oriental people) and say, see what they have accomplished, by their own efforts, it makes quite an appeal, even if the picture of the Chinese situation is misrepresented to them, for they do not know the facts.

Perhaps the most frequently mentioned contrast between Hinduism and Communism was the Hindu teaching of *ahimsa,* or nonviolence, and the ruthless employment of violence by Communism in effecting its ends. Over and over again it was emphasized that Hinduism never uses compulsion. Communism, which allows no freedom of choice to the individual, and is uninhibited by any ethical principle from using the most violent methods of coercion in compelling the acquiescence in its views and purposes, can never be acceptable to the Hindus who are true to their heritage. On a theoretical basis, this is undoubtedly the case. To Gandhian Hindus there could be no question of its acceptance, but one is struck as he travels about India, and talks with the people, at the degree to which violence and coercion have come to be recognized as justifiable in the achievement of what are considered to be worth-while ends. The question here may be whether the Hindus are true to their heritage.

Other points worthy of mention were: "Self-realization is always the goal in Hinduism, never that of equal sharing" as in Communism. "Communism is utterly intolerant of any other point of view, Hinduism is all-tolerant. Hindus would not therefore readily accept Communism." Marxism, unlike Hinduism, runs counter to nature in its failure to regard certain psychological laws—one of them, that all should be equal. And finally, Communism is international, while Hinduism certainly is, in its present form, strongly linked with nationalism. It should be said, however,

that for multitudes of Hindus Hinduism is not merely a national religion. It is at this moment in history largely national, but in the end it is universal in scope, and will some day become the universal faith of mankind, or will form an important component of the world faith that will one day emerge out of the rival faiths of the contemporary world.

Is Hinduism then a deterrent to Communism? My answer is: Not by any means to the extent that Islam is, but it may help prevent its coming. Many to whom I put this question said frankly that it formed no effective barrier to Communism's advance. "Hinduism is too tolerant," someone said. "Hinduism's great tragedy," said another, "is that it never says no." Hinduism is too amorphous to offer effective opposition to so vigorous and actively promoted a doctrine as Communism especially when it purports to meet man's immediate physical needs. There is no great institutional solidarity within Hinduism. It is not at all congregational in its worship. People come as individuals to worship in the temples and while there may be hosts of others present, they are still individuals. There is no strong central body with authority to issue statements of belief or to send out orders or even advice to the churches or temples. There is no well-defined teaching body to hand on doctrine. Priests have little to do with determining how people think and act, but are primarily concerned with matters of ritual. So the mobilization of Hinduism for or against anything is exceedingly difficult. It does not lend itself readily to effective opposition to Communism, even if it were completely convinced that it should be opposed to it. It will be understood, of course, that I speak here of Hinduism as a whole, not of certain reformed groups within it which do have a cohesion and a machinery not common to Hinduism as a whole.

When I asked, as I did, almost everyone with whom I talked, "Will Communism win out in India?" I got, of course, a variety of answers. No one really knows. A few said, "Yes," categorically. A few said, "Absolutely not." The great majority qualified their positive or negative replies in some way or other.

"Yes, of course," said all of the Communist leaders whom I inter-

viewed. "It will be delayed perhaps, but it is bound to come." Their answer was to be expected.

"Yes, absolutely," said the outstanding leader of the untouchables, the man who was chairman of the committee that drafted the present Constitution of India, Ambedkar. "Communism must and will come, it is the only way out for India's masses. I do not mean it must or will come to the United States, or to England, but for India, I can see no other way," he said in effect. "Hinduism is bankrupt, there is in it nothing upon which to base a democracy. There is in it no sense of justice." Here was talking a man who was born an untouchable, and who sees his people, despite a constitutional provison outlawing untouchability, still suffering the disadvantages of birth in flagrant fashion, and without any adequate recourse under the present Congress form of government.

But do you mean Communism as in Russia, with its employment of forced labor, its use of coercion, its public trials, etc. etc.? "Yes," he cried passionately, "there is no other way for India. How can a country as poor as India ever achieve what is necessary in the way of roads and dams and irrigation projects in any other way? And do you not know that this principle is recognized in the present Indian Constitution, the only restriction upon it being that there must be no discrimination in applications of the law?" He reached for a copy of the Constitution, which he had himself written, in no small degree, and read it to me. I was astonished. Then he launched into a bitter diatribe against the Western nations for trying to compel India to follow the patterns of Western democracy.

"Yes," said several, "though maybe not in the Russian or Chinese way. India might adopt Communism in some form better adapted to her peculiar genius." This I found a fairly common form of belief. If Communism comes, it will be something peculiar to India; an Indian Titoism, I heard suggested many times.

"No, for Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism fall short of Indian thought in every way," said a Hindu leader. "No, for Indian thought is very religious and believes in nonviolence." "No, Communism simply can't exist together with Hinduism." "No, Com-

munism is contrary to Indian social philosophy of the family systhem, and their sense of social responsibility." "No, India is too passive, not activist enough to meet Communist requirements"—an interesting observation. "No, Communism is internationalist, India is too strongly nationalist." "No, Communism rests on force and violence, India is a follower of nonviolence."

These negative reasons for not going Communist were repeatedly given in one form or another. But most answers were qualified: "Eventually, yes." "Probably." "Yes, if government continues at the present rate, and it is doubtful if Congress will do much." "Yes, if poverty and want continue." "Yes, if Nehru should disappear from the scene." Here was a note heard over and over. There is a pathetic faith in Nehru. He is greatly admired and loved, and trusted. I heard many times the suggestion that if Congress would only vote to him dictatorial powers for a period and then adjourn, he would bring about the necessary changes to solve India's problems. To which a very astute political observer replied, "Who do they think is doing whatever is being done now? Have you ever heard of Nehru being refused anything he asked for?" "What would happen if he should suddenly be removed from the scene?" I asked again and again. "Who would take his place?" I never got an answer. The people just don't seem to have anyone remotely in mind as a successor. Yet, Nehru is getting on in years and his most effective fellow leaders are as old as he is, or older.

"Yes, if Congress fails," came up often among the replies. "Yes, unless something is done, and soon." "Yes, unless the present corruption in Congress government can be eliminated."

"There will be pockets of Communism, but to India as a whole it will not come." "It depends on what the outside world does, since one might seize the instruments of power, but from the people it will not come." "If war comes, Communism may well come, hence the importance of peace." "Not if nationalism and religion remain as strong as now, for the standard of living can be considerably further depressed without producing popular revolt."

"It may come if China makes great progress," for there is no doubt that China's progress is being watched with interest. "If a

backward country like China, and one that is as badly overpopulated as India is, can find a solution of her problems in Communism, then India may well decide that for her the way out lies through Communism also."

"If Communism does come, it will not last," said a strong religious leader, and he seemed untroubled. "Systems come and go. Time is long. One needs to take the long look. There is a moral force at work in the universe which will bring to nought what runs counter to it."

It is to be seen from this variety of answers that the question has no certain answer. By far the greater number of answers were of the conditional sort, yes—if or no—if. The chief impressions I got out of all these conflicting answers were these. The coming of Communism in India depends chiefly on two things: internally upon some effective reforms in the political, social, and economic order in India which will relieve the fearful poverty and economic distress among the masses of the people. If this is done, or if some decent progress toward a bettering of the situation is made within a reasonable time, the people will not be likely to go Communist. This seems to be the first line of defense against it from within. Whether it will be accomplished is a question. I got the impression that the once revolutionary Congress party has become deeply entrenched, has lost much of its crusading form, and has settled down to enjoy the fruits of office. One of the difficulties in getting new blood into governmental services is the claim that so many have, because of sacrifices made in revolutionary days, imprisonment, loss of property, etc., to some place in government. This feeling might well be understood by representatives of veterans' organizations in other countries, who demand priorities in opportunity for government jobs because of the service they rendered in wartime, even if they never, most of them, got near the fighting front! One hears that the Congress party is mostly made up of rich men, who do not feel personally the pinch of circumstances as the people do, and prefer to maintain the *status quo*.

But even if the Congress party were desirous of alleviating the economic ills of the masses, they are faced with almost impossible difficulties, because of vast overpopulation, and insufficient resources to cope with the problems. Whether they can, without outside help,

achieve their goals is a matter of grave doubt. The south of India has suffered from drought for a series of years. Partition has left an enormous problem of resettlement and rehabilitation of millions of refugees. What resources are there for meeting these needs?

By far the most farseeing view of the whole came to me from a long conference with the American ambassador to India. His was a most statesmanlike view of the situation. He had studied the problem assiduously, had traveled about and met the people, seen the resources available, and had the advice of highly competent engineers, agriculturists, and other specialists. He was not so simple-minded as to suppose that the United States could solve India's problems, but he clearly saw that the United States could be of great help in some ways. How is India's food production to be stepped up to where it will be adequate for the consumption of the people? There are two chief ways of achieving this end: (1) put more land under cultivation; (2) increase the productivity of the land under cultivation now. Is there more land available. Lots of it, very fertile land. The only thing that is lacking is water. Is there enough water? Yes. Engineering surveys indicate that there is water available every year for the irrigation of millions and millions of acres of additional land, if only dams are built and the water is stored, then released as needed, instead of running off quickly and bearing with it, incidentally, good topsoil which India very much needs. This requires (1) capital and (2) engineering skill. Both could be provided by European nations. Eventually the capital could be returned, or would yield a good return to the investors, though it might be good economy to make substantial outright gifts of money for this necessary capital outlay. The increase of acreage would not only yield more grain but provide for the partial solution of the refugee problem.

But there is another way of bringing land under production. That is by deep wells from which the underground flow of water from the eternal snows of the Himalayas can be brought up by pumps and used to irrigate now desert or near-desert land. One well is capable of irrigating as much as four hundred acres. Already American aid to India is bringing in some of these deep wells and surveys are being made for others. It seems an entirely practical matter.

But production of already functioning farms can be substantially increased by the introduction of improved strains of rice, wheat, corn, or whatever the crop is, and by improved methods of cultivation and fertilization, which can be introduced, not overnight, but gradually, if the "know-how" is made available to India's farmer. This can be and is being furnished. Such a program, it will be recognized, is no complete blueprint of what America is going to or can do in India, but only a bare indication of what a wise and vigorous American ambassador had in mind to do and was seeking the means actually to carry out in India. Unfortunately, the shift of political fortunes in American politics has had the effect of interfering with the carrying out of these excellent plans. It is my personal belief that Mr. Bowles certainly ought to have been kept at his post in India, and given hearty support by the administration and Congress when he came seeking the necessary funds to make his plans effective. If one-fifth of the enormous sums that have been poured into little Greece were made available to India, it might mean the difference between India's going Communist and remaining as a bulwark of the free nations in the East. Many believe that India is the key to the situation in southeastern Asia and that if India can be kept from going Communist, the chances of stopping Communism there are greatly improved.

It will be seen from what has been said that while Hinduism is a factor in the deterring of Communism, it is not generally considered the primary factor. That is economic. Religion in India can and may help hold back Communism, but any reliance simply on the fact that people are Hindus in a religious sense would be misplaced. Either international factors, or the persistence of the unsolved problems of poverty and distress, or both, will quite outweigh religious considerations. Belief in neither God, nor Karma, nor nonviolence will serve to keep a starving people from revolt against the present order, especially now that they have the example of China before them, and while there is an active Communist propaganda promising them immediate, here-and-now, not other-worldly relief from the intolerable conditions under which they live.

Some leaders of Hinduism are conscious of this, and are actively

seeking alleviation of the ills from which society suffers, but by and large I was unable to discover very much that is being done to offset the propaganda of Communism. Many Hindus, even the leaders, assume that Communism is antireligious and that its antireligious character will repel people. But that simply is not the case. Communism in its Indian form is not openly antireligious at all. It says specifically in its published program for India that it stands for "Inviolability of person and domicile; *unhampered freedom of conscience, religious belief and worship,* speech, press, assembly, etc." and promises that "Religious minorities shall be given protection against discrimination."[4] When I asked Communist leaders, as I did in personal interviews with them, "What is the attitude of Communism toward religion?" I was invariably told that they regarded religion as a private matter, that one might follow any faith he wished, so long as it did not conflict with the principles of the Communist party. When I asked what that might mean, it was explained that it meant such matters as supporting the rights of private ownership, or overt interference with particular announced party principles. "And what if one does on principle oppose the party on something it decides to do, as a matter of religious principles?" "Then we shall have to deal with it," he said. "As they did in Russia?" I asked one leader. He shrugged his shoulders in assent.

Most people do not know that the Communist use of the term "freedom" is quite different from Western democratic usage. In Communism it is claimed that there is freedom to vote, but only one party is allowed to present candidates. Religion is free only in a very circumscribed sense, free within narrow limits imposed by Communist government. But people do not know this, and when it is said that you may continue to be a Hindu while a Communist, or a Buddhist or a Moslem or a Christian, a great barrier to the acceptance of Communism is removed.

Religious groups in India, by and large, in their attempt to carry on any kind of anti-Communist counterpropaganda, assume that Communism is antireligious and condemn it primarily on this ground. Thus their condemnation is relatively ineffective

[4] Programme of the Communist Party of India, 1951, ¶ 24, p. 14.

unless it goes behind or beyond the declared attitude of Communism to the practice that actually exists in places where Communism is in power, where all right of religion to pass moral judgment upon Communism in the name of God or their religious heritage is denied.

So far from being antireligious, at least on the surface, in India, a Communist labor union, for example, contributes funds for the celebration of certain religious ceremonials in Bombay. Communist leaders sometimes participate openly in religious festivals, I was told.

I sought diligently for some evidence that Hindu leaders were conscious of the problem of Communism. I found the Ramakrishna movement fostering public discussion of the principles of religion and of Communism. They conducted a forum in Calcutta, in which representatives of Communism and of religion each set forth their beliefs, but the movement itself took no position in the matter. I heard of one or two articles that had been written setting forth the fundamental differences in outlook between Hinduism and Communism. Professor Radhakrishnan, the vice-president of India and her ranking philosopher, writes an academic critique of Marxism as a philosophy in one of his books.[5]

I was told of one rather slashing attack on Communism written in Bengali from the standpoint of Hinduism. The R.S.S. actively opposes Communism through lectures, study circles, and publications. But this movement, a member of which shot Mahatma Gandhi, is under the ban now and of little influence. It is suspected of subversive tendencies itself. The Mahasabha, once a rather powerful orthodox Hindu group, has declined in influence in recent years, since partition, but it does carry on anti-Communist propaganda through one of its papers. One distinguished leader simply declares that Hinduism can't take sides in the issue, and that there is no group capable of stating the case for Hinduism.

There is no hope of getting anything done through the priests, says another. No Communist can hold leadership in the Prarthana Samaj, a reformed group in Hinduism. They and the Brahma Samaj

[5] *Religion and Society,* Allen and Unwin, London, 1948, pp. 24-42.

sometimes publish anti-Communist matter. The Ramakrishna movement is probably doing more through its social program to offset Communist propaganda than any other Hindu group. Its members seem actually to be concerned about man's plight, and seek to do something about it. But their work, while highly humanitarian, is chiefly remedial rather than concerned with the fundamental causes of the economic distress which they help relieve.

But relatively little has been done or is being done to make clear the relative faiths of Hinduism and Communism. Many informants agreed that something ought to be done about it. Maybe editor Da Costa was right when he said that Communism has not yet become a serious enough problem in India for Hindu religious leaders to have any reaction to it, but I doubt if this is the case.

I do not know if India will become Communist. I rather doubt that she will, but if she does not, it will not be chiefly or even largely because of any deep religious influence upon the people. It will be because some major changes have been wrought in the social and economic structure of India. Religion may, and I think will, help as a deterrent to Communism. But religion will not have the last word.

Thus far I have spoken only of Hinduism in India. But there are other religious groups as well. While Hinduism will play the leading religious role in determining whether India will go Communist or not, there are minority religious groups in India whose relationship to Communism ought to be told. Let me therefore briefly summarize what I discovered as I talked with Sikhs, Jains, Zoroastrians, and Christians.

### The Sikhs

The Sikh community suffered gravely from war but not World War II; for by it they were only touched indirectly, as was India generally. The fact that large numbers of Sikhs have served as soldiers, and as policemen or gendarmes for Britain throughout the Far East, has exposed them in greater proportion to the current of world life than India as a whole has been exposed. One finds Sikhs in all oriental ports, tall, well-built, bearded and turbaned figures, who stand out from the crowd wherever they are

found. This may be one of the reasons for the loosening of the ties of religion which a number of informants remarked as having occurred among them in recent years.

But war in the guise of the struggle for independence and the partition between India and Pakistan, had very disastrous results upon the Sikhs. Stories as to just what happened differ markedly as one hears them from Indians, Moslems, or Sikhs. The Sikh story, whether correct or not, is that for six months or more they suffered in silence, and patiently, the grossest injustices at the hands of the Moslems, who, they affirm, hated them bitterly and sought to destroy them. Then, unable to bear it longer they took to arms and retaliated against the brutal killings and atrocities being perpetrated against them. As the world knows, blood flowed freely for months. It is a dark page in the history of all the parties concerned, Hindus, Moslems, and Sikhs—a page many would gladly expunge now, but it cannot be. It remains too deeply graven on the minds and hearts of all three peoples to be easily eradicated. It will be long before it can be forgotten and a movement gotten under way to undo the damage done by partition to all India, as a whole, and to the three separate groups. Many Sikhs, Moslems, and Hindus with whom I have talked regard the whole matter as a colossal mistake, and yearn for a reunion of divided India. But all recognize that it will be extremely difficult so long as the memories of the days of mutual slaughter are still vivid in the minds of the several communities.

Partition meant, for the Sikhs, the total abandonment of that part of the Punjab which lay within Pakistan. Sikhs were obliged to migrate east of the border and find a new life in India. Many were settled on the land and, within a short period, have, by their industry, I was told, converted a food deficit in the eastern Punjab into a surplus. But many have settled in the cities, to swell the urban population and to become artisans, automobile drivers, and mechanics, or small merchants. They are, as a whole, a vigorous, self-reliant people and are succeeding remarkably well in solving their economic problems. Few Sikhs go hungry. To a visitor who has just covered much of India, they seem better fed, better clothed, and rather better housed than the people in any other

section. He has often noted that elsewhere he has seen comparatively few old people, and seldom a corpulent individual. Not so in the Punjab among the Sikhs. Here the number of stout, well-nourished and gray- or white-haired men and women is in striking contrast to the rest of India. Patriarchs with truly Mosaic beards are common in the streets and bazaars of Amritsar. And of food, in variety and quantity, there seems to be no end.

But religion in its temporal aspects has suffered gravely. There remains but one Sikh temple in all Pakistan, I was told by the secretary of the Temple Organization, which controls a large number of Sikh temples. Here a few Sikhs, eighteen in number, are kept, a year at a time, but no public function is performed by them. Concerning the fate of the rest of the hundreds of *Gurdwaras*, or temples, he could give no information, other than that they were no longer open. Some of these temples possessed extensive lands from which they derived a substantial income. One, for example, owned some eighteen thousand acres of land and had an income of two million rupees or more a year. This has been completely cut off, without any compensation so far. Whether any indemnity will ever be paid is extremely doubtful.

The financial loss is mainly on the Pakistan side of the border. The migration and resettlement of Pakistan Sikhs in Indian Punjab has not overstrained the economy of that State, for the majority have become productive farmers and workers who have helped step up agricultural and industrial productivity. I was struck by the relatively few beggars I encountered in the Punjab, in comparison with the rest of India, where they are terribly numerous at railway stations, in the bazaars, and, most of all, in the temples. I do not recall any beggar whom I could surely identify as a Sikh while in Amritsar. I did see some who were definitely not Sikh.

Various informants mentioned the breakdown of morals among the Sikhs as one of the results of the war. This tallies generally with the effects of war everywhere. Some say that there is a far greater incidence of crimes of violence since the war. The outbreak of violence and slaughter, in which it is admitted that the Sikhs participated, had the effect of cheapening human life and making

it easier for resort to the sword and dagger under provocation. As everywhere, when the indiscriminate use of slaughter and rapine are permitted under the guise of patriotism or nationalism, there are always those who carry over this type of behavior into normal social life as well. One high-placed informant complained of the lack of honesty. He almost voiced the plaint of the Psalmist who cried, "All men are liars." He found crookedness and venality rampant among those of his community, and attributed it, in part at least, to war and its aftermath. Sikhism, never nonviolent as much of Hinduism is in its teaching, was confirmed in its adherence to force as a means of settling questions by the experiences of the post-partition violent outbreaks.

Various informants believe, apparently, that whether or not it is the result of war, there is a steady and persistent retreat from Sikhism as religion. One observes that the very orthodox practicers command little respect, for in money matters they are dishonest. He doubts if more than 1 per cent of the Sikhs are really true to their profession. He declares that if the Punjabis are not becoming antireligious, they are at least becoming nonreligious. Not 5 per cent of the younger people, he asserts, go along with orthodox views. He thinks Sikhism is losing its influence, largely because it is on the side of privilege and reaction. A religion which teaches the people that they ought to be satisfied with their present state, he observes, is not teaching religion. But this informant was an out-and-out Communist sympathizer. He might be thought to be predisposed to find such conditions. But other Sikhs who are not at all sympathetic toward Communism agreed that the hold of the Sikh faith upon the people is by no means what it was in earlier years. Young people, it is admitted, are harder to hold, and particularly the educated Sikhs are less zealous in their espousal of their faith, more given to questioning the whole basis underlying it. In this they differ little from students in most countries. There is, it is said, a steady drift among them toward Communism.

It is true that thus far organized Communism is not strong in the Punjab, but it is a force to be reckoned with. In Hinduism we have seen that there is little or nothing calculated surely to serve as a deterrent to Communism. What of Sikhism? Its doctrines are

much more specific, and the Sikhs are profound believers in God. This they inherit from their Moslem background. How could they reconcile their Sikhism with Communism, which is usually antireligious? I sought an answer from both Communists and non-Communists. It is a simple fact that a great many who are admittedly Sikhs are also Communists. One cannot, therefore, count upon the simple fact of being Sikh as a deterrent.

The answer is at least twofold. One is that many who are of the Sikh community are not, as a matter of fact, really Sikhs by rigid tests. They were born into the community, they grew up acquiring its characteristic beliefs and practices, and holding to them not because of any inner conviction but because of social example or pressure. No alternative had ever challenged their beliefs seriously. They were simply nominal Sikhs, not what might be called *good* Sikhs. It is necessary to distinguish between good Sikhs, just Sikhs, and bad Sikhs, as in all the other religions of the world. I asked various learned and active Sikhs whether they thought a *good* Sikh could be a Communist. Always they countered with the question, "What do you mean by Communism?" When I have defined it as Marxist dialectical materialism, the answer has generally been a categorical, "No," followed by the question, "But is that what Communism is as it is presented to our people?" And at that point I have had to admit that currently in India the Communist party is not openly antireligious. It states definitely in its Indian constitution that religion is a private matter, and that one may hold the faith he chooses, so long as it does not interfere with the program of the party. This is almost completely disarming to the average religious person, who does not know what this limitation has meant practically, in countries like China, Czechoslovakia, etc., and he feels he can therefore be both Sikh and Communist at the same time.

Said one very distinguished and powerful Sikh leader: "There are a good many Sikhs, strong believers in God, who are nevertheless Communists. They agree only with the economic side of it." Indeed, this leader was recently quoted in the public press as offering to adopt the economic program of the Communist party, provided next place be given to religion. When in personal con-

versation with him later I questioned him about it, he asserted that he made his statement in an attempt to draw the Sikhs out of Communism, rather than to encourage the latter, for he intimated they well know that Communism will not accept Sikh religious beliefs.

He is himself quite definitely opposed to Communism as a whole, though he finds in its economic doctrines some very attractive features. He and other Sikh leaders were at pains to point out to me that, as a matter of fact, Communism and Sikhism have much in common. Both, they say, are against class distinctions. The ideal of the classless society of Communism is well known. The Sikhs point out they are opposed to all caste differences as held, for example, in Hinduism. All men are brothers, they say. They stand without distinction in the Gurdwaras, rich and poor, high and low, men of all colors and races. Then there is the concern for the common man and the sharing of food, in the custom long practiced among them of the "Langar," or common kitchen. There is one of these in each temple. At the great Golden Temple at Amritsar I saw their provision for pilgrims. All might come freely, be furnished lodging in the dormitories, or in tents set up especially at feast times, and all might eat without cost at the common kitchen. I watched the preparation there of the food which the crowd of pilgrims would later consume. Perhaps as many as twenty people sat around in a square, in the midst of which the floor was covered with whole wheat flour. There was a great mass of dough in a huge brass tray. Some would pinch off pieces of dough, roll them into balls, flatten them slightly, and throw them onto the flour-covered floor. Thence one with a crook in hand would rake them over in front of others who sat before flat stones with rolling pins and would roll them out into flat disks about seven or eight inches in diameter and sail them through the air to another man who sat near the furnace. On the top of this these "chapatis" were baked like Mexican *tortillas*, being turned as occasion required by a corps of "turners," then passed on to sorters who finally stored them in baskets for future use. All this labor was volunteer. Now and then a worker would stand up and another from those sitting close by would take his place, and

the work would go on without interruption. In another room a great kettle of "dahl," a kind of lentil dish, was being cooked, to serve together with the "chapatis" as a nutritious meal. There would be no dishwashing for the "dahl" would be served on the "chapatis" and the two eaten together with the fingers. It was a bit of genuine communal activity. No Sikh need go hungry if there is a temple about.

There was also, my informant said, a theoretical objection to the accumulation of wealth. The third guru taught that all food prepared for the day should be finished off within the day. There should be no carry-over. The wealthy were not recognized, he said, as *good* Sikhs. "It is like your New Testament teaching. It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven." It is a cardinal principle, said a noted Sikh theologian, that everybody must earn his food and share it with others. There is, he pointed out, no idle class in Sikhism. There is no priesthood. With but few exceptions, such as officials at temples, those who are active in Sikhism are laymen. Any five laymen can baptize, and any layman can officiate at weddings.

Here are indeed likenessess, and where the antireligious aspect of Communist doctrine is played down, it is not surprising that Sikhs embrace it without a feeling of disloyalty to their faith. And Communism here doesn't come to the people as dialectical materialism or as atheism, but, by deliberate strategy, as a simple device by which the landless people and those who are living at a very low standard may have a better life. The people know and care little about theory. They just don't want to be hungry or ill clad, or exploited. Communism, they are promised, will provide a quick remedy for this, so they are willing to go along with it, particularly when it seems that the dominant Congress party is doing nothing to better conditions. The Communists come to them living, not as rich men, but near their own economic level. The chief Sikh Communist leader himself has a salary as an office-holder of three hundred rupees per month. He keeps thirty-five rupees for himself and gives the rest to the party. Other representatives receiving the same amount are compelled to give up

two hundred of the amount to the party. This makes an appeal to the people who are living in the villages, and to the small wage earners in the cities. Here is a party that is genuinely concerned about them. Congress, on the other hand, seems to have an interest only in the privileged classes. Little wonder many feel that the Communists have the real answer to their problems.

Two major forces are contending for the following of the masses in the Punjab, aside from the Congress party, which is now identified with capitalism. One is the Akali, or militant Sikh party which is interested in the establishment and recognition of a Sikh state, not independent of India, but a constituent part of it. But according to its critics it has no real social program, though its leader, Master Tara Singh, has, as above indicated, expressed his admiration of some of the Communist economic policies. He himself says that he sees ahead only chaos, and out of the chaos either the Akalis or the Communists will come to leadership of the masses. He thinks the Akalis will win. On the other hand, an extremely orthodox Sikh thinks, while he does not desire it, that the Communists will win. The Sikhs, he says, are laboring under a sense of frustration. They are distrusted by the Hindus, and as a minority feel a deep sense of insecurity. Communism may appeal to them as the way out. A prominent professor, who is both Sikh and Communist, sees Communism as the inevitable winner in the struggle. Which will it be?

Are the Sikhs doing anything about Communism—that is, those Sikhs who oppose it? As far as I could discover there are several Sikh periodicals which are favorable to Communism. I found only one, a periodical of the Akalis, which sometimes, says Master Tara Singh, publishes anti-Communist articles. He also gave me two little books written and published by his own son which are definitely anti-Communist. One of these is entitled *Moscow*, and is given up largely to quotations from Communist books setting forth Communist ideas, or from books by Western writers about Communism. The main emphasis is on its antireligious character, though stress is also placed upon the lack of any other moral basis than the will of the party, and upon the crude ideas with reference to sex and marriage in effect at least early in the Communist period

in Russia. There may be more that is being done, but no one I talked with knew of anything else. It is apparent, therefore, that little or no attempt is being made to deter the Communist advance within the Sikh community. In the case of one or two prominent informants, stress was laid upon a kind of fatalistic acceptance of whatever comes. People may, under the influence of their belief in the Karma principle, accept whatever is as the will of God and not revolt against it, or they may equally accept the coming of Communism against their will or desire as also the inevitable outworking of the will of God, and so do little or nothing to stop it. While Sikhism might, and I think would, resist an avowedly anti-religious or atheistic Communism, I doubt if it will very seriously resist it if it comes in the guise only of an effort to better the condition of the masses, to destroy class distinctions, and possibly even to restore the unity of India, broken by partition. Unless the Congress party makes some more successful efforts to solve the land problem and the resettlement of refugees, it will almost certainly be defeated in the next general election in the Punjab, and either the Akalis or the Communists will win out. This would by no means assure that India as a whole would go Communist, for Sikhs are a small minority, but it might be one of several factors that would help put India in the Communist camp.

I have elsewhere alluded to the favorable effect of what is reported in India as having been done in China by the Communists. The Sikhs are as much impressed as are the Hindus and are no more critical of the reports than Hindus, generally. Whether all that has been reported is true or not, the effect is the same. They believe it, and it simply appears to them that if the lot of the Chinese can be greatly benefited by Communism, the people of India might very well be benefited by it also, for the conditions in India and China are in many ways closely similar.

### The Parsis

Two other minority religious groups need to be mentioned in order to complete the picture of India's religions, the Parsis, or Zoroastrians, and the Jains. The Parsis are a very tiny minority, little over 100,000, and so numerically negligible. I talked to some

of their leaders and found little or no effect attributable either to war or Communism. All those with whom I talked, including their most distinguished writer and thinker, asserted that Communism and Zoroastrianism were mutually exclusive, that one could not subscribe to both at the same time, basing this belief on the assumption that Communists are atheistic and antireligious, an assumption which in India it is not safe to make, as I have abundantly shown. Economically, the Parsis are definitely opposed to Communism, for they are mostly engaged in business or industry, or connected in some way therewith. They are among the most prosperous groups in India, and likely to have strong capitalist sympathies; e.g., the great Tata steel industry, as well as other substantial industries, is Zoroastrian owned and operated. My informants reported no Zoroastrians as having turned Communist, and denied that they are even attracted to Communist propaganda. This is probably not absolutely true, but relatively I am prepared to believe that it is.

### The Jains

As for the Jains, while larger in numbers, they are still much fewer than the Christians or the Sikhs. Talking with representatives of their group, I found that they are little conscious of the problem of Communism, and say their people are not attracted by it. They admit that, theoretically, the fact that Communism may be atheistic would not necessarily make it unwelcome to the Jains. For their founder, if not actually an atheist, attributed no powers to any god or gods which might exist, to help man in the working out of his salvation. Where the Jains are in complete disagreement with the Communists is at the point of their ruthless use of violence in attaining their ends. This is a sufficient count against them to keep Jains from following them. While not all Jains actually attain to a complete practice of *ahimsa*, or noninjury, or nonviolence—indeed, it is not expected of a layman that he achieve what monks and holy men do—nevertheless, any such doctrine as Communism which frankly employs violence and defends it as necessary to the attainment of its ends cannot hope to win the Jains, at least those who take their religion seriously. I heard of no Jains who had become Communists as I did

of Sikhs, Hindus, Moslems, and Christians. There may have been some, but not many. This gentle people, who will not injure any life, however lowly, if it is possible to avoid it, will not readily lend itself to the support of a party which has such a record of liquidation of those who stand in its way as Communism has. Communists may and do deny that they are antireligious. I have never talked to a Communist leader who did not justify the use of violence, when that is necessary in order to reach its goals. Communists may prefer not to use violence, but it is a cardinal tenet of their faith that capitalism will never yield its gains to the public save through the use of force. Marx said it. Lenin and Stalin regarded violent revolution as the only means of wresting property and wealth from the hands of the capitalists. Jains know this and can hardly be imagined as agreeing to such a program. Here too, economic status probably places the greater number of the Jains on the side of those who hold individual wealth and property. So economic interests as well as religious and moral conviction place them firmly in the camp of the non-Communists in India. Their numbers are so reduced, however, that they alone can never determine the issue. If they can stimulate as Gandhi did to the greater acceptance of the *ahimsa* principle, they will contribute something of value to the struggle.

### Christianity

I found that Christianity in India has experienced a number of effects both from war and from Communism:

By reason of its foreign origin, it was naturally affected by the wave of strong nationalism that resulted finally in independence for India. One of the charges most frequently made against Christianity has been that it had the effect of denationalizing Indians who became Christians. While this has not been wholly true, the very circumstances surrounding a new convert, who was often enough completely cut off by his family and neighbors, lost his job, or had his business or vocation boycotted, practically forced him into a position of dependence upon the foreign community. In the schools run by missions usually not sufficient attention was given to Indian history, literature, and culture in general, though

this was a weakness shared to some extent by the whole system of higher education. Christians rarely entered the political arena. Of course there was a great handicap against them if they did, especially standing for any position other than that of communal representative. It was harder for a Christian outside of a community definitely Christian to get an elective office in India than it is for a Catholic to get high office in America.

In a sense, the effect of Christianity was often that of raising an individual above the narrower interests of nationalism and making him international in outlook, more interested in man as man, rather than in any one single race or nation. But as nationalism became stronger and stronger, Christians were more and more drawn into it. Some Christian leaders came to feel that the very interest of Christianity in India demanded that Christians participate actively in the struggle for independence. Many of them did so. It became necessary for them to prove that Christians could and did fit into the scheme of Indian nationalism. Some went so far as to form a Christian party in order to convince the world that they were concerned about the national life, even when they would have preferred working within the framework of the Congress party or other parties. A number of Christians became active workers in the Congress party and supported Mr. Gandhi in almost all he tried to do. As a result, there are several highly placed Christians serving in executive and other positions under election or appointment by the Congress party. One of the most eminent of these is the able governor of Bengal, who enjoys universal respect among people of all shades of political opinion. Others hold ministerial portfolios in the national or provincial cabinets or executive posts at the policy-making levels of government.

Mr. Gandhi, who was a great admirer of the educational and philanthropic work of the missions, was quite against conversion to another faith, particularly because it somehow took the convert out of his own element. Gandhi spoke and wrote freely on this theme and had a very considerable influence on the thought of Hindus. Forbidding conversion from one faith to another was even considered, and this is still not out of the realm of possibility, though the Constitution now specifically guarantees the freedom

to propagate one's faith as well as freedom to worship. In some areas of India, conversion has been obstructed by local officials, though without the law. A natural result of this strong national emphasis has been the intensification of the effort to make Christianity self-directing, self-propagating, and to a somewhat less than desirable extent, also self-supporting. An able national Christian leadership has been raised up and is carrying on work formerly directed by foreigners. Most forward-looking missions have welcomed this, but not all have been willing to relinquish direction of the work, while still continuing financial support. In such groups the Indian leaders are very restive, and the relationship with the foreign group is somewhat strained. I recall the bitterness with which an Indian Christian castigated a certain mission for going to law to restrain a local church body from attempting to make use of certain church property for purposes other than those stated by the donors, who were foreigners. Many of the missions are gradually transferring mission properties to the control of the Indian Church, and most of the important mission institutions are now headed by Indian nationals—very successfully too, in most cases. This general trend of devolution began long ago, of course, but the nationalist struggle greatly accentuated it. One could wish that more stress were put upon the self-supporting feature as well, for this is the weakest spot in the development of the younger churches. Help during the early years of a new local church organization is perfectly proper. One wonders whether that same church should for fifty or a hundred years, as in some extreme cases, continue to receive money from abroad for maintenance. One Christian layman—not a great leader at all, but an active church member—said to me, "It is a mistake on the part of the Indian Church ever to accept a cent of foreign aid. Every missionary should go home. Their presence cripples the growth of the national church." This will find a ready welcome among many people at home, but does not at all represent the majority Indian view. Even the non-Christians desire the medical, social, and Educational work of the missionaries—only disliking their disposition to convert.

The general economic effect of the war has touched Christians

as well as others. In some ways it has affected them even more disastrously, for the Christian group as a whole is from the lower economic levels. Many of them were untouchables. It was already a serious effort for them to support even the very modest village churches to which they belong. Now their condition is even worse. As unemployment grows these people suffer most, because they are among the first dismissed from jobs, and the last to be hired, because of religious prejudice. In the north, in the Punjab, a good many of them were farm laborers. When partition came and the Moslems left, some of them were given land to farm. But with the resettlement of refugees, they tend to be displaced by returning Hindus. If they start a little business it is boycotted; they can only find such jobs as Hindus do not wish to work at, e.g., as sweepers, so gradually they are being depressed once more into the ranks of the menial workers from which they had begun to emerge. Many feel that this is the direct purpose of Hindu leaders. For there is undoubtedly now greater opposition to Christianity than in many years. Again and again in conversation with quite liberal religious leaders of Hinduism strong criticisms of Christianity and the way in which it is injuring India were made to me, a Christian, and their guest. This was true also of Hindus who were not especially religious leaders, but men of great political influence. Sometimes it went almost to the point of rudeness, I thought. It was the one point at which the utmost of courtesy was not shown me, and is evidence of one of the effects of war upon Christianity.

But this is not the whole story. There is something in the present crisis that is causing at least some people to seek a more satisfying religious outlook. I was told by a distinguished Christian leader that never before had he had so many people coming to him personally or writing to him for religious counsel. Most of them are from the intellectual classes or are at least educated people. How widespread this movement is I have no way of knowing. That it occurs at all now, when it had not so occurred at any earlier time in this man's long career in India, is surely of some significance.

This is not the place to recite the successes of the church in other ways than those conditioned by war. If the whole story were to be told it would reveal that there is much that is well with the

Indian Church. There are those who fear that with the upsurgence of nationalism India's interest in the Ecumenical Church may suffer. I could discern no weakening of the desire for church union within India, or for union with the other churches of the world. In the Ecumenical movement the Indian Church has played and will, I think, continue to play a conspicuous role.

Turning now to Communism, how is it affecting Christianity and how is Christianity responding to it? It must be said that not a few Christians have been attracted by some features of it. Indeed, there are a good many who regard themselves as both Christians and Communists. How can this be? The answer is that, in the guise in which it has come to these Christians, there was no antireligious element about it. Had it been so the Christians would have been repelled by it. On the contrary, Christians have been told directly that there is no quarrel between Communism and religion. Religion, they say is a private matter—and one may choose whatever faith he wishes. But they are not told that there is a serious unmentioned limitation upon this freedom. That is, they may follow this faith only so long as it does not stand in the way of the program of Communism, and they are not instructed in all the purposes of the Communist party when first contact is made with them. Various Christian persons, pastors and others, told me of the ways in which the Communists work. They stress the positive idealistic features of Communism, of which, it must be confessed, there are many. Communists are interested in the underprivileged and want to improve their lot. They want to provide a better living for the hungry and the oppressed, better medical care, greater security. It is not easy to find any quarrel with this. Christians also want these things. Indeed, the gospel is full of just such ideals. The Old Testament prophets preached them with great insistence. Many young people in the churches are already eager to see them realized.

At least two outstanding young Indian Christian leaders told me how deeply they were concerned about just such things. The trouble was that there seemed to be no way of actually achieving them. The ideals were there but how could they be realized? When the young people began to talk about using political means

to implement the ideals, their elders, both lay and clergy, regarded them as radicals, and sought to restrain them. One of them, in this situation, welcomed Communism when it came to his attention. It seemed to him that here was a practical program designed to get things done. Christianity had ideals, but no program. Why not combine the two? So he joined the Communist party.

Nobody objected that he was a Christian. He worked for some years both as Christian and Communist, without feeling any strong sense of inner strain. He became a well-known Communist leader and cofounder of the party in the Travancore-Cochin area, where Communism has had one of its major successes. Then, one day, he told me, he was ordered by the party to blow up a freight train. Here his Christian conscience asserted itself. He could not do such a thing. He became conscious, apparently for the first time, that there are deep differences between the two faiths. Communism would allow no hesitation. It would brook no personal objections on moral or other grounds. He must do what he was told, or else—. Well, he refused. There came over him the feeling that, quite apart from his being required to do something wrong, the whole episode revealed that in Communism there is no place for individual judgment. There is really no freedom. This brought about a powerful reaction within him, and as a result he quit the Communist party and, taking his place in the ranks of Christian leaders, has become one of the most effective opponents of Communism. He has seen it from the inside. He knows its weaknesses, and understands better than those who have had no personal experience of Communism how it works and how it may be most successfully met. He is now engaged in his spare time, over and above the time necessarily given to a job by which he lives, in writing and speaking on the true nature of Communism.

The other young man had studied abroad. He had, in studying the prophets and Jesus, become completely convinced that there is a great need for social justice, and he thought that the youth of the Church should try to do something about it. He even appears to have thought that there were inequities and injustices within the Church which should be frankly faced. He felt that the Church should go to the task of preaching and implementing social justice

with a clean record of its own. He appeared to be a radical and rather dangerous young man to turn loose in the Church, so he has not been given the chance to work within the organized body of Christ. He has not become a Communist—or had not when I met and talked with him. He had turned to the ranks of labor, and was trying to do through this channel what he had wanted to do through the Church.

There is no doubt that some excellent material has been lost by Christianity to Communism, because the Church had no practical program to offer to those desirous of seeing the clear teachings of Jesus and the prophets made effective in the life of India. Conversations with men who work chiefly with the youth of the churches confirmed what I had gotten direct from some of the men who had actually experienced frustration at being held back on social issues by Church leaders. Over and over these men told me that, if Christianity is to hold its better and abler young idealists, it will have to provide a more challenging program than it has yet done. Thus, one of the clear effects of Communism on Indian Christianity has been to challenge it, and at least among some of the leaders, it has led to an awakening of moral sensitivity to the great social ills from which the people suffer.

The leader of the Communist party in Travancore-Cochin is of Roman Catholic background. When I asked him if he was a practicing Catholic his answer was, "No." "Have you withdrawn formally from the church?" I inquired. "No," he replied, "I am waiting for them to put me out." They have not yet done so.

Various pastors reported to me that Communists were active in their areas. Their method employed was very much that which they themselves used, that is, a kindly ministry to the people, at the level of their immediate and obvious needs, doing neighborly services, looking after children, providing food and medicine where needed, etc. As elsewhere already mentioned, the simple villagers could see no difference between this and Christianity. If this were Communism, then there could be no objection to it.

Not all the work was of this kind. In city churches I found pastors complaining that Communists were infiltrating into the young people's societies, getting posts of leadership, then using their

position to introduce Communist literature or songs or ideas in the discussion meetings—always, they said, in the interest of improving the life of the church. Some pastors were greatly troubled by this propaganda and were anxiously wanting to know how it could be met.

I found in certain areas, at least, a greater consciousness of Communism as a problem than I did among Hindus or Moslems. And perhaps because Christians were more conscious of it, they were beginning to try to do something about it. Roman Catholics were more militant in their anti-Communism than Protestants generally. This might be expected because of the extreme activity of the Pope against it. Particularly in South India, where Catholicism is rather strong, I found them making a real anti-Communist drive. They publish periodicals in which, in almost every number, there is an exposé of some of the evils of Communism. I copied down some of the headlines of articles that had appeared in these journals recently. Here are a few of them: "The Treachery of Communism"; "Behind the Iron Curtain Labor Unions Mere Puppets, No One Safeguards the Right of Labor." An article headlined "Marx and Gandhi" in heavy type was followed by these subtitles, also in large black-faced type:

Marx is entirely materialistic
Gandhi is entirely spiritual
Marx installs the State on throne of autocracy
Gandhi protects and safeguards rights of individual
Marx believes in Communistic strife and autocracy of the few
Gandhi believes in cooperation and democracy
Marx does away with private property—State ownership
Gandhi supports and extends private ownership

I found some Protestant ministers quite alert to the Communist challenge. One of them published an article in his church bulletin saying why a Christian could not be a Communist.

The National Christian Council has concerned itself with the matter. At its suggestion, two Christian leaders collaborated in publishing a good study of Communism in contrast with Christianity. This was done on a high level, examining the basic philosophic premises of Communism and Christianity, and showing how they

differ, both at the abstract and at the practical level. This is used as a basis for study in church groups, especially youth groups. It is well done.[6]

A Lutheran missionary in the very Communistic Telugu country produced anti-Communist articles in a periodical and subsequently gathered them into a booklet, which circulates quite widely. It is of interest to note the nature of his attack upon Communism. It was by no means solely, or even primarily, on the basis of the antireligious attitude of Communism, though this was pointed out quite clearly. He was writing in English for the educated people of his part of the country, including most of the pastors and leaders of the church. Communism, he states, comes in the guise of friendliness to religion, at least in India; but he shows at length, by recourse to the original writings of the creators of Communism, the theoretical antireligious nature of it. It is not accidental, or incidental, but integral to the total point of view on the testimony of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, *et al.* But he goes on to quote, from reliable Marxist sources, deliberate instructions to workers to dissemble at this point and not arouse undue prejudice by declaring the truly antireligious character of Communism.

A recent Communist Manifesto, for example, gives these instructions to Communist agitators:[7]

1. Do not manifest the purpose of Communism to immature companions.
2. Struggle against priests, ministers and rabbis by denying emphatically that we are opposed to religion, family, and private property. [That is, Communists are advised to conceal their real aim.]
3. Show with jokes, sarcasm, and with a happier show of conduct that you are freer without the impediments of religion, making it understood that we who live without religion live better and do more freely what we wish to do.
4. Destroy morals; teaching the inexperienced; create a mileu (i.e., environment) satiated with that which the clergy of all sects call immorality.

[6] J. F. Butler and C. Devanesan, *Communism and Christianity*, Student Christian Movement, Madras, 1951.

[7] M. L. Dolbeer, *What About Communism?* Pt. IV, p. 7. Andhra Evangelical Lutheran Church, Rajahmundry, India, 1950.

5. Always remove your companions further from their religion by any and all means, but especially by putting priests, ministers, and rabbis in as bad a light as possible.

6. Destroy the family, especially the Christian family—by planting ideas about freedom in marriage, showing divorce as a more human way of life and encouraging your people to love freely, practice free love.

7. Educate workers, especially the young ones, to be intolerant of any and all authority, especially police authority.

8. Encourage workers to participate in disorders, to use brute force, to revenge, and not to have a fear of bloodshed.

9. Be in the forefront of all labour movements, render small services to workers; speak loudly and make yourself heard in their behalf, hide the good which others do for them, and make it appear as if you did it; and strive to enlist such workers in our cause.

The author of the booklet then proceeds to a frontal attack upon Communism, first, because of its theory of morals. All morality is class morality. Lenin is quoted as declaring, "We deny all morality taken from super-human or non-class conceptions. We say that this is a deception, a swindle, a befogging of the minds of the workers and peasants in the interest of the landlords and the capitalists. . . . We deduce our morality from the facts and needs of the class struggle of the proletariat." Lenin further writes, "It is necessary . . . to use any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, concealment of truth." That this alone should make Communism unacceptable to Christians who follow Him who was the way, the truth, and the life is the inference. Furthermore, Communism makes use of violence wherever and whenever it seems to be necessary to achieve its ends. Any means is justifiable. Stalin is reported as saying concerning dictatorship, which to Communism is an essential step toward the achievement of its goal, "It means nothing more nor less than the power which directly rests upon violence, which is not limited by any laws or by any absolute rules."

Again, Communism utterly ignores the individual. He is of no importance in and of himself, but only as he serves the State. There is therefore no security for any individual, even those in the highest posts in a Communist State.

Once more, the author criticizes the assumption of the Com-

munists that the economic is the basic element in life. Furthermore, on examination the achievements of Communism in Russia do not bear out the hopes and promises made of a broad and equitable distribution of the goods to the people. He does not indicate the source of these data, but shows in tabular form how the material income was divided in 1940—some twenty-three years after the October revolution. Government employees including the top intellectuals, who constitute in all 12-14 per cent of the population, received 30-35 per cent of the national income; workers in industry, 20-22 per cent of the population, received a third of that income; while the peasants, consisting of 53 per cent got only 29 per cent; and 8-11 per cent who were engaged in forced labor received 2-3 per cent of the national income. This picture is then applied to Indian society, and the question is asked, Is this what the underprivileged people of India want? Communism as it exists in actual practice in Russia and her Satellites is not Communism at all, but the worst form of State capitalism, with the control of the wealth all in the hands of a very small group who are subject to no democratic controls of any sort. Is this the sort of thing India wants?

The booklet does not overlook certain good elements in Communist theory, but asserts that these were ideals of Christianity long before Communism arose, though never perfectly realized. Communism has served a useful purpose in awakening Christianity to the obligation to seek a better social and economic program. Nor is this program merely referred to in general. The author sets out quite concretely just what it ought to be. This booklet is altogether quite the most effective counterattack upon Communism that I have seen, and deserves a much wider reading than it probably gets.

Two other persons, missionaries, were eager to get effective material on Communism and Christianity which they could have translated and adapted for various language groups. A secretary in the National Christian Council is compiling a list of available literature on the subject. There was held in Delhi, during my stay in India, a conference of leaders of Christian youth, and one of the main topics of discussion was how Christian youth could meet the

social and economic challenge of Communism within and through the framework of organized Christianity.

No one has any illusions that Christianity, a very small minority faith, will be able to stop Communism. In point of numbers it is totally unequal to the task. Only Hinduism can really do the job, if any religion can. Where Christianity may make its contribution is in showing the way, and in stimulating Hinduism to a more active consciousness of the problem. Hinduism is, particularly at the more intellectual level, keenly conscious of Christianity as a rival faith. Whatever Christianity does of a constructive character, it is likely to try to do, and may do on a much larger scale and possibly more effectively. A substantial number of Christians are in positions of some influence in government, quite out of proportion to their numbers, in fact. So Christianity may hope to make some impact upon India in the direction of helping to preserve the religious and spiritual values which Communism, however much it may say it permits religious freedom, in the end does not regard as of primary importance, if indeed it does not consider them a positive menace to its program.

# War, Communism and the Islamic World

I DID not visit every Moslem country in the world. It may possibly be, therefore, that conditions exist in parts of the Islamic world which are different from those described here. It would have been interesting, for example, to have sampled Moslem thought in Arabia, the original cradle of the faith, and the home of the most conservative Moslems to be found anywhere. How have war and Communism affected them? It would have been profitable no doubt to have visited Turkey, which is traditionally Moslem, but a quarter of a century ago deliberately set aside its Moslem heritage in law and turned its face toward the West. Does her outlook differ materially from that of other Moslem lands? Living next door to Russia, how does she face Communism? It would have been desirable to cross North Africa and sample the thought of the Moslems of Tunisia and Morocco, but time did not permit.

Having seen something of Islam in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Trans-Jordan, and having talked with outstanding Moslem leaders of China, it seemed to me that I had a fair understanding of the Islamic world. I doubt if I would have found any great difference elsewhere.

I learned a great deal about Islam in China from Moslems whom I met in Formosa, in particular from the eminent Moslem general Pai Chung-hsi, who had for fourteen years been president of all the Moslems in China. Of this I have written in Capter II. But I did not actually see Islam in China. My first brief glimpse of it was in Malaya. One day while in Singapore, which is a great cosmopolitan city, I drove over to Johore Bahru on the mainland of the peninsula —Singapore is on an island—and at once found myself in a different world. An interview had been arranged for me with three men

in the Ministry for Religious Affairs. I met them in the office of the Ministry, in the rather imposing government building. Two of the men were concerned with religious education, and one was a *mufti*, that is, a Moslem scholar, graduate of the great Moslem University, al Azhar, which I was later to visit in Cairo. He wore a distinctive dress, and was looked to by the others for the last word, whenever a question of Moslem law or faith came up. Their attitude of extreme deference to this man who, though young, had won his right to be regarded as an authority, was very interesting. It was fairly characteristic of Moslem laymen, I discovered, in the various Moslem countries I visited.

Islam in Malaya suffered severe physical losses in World War II. The Japanese came down through the peninsula to launch their successful attack upon Singapore and capture it. They ordered the Malays to face toward Toyko and bow to the Emperor. To Moslems this was a serious affront. There is but one God, Allah; they can bow to no other. The Japanese persecuted those who refused. Slapping was frequent. Sometimes they were thrown in jail, and generally classed as anti-Japanese. Many copies of the Koran were destroyed, pigs were allowed to go into the mosques, a profanation of its sacredness, since for Moslems the pig is unclean, and its presence defiles. Not a few mosques were destroyed, and for lack of repair during the Occupation others deteriorated. The Japanese held band concerts at prayer hours, and in other ways sought to interfere with Moslem worship, though they did not generally close the mosques.

My informants thought that, on the whole, the effect of these persecutions and the sufferings occasioned by war was that the people became more conscious of their need of religion. War compelled a return to God.

The moral effects were serious. Bribery increased, thieving became very common. Prostitution, introduced for the benefit of Japanese soldiers, had its effect on young Moslems as well. Increased expense for armaments resulted in less being available for education, religion, and social services.

The whole social structure suffered considerable disorganization. And it is still suffering from the guerrilla warfare being carried on

in the interest of Communism in many sections of the peninsula. It was still relatively unsafe to try to travel through the country. Frequent cases were reported of travelers being killed by ambushed soldiers, and of whole villages attacked and destroyed by guerrilla bands, who usually managed to escape into the jungles before they could be overtaken.

What, I asked, was the effect of Communism on Islam? The reply to this was categorical. "Islam is completely opposed to Communism. Malaya cannot become Communist, since it is a Moslem state. No Moslem can be a Communist."

But might not a Moslem, faced with the promises which Communism makes to the people, decide that he could sacrifice Islam to advantage and become a Communist? This, it had to be admitted, might be possible. But it would only happen in the case of those not well grounded in the faith. And it was the business of the religious and State authorities to see that they became well grounded in Islam. That was in part the purpose of the Department of Government. I was assured that there was a very definite attempt being made to point out the deep differences between Islam and Communism, in order that the people might see them and choose wisely. My informants agreed to send me copies of printed materials which they used in their anti-Communist instruction, but I have never received them.

These men were so very positive in their convictions that I began to think perhaps my investigation in the Moslem world would be much easier than elsewhere. Perhaps, if it were all so simple and clear, I should revise my time schedule and devote more time to the countries where other religions flourished, and where there was a more definite Communist problem.

Actually, there is a very real Communist problem in Malaya. Had I been able to get into other parts of the country and meet other people than those officially charged with the problem of meeting Communism, I would have discovered, no doubt, that, as elsewhere, there were a great many Moslems who were not 100 per cent indoctrinated with the faith and, because they were at the same time suffering from poverty and insecurity, were turning a sympathetic ear to the Communist propaganda. Many Malays

are already Communists. Edward Hunter in his *Brain-Washing* tells of their activities in the guerrilla warfare they are carrying on in Malaya. Some, though not all of them, were once Moslems. Yet they display a zeal and a degree of self-sacrifice in their loyalty to Communism that is notable.

Will Communism succeed in Malaya? I doubt it. Communists may, from without, invade and take it over, but that the inhabitants themselves will become Communists by conviction seems to me doubtful. And a chief reason for not doing so is the fact that they are dominantly Moslem. Islam alone may not be able to hold Communism back, but it will undoubtedly help greatly in so doing. As elsewhere, there will have to be a much more profound effort on the part of government to solve the serious economic and social problems, if it is to resist the march of Communism through the peninsula.

### Indonesia

From Singapore I went to Indonesia, which is a dominantly Islamic island country. It was more difficult there to make contact with leaders than in any place I had been. Yet, when I actually did manage to get to men in high places, they talked with what seemed to me to be remarkable frankness. One got the impression that, while Indonesia is Islamic, it is in no sense so outwardly so as Pakistan or the Near Eastern Moslem lands. Perhaps it was only because Jakarta and Bandung, the two cities I visited, had been strongly Dutch in character that the outward signs of Islam were relatively few. It seemed to me there were more Christian churches in both cities than mosques. I certainly saw many beautiful Christian churches but no outstanding mosque in either city. I was told there were a great many small inconspicuous mosques scattered throughout these cities. I saw very few. I did not once hear the call to prayer while in Indonesia, though I did occasionally hear it in other countries. A friend who has lived some two years there recorded much the same impression I had.

I saw no indication of the characteristic attitudes assumed toward women in other Moslem countries. Women were present in large numbers at a great political meeting I attended. They were

seated together, it is true, but that seemed to be the only way in which they were treated differently. The speakers appealed as much to them as to the men. They play a definite role in the political life of Indonesia. Polygamy is possible there, but by no means common. Women, I was told, do not attend the mosque service. But there seems to be no seclusion of women. When I asked a brilliant, highly educated young Moslem woman, mother of three small children, if there was any such thing as seclusion of women in Indonesia, she didn't seem to understand what I was talking about.

When I discussed the degree to which Indonesia is Moslem, it was pointed out that there are various levels of Moslem practice. Almost all so-called Moslems are circumcised. That may be put down, perhaps, as a minimum requirement. Then there are those who fast to some extent, and participate in the feasts that take place at night after the day's fast. These correspond somewhat to the special Christmas and Easter festivals of the Christians.

Then there is a moderately faithful group who perform the fasts and engage in the daily prayers and the Friday prayers in the mosque. What percentage this may be, I could get no estimate. Some thought it not very high, especially those who observe the five daily prayers.

Beyond this there are political-minded Moslems, whose interest in the faith is largely in its use as a means of social control and the achievement of power. This may be thought of as a relatively small group, but powerful. They are likely to be of the reformed type who tend to modify their faith and adapt it to modern-day conditions.

Finally there is the fanatical group, represented in its most extreme form in *Darul Islam*. Not all of actual *Darul Islam* is motivated religiously. One of the leading editors of Jakarta classed these people as (1) fanatical Moslems who desire a completely Moslem state; (2) collaborators with the Dutch; (3) Communists who find the terroristic tactics of the group a useful tool of their own in the embarrassment of the nationalist government, as do the Dutch sympathizers; and (4) just plain bandits and malcontents who have no ideological interest, but live by plunder and banditry.

Whether this is a fair or adequate description I am unable to say. It seems highly probable that it is.

The change wrought by war and the struggle for independence, most frequently mentioned by my informants, was the increasing political consciousness of the Moslem community. It is by no means united in just what it wants, but that Moslems are disposed now as they were not formerly to make themselves felt politically is very evident. They form the largest single bloc in Parliament, holding some forty-six seats. This is the Musjumi party, headed by Muhammad Nasir. It is made up of a variety of larger or smaller Moslem groups and individuals, from the quite conservative to the Mohammadiya or reformed. While I was there it was announced that one of the constituent groups had withdrawn. Besides Musjumi, there are other Moslem parties, the P.S.I.I. with nine members and another Islamic bloc with four. This does not count *Darul Islam*, which is working through other than constitutional methods, though this is said to be favored secretly by many of the members, especially the more orthodox Moslems, in the Musjumi party. All definitely want a Moslem State, but some want it to be liberal and tolerant toward other faiths.

One important leader declared, however, that if any kind of Moslem State comes there will not be much real freedom for the minority religions. Christians are apprehensive, for in recent times there have been definite persecutions, and, it is claimed, violent attempts at conversion. It is said that two foreign missionaries were offered freedom if they would only embrace Islam. They refused and were slain. The week I was in Indonesia protests were made in the press by Christians in one section against the persecution they were experiencing at the hands of Moslems.

As a matter of fact, the Constitution of Indonesia says nothing about Islam itself, but does make several specific references to religion. Here are the pertinent sections. In the preamble of the Constitution is found this statement: "Having arrived at this state, thanks to God's blessings and His mercy, our independence is ordained and established under the unitary Republican State, based on the recognition of Divine Omnipotence, Humanity, National Consciousness, Democracy, and Social Justice." Article 43 says:

"1. The State is founded on the belief in the Divine omnipotence.

"2. The State guarantees the freedom of every resident to profess his own religion and to worship according to his religion and belief.

"3. The authorities give equal protection to all religious denominations and organizations. Aid in any form, given by the authorities to ministers of religion and to religious denominations or organizations shall be rendered on the basis of equality.

"4. The authorities shall see to it that all religious denominations and organizations obey the law—common law included."

(It is this last clause "the common law" that causes some apprehension among Christians in Indonesia.)

"Article 18. Everyone is entitled to freedom of religious conscience and thought."

That even modern Moslems are not wholly satisfied with this very general attitude toward religion appears in a speech which Muhammad Nasir, leader of Musjumi, made before the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs in April, 1952. He began by saying, "Indonesia, my country, is another Islamic nation; however, though we recognize Islam to be the faith of the Indonesian people, we have not made express mention of it in our Constitution as a State religion; neither have we excluded religion from statehood. In fact it is delineated in the five principles adopted as the spiritual, moral, and ethical ideals of the State and nation. Our paths, yours, and ours, are the same, our terminology differs."

He alludes to the prevalent fear in the West that Moslem peoples will set up theocracies, forgetting that a number of these very nations of the West regard themselves as Christian, some even having State churches, yet are in no sense theocratic in organization. Even so, there is no desire to set up theocracies in the lands of Islam. Islam, however, must pervade the life of man, as an individual and in society, including his relationship with the State. "Islam cannot conceive of a separation of religion and community, or society, or nation, or State, or for that matter, of manhood. But this is a far cry from what is to be understood as theocracy."

He thinks that too much stress has been placed on the fact of their being Moslems. What is needed is real Moslem performance, not mere words. "The Quran tells me that Islam is a religion of

progress, of going forward, of doing." The Prophet, he says, "taught his followers to go forward and prove their faith by their deeds." Because Islam has spent its time professing rather than proving its faith, Moslem lands are backward. Once they led the world. The Western world borrowed from them and went ahead. Islamic peoples fell behind. Now Islam is being given another chance. "A vast number of us are determined to move forward—not only to the heaven of the other world, but the heaven we can make of this present world, if we practice Islam instead of merely talking Islam. . . . There is no need for more talking. All has been taught and is to be found in our religion. We have this message to bring to the world that, Religion in all its purity and simplicity, religion and integrity, restored as the guiding factor in human relationship is the solitary hope. We look to God."

When in personal conversation I asked Mr. Nasir what changes had occurred in Islam as a result of war and Communism, he said first of all they had brought about a reform in Islam—a getting away from old literalism in its interpretation and making it relevant to present-day conditions. Had other factors, I asked, had the effect of heightening the sense of the unity of World Islam—i.e., strengthening the pan-Islamic feeling around Moslem countries? To some extent, he admitted. Islam does furnish a central cohesive force that binds them all together, but beyond that, account must be taken of specific situations which must be met. I was to find this feeling in a number of Moslem lands. There are common interests, but at the same time there are sharp differences among them, points of national interest which at times clash with those of sister Islamic States. I incline to believe that these national considerations would outweigh the bonds of Islam in any serious crisis situation.

Another general effect of war, or possibly of the outcome of it, seems to have been a greater spirit of divisiveness among the Moslems. For years they had been drawn closely together under the banner of nationalism, a necessity if they were to achieve independence from the Netherlands. Small differences were held in abeyance while they were fighting against a common enemy. But now that pressure is off, the tendency is to revert once more to their sectarian emphases, which tend to divide and weaken Islam.

Before the war there was no separate Islamic labor movement. Now there is a Moslem labor-union movement partly due to the strong Communistic infiltration within the general labor movements.

Communism is fairly strong in Indonesia, especially among the numerous Chinese inhabitants. And among them it is spreading. It is infiltrating the educational system. Precisely while I was in Indonesia, it was discovered that marked Communist propaganda had gotten into some of the textbooks used in the schools. There are a great many Chinese teaching in the schools and some of them either are members of the Communist party or have leanings in that direction. Indonesia has recognized Communist China. It is therefore possible for Indonesians to go to China for a visit. The Chinese government has invited numerous persons to come and has given them expense-paid trips of as much as four months through China, from the port of arrival. They did not pay steamer fares.

I talked to various Chinese persons who had had this privilege. They almost without exception followed the Communist line in reporting on their experiences. They were quite uncritical of what they saw and heard. How much actual freedom of movement within China they had is questionable. They claimed that after a long conducted tour, from Canton to Manchuria, they were allowed freedom to go where they wished, back to their ancestral villages or provinces, if they cared to. They did admit that they had always to check in and out with local police, but aside from this claimed that they were under no restraints. Some of them were belligerently enthusiastic about what they saw, and resented any suggestion that I had heard quite a different story from people who had lived in China but had recently come out, especially with reference to the way the religions were being dealt with.

The most impressive testimony of all, to me, was that of a Chinese physician and his wife, who, after making such a trip, allowed their sixteen-year-old daughter to go to Canton alone to enter school. They had been quite favorably impressed. However, when the husband, asked about some of the persecutions which I reported of Christians and Buddhists, began to excuse the Communists, using the old line, "Well, in every revolution someone

has to get hurt," his wife said to him, "Now don't you go trying to justify that sort of thing."

As might be expected, the proportion of Communists among the Chinese born in China is considerably greater than among those born in Java. In the first place, their ties with the motherland are much closer than the ties of those who have never been in China. Many of them hardly use the Indonesian language, while those who were born in Java have to some degree been assimilated to Javanese ways of thinking. This problem of assimilating the huge Chinese population is a difficult one throughout all of southeast Asia. Rather drastic steps are being taken in Thailand, but in Java it has not been faced seriously. Chinese is taught in the public schools along with Indonesian, so the assimilation process is definitely retarded. Also, it is probably true that those who have been longer in Indonesia have become economically better off than the more recent immigrants, and are more likely to be capitalist-oriented.

One of the prominent editors with whom I talked pointed out that a Communist daily, published in both Chinese and Indonesian, prints a much larger number of the Chinese edition than the Indonesian. Lately, too, the circulation of the Indonesian edition had declined by more than a third. And a frankly anti-Communist paper, published in Indonesian, has a larger circulation than any Communist paper, and it is steadily going up.

Thus far we have spoken only of the Chinese. Here, as we have seen, religion is not likely to be a serious deterrent. But most of the Communists are not Chinese. They are Indonesians, most of whom are Moslems. I heard over and over again that Moslems constituted at least 70 per cent of the population. Communism is strong in the labor groups, which are largely Moslem.

What then of the declaration I had heard so strongly made in Johore Bahru in Malaya, that no Moslem can be a Communist? Shall we have to assume that all those who are members of or sympathizers with Communism have renounced their Islamic faith? Many devout Moslems would say that, whether or not they have formally renounced it, they are no longer truly Moslem. When I asked this of a prominent leader in Indonesia, he said no, that loyalty to political groupings in Indonesia has nothing to do with

religion. He pointed out that Christians like the Dean of Canterbury claim to be Communist and that not a few Christians follow him and other Christian leaders, among whom Jerome Davis was mentioned as at least sympathetic with Communism. Do they think that in so doing they are renouncing their profession as Christians? he asked. So it was, he said, with some Moslems he knew. There is one woman in the national Parliament who definitely claims to be both Moslem and Communist. She finds parallels between Islam and Communism and frankly accepts what is common to both, e.g., the struggle for justice. Like John Murray of England, Nicolas Berdyaev, and Jerome Davis, she repudiates the materialistic philosophical basis of Communism but does accept the class struggle as a necessary step in achieving the desired ends. Another Moslem, a *Ulema*, or Moslem teacher or leader, holds much the same opinion. He is not of course a good Moslem except to those who think that Communism and Islam can be joined. Many Moslems think that there is a fundamental difference between the two, that one who attempts a synthesis is neither a good Moslem nor a good Communist.

But there can be no doubt that many who regard themselves as Moslems, who say the prayers, who fast, and who observe Moslem traditions more or less faithfully, find no inherent conflict between this and what they think Communism is, namely, not a theoretical ideological matter, but a practical way of getting a better social order—indeed, one which they believe that their Islamic faith supports. This is something which very much needs to be understood. Probably only the leaders of Communism are acquainted fully with all the points of its official ideology and hold by them. The masses of people in most countries, including Russia, are influenced not by intellectual considerations but by such practical matters as hunger, poverty, class exploitation, etc., and something that will secure for them the freedom from exploitation, poverty, and hunger which they so deeply desire. Clearly it will not do to say that the kind of Moslems which Indonesia has in quite large numbers will not go Communist. If Islam is to act as an effective deterrent to Communism in Indonesia, it will have to produce a different kind of Moslem than it is actually at the present time doing. The Javan-

ese people are land hungry. There are many large estates owned by absentee landlords who grow rich on the patient toil of peasants, whose economic condition is very bad. The Communists come offering land reform, a redistribution of the soil among those who labor on it. This makes a genuine appeal. What does Islam have to say about such conditions, "*Insha Allah?* It is the will of Allah?" Can the Moslems seriously think that this will forever hold people into whose ears a new kind of doctrine is being poured? "It is not the will of Allah," says Communism, "but the will of selfish men that you suffer as you and your children do from undernourishment and overwork. This is something you can yourselves correct. It has been done in other lands—in Russia, in China; it can be done here. The land belongs to you, the people who work it. Etc., etc. You need only to rise up and take it." This kind of talk people understand who know nothing of dialectical materialism, and it makes sense to many of them.

There are thoughtful Moslems who recognize this. Many members and leaders of the Musjumi party see it and are working for a reform within Islam which will make it more conscious of its social obligations. And they are seeking through political organization to force government to take steps to change the economic and social order in such ways as will raise the general level of living for the people. If Islam does throw its influence on the side of the people rather than on that of privilege, or better, seeks to mold society in such fashion that everyone will have the right to a decent livelihood, a chance to rear his family and supply all their needs, both spiritual and temporal, and none can exploit his fellows, there is a very good chance, think most of my informants, of keeping Indonesia from going Communist. But just to rely on the fact that the vast majority of Indonesians are Moslems is quite unsafe.

I asked an important figure in the Ministry of Religion, "Is Islam conscious of Communism as a problem?" His reply was that leaders are very much aware of it as a problem, that some leaders have made statements setting forth the fundamental contradictions between Islam and Communism. When I asked what was being done practically, he spoke of attempts to strengthen religious faith.

Religious education is given in the schools. While there is no overt propaganda against Communism in these classes, it is believed that if the children are taught the fundamental basis of Islam they will become anti-Communists. When I further asked whether one could take for granted that the children would grasp the differences unless these were specifically pointed out, he admitted that teachers often do this informally, especially when questions are asked.

Most of the people I talked with did not believe that Indonesia would go Communist. Most thought that if it did not, religion, i.e., Islam, would be one of the factors preventing it, but none thought that Islam alone was sufficient. There was almost unanimous belief that unless the economic problems were effectively met, not Islam or anything else could prevent the coming of Communism. Foreign influence couldn't do so. There was not a little hostility toward both East and West, who are both struggling for Indonesian allegiance. "Why," they cry, "must we follow either Moscow or Washington? Is there not a *via media*, a third possible position?" At a great political meeting I attended, I could understand nothing of what was said, but from the frequency with which the words "*colonialism, capitalism, imperialism, Russia, Moscow, Washington, Yanqui*" were repeated, it was clear that those were very much in people's minds. And from them they want forever to be freed.

Actually the present government, which is in some sense Socialist, has made a beginning at the matter of land reform, so has partly robbed Communism of one of its major appeals. But unfortunately it appears that there is a great deal of corruption in government, so the Communists, always looking for a place to take hold, were, when I was there, stressing the matter of government corruption, and posing as a means whereby this evil could be corrected. Communism, they say, is against such corruption and knows how to deal with it. As in other countries I visited, it always seeks to identify itself with what is good. Corruption is bad. You are of course against it. Then you are squarely on the side of Communism or Communism becomes your champion, self-chosen, to rid the country of what you abhor. In other lands Communism is the way of peace, the West is the way of war. I met this again and again, not in one country alone, but in many. The United States

information service was trying valiantly in most of the lands I visited to offset this kind of propaganda, but the idea has been planted pretty well in the minds not alone of Indonesians and I fear will not be dislodged by merely reiterated denials. For on so many occasions we have seemed to give point to Russia's claims by the unhappy way in which we have met her real or pretended overtures toward peace. Until the West boldly seizes the initiative in waging peace, by some bold stroke which will put Russia on the defensive, our propaganda will fall on deaf ears, and people will continue to believe it is we who stand for war, in spite of all the efforts Russia is making for peace.

### India

I have made some reference in the chapter on India to the effects of war and Communism on Islam there. A great many Moslems, though lacking the *ahimsa* basis of Hinduism, nevertheless co-operated with Mr. Gandhi in his war without violence, which led to Indian independence. Whether believing in it or not as a matter of principle, they saw that it was likely to be effective, and so went along with him. It is the partition of India which has had the most pronounced effect upon Islam in India.

With the withdrawal of some fifty million Moslems and the creation of the new State of Pakistan, there were still left thirty to forty millions scattered throughout the whole of India. In some places they are strong, as in Hyderabad and in the United Provinces. In Kashmir, which is, at least for the present, under Indian control, pending final settlement of one of the most serious problems faced by India and Pakistan, they are definitely a majority of the population. As a whole, however, they are a minority, smaller now in proportion to the Hindu population than was the whole Moslem community in relation to the Hindus of undivided India. For comparatively few Hindus lived in the areas now included in Pakistan. If their position was an unhappy one before, it could be worse now.

As a matter of fact, Hinduism is very tolerant of Islam, much more so, I think, than the other way round. India grants complete religious liberty to Moslems. Indeed, in political matters, it would

seem that the government had leaned over backwards in its endeavor to secure the political rights of the Moslems. A number of Moslems occupy influential posts in government, both provincial and national. In Hyderabad, and perhaps some other former independent States ruled by Moslem princes, the Indian government has decreed that government posts must be distributed among the various groups on the basis of the ratio of their populations to the total number of citizens of that State. This in theory seems quite equitable. Actually, it works a severe hardship upon many Moslems, for they held government positions to a degree quite out of proportion to their numbers. And they now are out of employment.

They nowhere feel quite secure. They are more fearful of their minority position under Hindu rule than they were under British rule. Conversely, the Hindus, while outwardly tolerant, are distrustful of Islam. There is some reason for this. Hinduism never seeks to convert people to its own faith. Islam does. There is a constant attempt to convert Hindus to Islam. It has been in this way, in recent centuries at least, that Islam has grown. If this continues, think Hindus, may there not come a time when again, in certain areas at least, the Moslem population will outnumber the Hindus and want to join up with Pakistan, and so will weaken India still further?

The effect of these considerations may well be to solidify even more the Moslem community. Under outside pressures groups tend to become more self-conscious and to assume a defensive attitude. This may result in an intensification of the very things which differentiate them from the out-group. I am bound to report, however, that I saw little evidence of this having happened among Moslems.

Among some Moslems, however, those who have become liberal in their outlook, it might have just the opposite effect. It might, because they see the difficulties of maintaining their Moslem status as before, lead them to accentuate less and less those things that separate them from the majority group, and to assimilate more and more to the majority way of thinking and behaving. This might well lead to the retaining of a minimum Moslem basis, such as

seems to be the case with many in Indonesia; that is, they might become essentially secular Moslems. As a matter of fact, I met not a few Moslems of this kind, people who definitely said they were Moslem, but never went to Friday prayers, never said the daily prayers, never fasted, never gave their children any religious instruction. I suspect that the number of such persons is not too large, but it includes some very prominent and influential people, and I further have the distinct impression that it is growing.

The effect of Communism upon Moslems in India differs little if at all from its effect on them in Pakistan, to the discussion of which we now turn.

## Pakistan

As I looked back on the period I spent in Pakistan, I came to the conclusion that a few generalizations could be safely made.

1. The effects of war, in the form of the internecine struggle in India which led to partition, have been greater upon Islam in Pakistan than in India. This is quite naturally so. Islam is the central core of the Pakistani State. It is the very reason for its being. Eliminate Islam and there is simply no basis for it at all. Economically partition just doesn't make sense. East and West Pakistan are a thousand miles apart. Communication is difficult. India, which lies between, is the natural link and with the two constitutes a real economic unit. East Bengal raises the jute; West Bengal has the processing plants. India can't produce enough jute to keep her mills rolling. Pakistan hasn't yet been able to build the factories necessary for the processing. This is but one example of the uneconomical arrangement that partition has brought about.

Only the common Islamic base can be invoked as a reason for such a move. Racially and linguistically it doesn't make sense either. There is little or no racial distinction between Hindus and Moslems. They both speak diverse dialects. No, it is Islam, which of course is more than just a religion, rather a total culture, that binds them together, but religion is at the basis of the culture. Nothing could be more natural, therefore, than that there should be greater Islamic religious self-consciousness in Pakistan. If this goes there is no rational excuse for her separate existence.

It may be an open question whether all who led in the agitation for a separate Moslem state were primarily concerned about Islam as religion. Moslems have expressed that doubt to me. But there can be no question that appeal to the people for the support of the movement was largely on religious grounds. They were a religious minority. They distrusted deeply the Hindu majority. There were frequent communal riots, usually arising out of some insult, real or fancied, to some cherished religious belief or practice. What was needed was a separate Moslem state where Moslems could carry out their religious practices undisturbed and work into the State the sacred principles of their faith. It was at first a forlorn hope, realization of which in any immediate future was hardly discussed; and when it finally came, rather suddenly, the Moslems themselves were surprised and hardly ready as yet for it. Almost overnight they were obliged to improvise a whole new government setup. They lacked almost every necessity for carrying on a vigorous national life. There was no adequate physical accommodation for the rapidly mushrooming federal government. Vast numbers of temporary structures were thrown up to house the various ministries and their bureaus. They quickly adopted a somewhat modified India Act as a basis for operations, and set up a Constituent Assembly to work out a new Constitution which would adequately express the truly Islamic ideal of government. This body serves meanwhile also as the National Legislative Assembly, passing such bills from time to time as seem to be required.

But what is the ideal of the Islamic State? Upon this agreement has not yet been reached. Should it be an actual theocracy, as in the early days of the movement, the religious head being also the political head of the nation, or should the State be a modern democratic State, only differing from others in that it seeks to express in practical form the ideals and principles of Islam? But if so, how would these ideals and principles be defined? Who should have the right to say when a given law or governmental institution is or is not the embodiment of those principles? Should there be an authoritative body of interpreters to whom appeal must be made, a kind of ecclesiastical authority to which government would be supposed to yield assent when they made a pronouncement, pos-

sibly a kind of Islamic Supreme Court that might have the last word? All sorts of possibilities present themselves. There is as yet no final solution in sight. But powerful forces are exploiting variant points of view.

As might be expected there are those who want a 100 per cent Islamic State. And they have very definite ideas of what that should be. The Jamaat e' Islami movement has that as its avowed aim. Begun simply as a more or less academic discussion of the matter by its leader Maududi, it has now become a definitely political party dedicated to achieving this ideal in practice.

Just how much strength this movement has it is difficult to say. It has no representation at all in the Constituent Assembly. One high government official to whom I talked had never heard of it. Its leader, on the other hand, said that it was growing rapidly, that through it strong pressure was being brought to bear on that body. There is no doubt that many conservative Moslems will be appealed to by this scheme. Here seems to be the chance, at least, of a return to what they regard as the pristine purity of their faith, the opportunity to do, in this still unformed and relatively plastic state, what in already rigidly established States is not likely to be done, and so give to the world a practical example of what a true Islamic State should be. The basis for such a reform can lie only in a revival of Islam, and that is what is being pressed by its proponents.

2. A second effect, in quite a different direction, is the displacement, due to partition, of great numbers of people who have fled or been driven from India to find refuge in Pakistan. India has a tremendous problem in the relocation of those fleeing or being forced out of Pakistan, but the percentage of population thus affected is by no means so great. I was told that as many as 15 per cent of the present population of Pakistan consists of refugees. For many of them there is land, left by departing Hindus, and some have already been settled on the land, but for millions there is no land, and so far at least, the remedy for the situation has not been found. Usable land is unavailable; the limited industries of Pakistan cannot absorb them. So they continue to flood the cities and to live wretchedly at public expense, a very heavy burden on the new State's limited economic resources. They form a fertile ground for

the spread of Communism. People who see no hope in the present government are attracted by the promises of Communism to relieve their misery. In any event, they said, things can't be much worse, and they might be better.

3. There is a very substantial orthodox group which completely discounts the possibility that Pakistan can be won by Communism. Pakistan is Moslem, they say, and Moslems cannot be Communists. Islam, they point out, is squarely based upon belief in God. Communism is godless and antireligious. No Moslem will give up his fundamental faith in God. Therefore Communism is not to be taken seriously as a threat. Often enough when I reported that, according to information I had gotten, Communism actually is making substantial progress among the peasants in the north or among labor groups, they simply refused to believe it. It can't happen, therefore it hasn't happened. There is a familiar ring to this. I have heard it in a number of countries.

4. There is another group, which recognizes the possibility that the people, when too greatly depressed, may, despite their faith, go Communist, but which believes that a solution will be found before the breaking point is reached. They point to some things already done by government, and it is true, particularly in the Punjab, that some progress has been made in the resettlement of peasants on the land, though only a portion of the people are affected by it. They point out also that plans are being formulated for the solution of the difficulties. There is an Economic Planning Commission set up by the Constituent Assembly which is concentrating on the problem. Long-run solutions are being worked out. But will these be reached in time? They seem to be proceeding so slowly; and those upon whom the working out of the plans depends meanwhile are drawing comfortable salaries, riding about in luxury cars at taxpayers' expense, while people starve or eke out a wretched existence in refugee camps or in squatters' huts on the edges of the cities, sometimes along the very streets through which these luxury cars must pass. How long must they wait for the formulation even of paper plans, and how much longer for these plans to become realities which will relieve their distress? In India I was told by a competent economist that the standard

of living could be depressed considerably more than at present before the people would revolt. But Pakistan is not India. One wonders about it there (Pakistan).

5. While there are many who regard Islam in Pakistan as the primary line of defense against Communism, others are convinced that not even Islam can hold back Communism, unless there is a pronounced rise in the standards of living, and this depends upon two things: (a) an increased industrialization of Pakistan to take care of the people who cannot be provided for on the land and (b) the settlement of the Kashmir question. Until this is settled there can be no healthy recovery for Pakistan. Why? How does the settlement of the Kashmir question affect the economic and cultural life of Pakistan? In many ways, but perhaps chiefly in two: (a) It would make quite unnecessary the piling up of armaments and maintaining of an expensive army, which today require a disproportionate share of the national income. Large sums would then be released for constructive purposes such as the building of dams for irrigation projects, which would open up great tracts of now waste land for habitation, at the same time increase the agricultural wealth of the country, and provide a place for the settlement of displaced persons. Thus would the refugee problem be helped toward settlement. (b) New power plants would furnish a great increase of electric energy which could be used in the development of much-needed industries. And aside from these practical benefits there would be a release from fear of war and its attendant insecurity. Government could go confidently about the business of developing the human and material resources of the country, and could have money to spend on education and the general social well-being of the people.

It is quite impossible for one who has not actually been in Pakistan to imagine how large this Kashmir problem looms in the thought of Pakistanis. One cannot talk ten minutes to one of them without the matter's coming up. Practically any subject one undertakes to discuss leads eventually to Kashmir. I often found myself sole auditor of what had all the qualities of a public oration on the Kashmir problem. Almost no one could speak of it without emotion. The one conspicuous exception was, curiously enough, the

Minister for Kashmiri Affairs in the Pakistan cabinet. But he, if he spoke calmly and without emotion, was no less cogent in his setting forth of the merits of the Pakistani claim to that mountain land. If this problem were solved, all the others could be quickly solved also. And if it were not solved the conditions favoring the growth of Communism would grow worse. Thus the most important factor in deterring Communism, he thought, was the proper settlement of the affair.

But how could this be done? It was in the hands of the United Nations, but the real powers determining the issue were the British and Americans. Britain, it was declared, had her reasons for not wanting a settlement. It better served her political purposes to keep India and Pakistan embroiled. America, because of her commitments to the British, did not wish to oppose her wishes in the matter. Also America was so much concerned to keep India from slipping into the orbit of Communist influence that she did not feel she dared antagonize the Indians. She felt she could take for granted the Pakistani opposition to Communism as she could not that of India. Therefore she must not go counter to India's wishes in the matter. But the real key to the situation, the argument ran, is not India, but Pakistan. If Pakistan, the largest Moslem State, were to go Communist, it would have a powerful influence over the entire Moslem world. If the Middle East were to fall to the Communists, it would be an incalculable loss to the Western powers. For along with it would go vast resources in oil and other products which would strengthen enormously the Communist peoples. Pakistan's sympathies are naturally with the democratic West, everyone asserted, but unless some relief from the very adverse economic situation is found, even Islam may not be sufficient to keep the people from going Communist. There are Moslem peoples under the Soviets. They have found some kind of *modus vivendi* under Communist rule. Pakistanis might be forced against their natural inclination to succumb to Communism. Thus the United States, which alone has the power to bring about a solution of the problem, by refusing for one reason or another to do so is put in the position, however unwittingly, of being the possible cause for Communism's coming to Pakistan. Whatever merit all this has,

it does represent the thought of probably the majority of the leaders, at least, in Pakistan.

6. Though not so commonly found, I did discover an opinion, held certainly by many of the more conservative Moslems, that the real cause of the growth of Communism in Pakistan was the prevalent custom in the West of thinking in secular terms, that is, separating religion from politics or from the ordinary affairs of life. This was weakening the hold of religion upon the people and opening the way to the appeal of Communism. To this might be added the opinion of one person who asserted that the Point Four money that goes to Pakistan goes chiefly to persons in the government who, in one way or another, are enriching themselves, and thus are widening the gap between the poor and the more privileged classes. Thereby the coming of Communism is hastened. It should be said, however, that this is probably not a fair statement. Really a great deal of Point Four money does reach the people in direct or indirect benefits. Most people believe, rather, that this program, while insufficient as now given, is nevertheless one of the things that is serving to deter the Communistic advance. Two definite impressions I found in Pakistan were: (a) Not much is being done by Moslems as Moslems to offset Communistic propaganda. A few publications carry articles against it, for example, one called *Yaqueem* or *Faith*, published in Karachi, with the editor of which I had a long conversation. Another was the Jamaat e' Islami movement, in whose publications there is a frontal attack upon Communism. The Ahmadiya movement, a Moslem sect, is also quite active in its opposition, both by its preaching and through its periodicals and other publications.[1]

But (b) much of the propaganda is based on the charge that Communism is antireligious and does not believe in God, while as a matter of fact both in India and in Pakistan Communism definitely does not appear in that guise at all. On the contrary, it specifically asserts that a man's religion is his own private affair; that, indeed, one may be at the same time both a Communist and a Moslem or a Christian. In fact it is sometimes asserted that Communism and

[1] The head of the movement has published and circulated widely several pamphlets on Communism and Islam.

Islam are essentially one in their aims, and the Koran is quoted to prove these assertions. Communism really complements Islam by implementing politically the ideals for which the faith stands. Now, well-instructed Moslems know that this is not true. But I have an idea that the ordinary mine-run Moslem does not. And so far as I was able to see, little is being done to inform him of the fundamental differences as well as the likenesses. I was told that in the villages some of the *ulemas* or leaders have become Communists. Said one distinguished Moslem leader, "If the *ulemas* in any considerable numbers go Communistic, it would be very influential among the people." And he added, "There are many village *ulemas* whose income is as low as, or less than, that of the average villagers upon whose support they depend. This means that they are living at an exceedingly low standard and might well prove receptive to the glowing promises of Communism, especially where it does not affect their religion."

## Iran

Iran differs markedly from Pakistan. Iran is old. Pakistan is new. Iran has an indigenous civilization and culture that go back many centuries. Pakistan has little to hold it together save its newborn nationalism and its Islamic faith. In Pakistan Islam comes first, at least at this stage, nationalism second—there might be a difference of opinion on this point—while in Iran there is little question that nationalism comes first and Islam a rather poor second. Pakistan is dominantly Sunnite; Iran is Shiah; that is, they represent different sects of the Moslem faith.

Iran was more directly affected by the war, for it offered a way to the Russian border from the south when, it will be recalled, Russia was our ally against Germany. Though experiencing little or no actual physical suffering on account of war, it was nevertheless an armed camp, and many foreign Allied troops were within its borders during the war years. It was thus subject to something of the same war psychology that the West experienced, with comparable effects upon its thought and life. Foreign influence was strong and had no little effect in two directions: (1) the introduction of an increasingly secular outlook among the literate and especially the leading classes

of Iran and (2) the weakening of the hold which the old Moslem culture had upon the young. This was more observable in the cities, but the country as a whole was likewise affected. The total result on the Islamic religion was in general a loosening of the ties which bound the people to it and a consequent weakening of its power to control the intellectual and social—yes, and the political—life of the Persian people. Among the leaders I met and talked with, it was the exception who was a faithful practicer of the Moslem faith. Almost none of them were what one might call mosque Moslems. They do not keep up the five daily prayers or the recurrent fast periods, nor do they have much respect for the ecclesiastical leaders, the *mullahs*. Yet they were, they said, Moslems. They were certainly not Christians or Jews. They were fully comparable to many groups in France, England, or America who own to a Christian background, and would probably, though not necessarily, say they were Christians, certainly not Jews or Moslems. Their basic outlook would be colored certainly by their Christian background. It is quite necessary to understand this when the claim is made that Moslems cannot become Communists, for as a matter of fact not a few Moslems of this sect not only can but do become Communists—even active leaders of Communism. Communism was under the ban when I was in Iran. Because of this fact I found it impossible to get to talk with any who admitted to Communistic beliefs or even deep sympathy. Yet there were Communists by the thousands in Iran. Estimates varied as to the number all the way from 10 per cent of the literate population to as much as 75 per cent, which I am sure was an exaggerated guess. They are found among the teachers in the primary, secondary, and university ranks, and there are many students both in the lower schools and especially in the university who are inclined toward Communism, if not actual party members. A university professor noted that the incidence of Communism is greater in the lower classes than in the upper. There is no recognized Communist party with representation in Parliament, though there are leftist parties. But Communist propaganda goes on under cover. Clandestinely published papers are circulated. It was not possible, under conditions of martial law, which prevailed while I was there, for meetings or demonstrations to be held, but no one doubts that

there is a strong underground movement going on. Just because it is secret, and its strength cannot be accurately judged, people are uneasy and insecure, not knowing when something will break. I found no fear at all of physical aggression from Russia. Why should Russia risk a third world war by overt aggression when there are forces working within Iran which will eventually, they think, carry her into Communism? There are no Russians operating in Iran. Their embassy, I was told, behaves even more circumspectly than does that of America, in matters of propaganda. But there is continual Communist propaganda going on, whether, as suspected by some, through paid Russian agents or by native Persians who are sincerely convinced that only Communism can bring prosperity and justice to the people of Iran. This fact was pointed out to me with considerable emphasis by one informant. "Why is it," he asked, "that with not a Russian anywhere about, the Communist propaganda machine works ceaselessly, while there are Americans everywhere trying to do the things necessary to offset the appeal of Communism? Communism comes to the people through the lips and activities of Iranians, while the counter-effort seems to be chiefly through the activity of Americans and other foreigners—foreigners," he continued, "who, by their seeming to support Britain in the current oil controversy, share much of the hostility felt towards the English."

So Communism is an ever present problem in Iran. How much the illiterate masses are affected by it, it is difficult to discover. Some say scarcely at all, except among industrial workers, of whom there are not a great many. Peasants, I was informed, are generally not affected by Communist propaganda, but I am not convinced that this is true. Living standards are very low. While the economic effects of the stoppage of oil exploitation by the British are felt chiefly by the urban population in the form of unemployment, due to decline in building operations, cutting down of government spending on public works, etc., with consequent loss of buying power which is reflected in poor business for merchants, there is nevertheless some effect upon the total population.

When I asked if Communism would come to Iran, I got a variety of answers. Most were negative with certain reservations. The inter-

national situation might change for the worse; the internal economic conditions might deteriorate to the point where Communism would seem to be the only way out. When I asked what were the most powerful deterrents to Communistic advance, I got five or six recurring answers, but ranked differently by different informants. One very influential political figure listed them in this order. First, the king. He is personally popular, and so long as he withholds himself as he does usually from active politics, and the people retain their love and loyalty to him, the king is a powerful restraining factor. Second, Prime Minister Mossadegh and his united front, which are avowedly strong in their opposition to Communism, are a bulwark against it. It was interesting, on the other hand, to hear from another man also highly placed in the political life of Iran that it was precisely the prime minister and his stubborn unwillingness to compromise further on the settlement of the oil controversy that was fast pushing Iran toward the brink of Communism, for it was forcing lower and lower the economic basis of Iranian livelihood, and people might come to feel that only Communism could furnish them needed relief. Third, he said, was Kashani, and religion. It was a significant fact, I think, that he placed religion third in importance in the list. Others put it first, some second, still others at the very end. Kashani needs some explanation. He is, some say, the second most powerful figure in Iran. Others say he is even more powerful than Prime Minister Mossadegh and could undo him if he chose to do so. What gives him this power? Very simply, it is that he has control of the religious forces of the country. It is to him that the masses look as their leader in religious matters. He can play upon the religious hopes and fears of his people as no one else can, and can stir them to action, or inaction if that is called for, almost at will. He is himself a *mullah*. He is not a great scholar, though he is a very keen-minded individual, and does have a good command of Islamic learning, but more than that, he knows how to appeal to the masses of the people, who are on the whole very religious still, and can be quite emotional when their faith is involved. The great Reza Shah, father of the present king, had brought about many religious reforms in his reign and had banned some of the more superstitious practices of the people. Under the present regime

these restrictions have been relaxed. There has been a return to some of them, with the result that religious feeling sometimes runs very high.

Kashani knows just what to do and say to arouse the people. If he told them, as he told me in a long personal interview, that Islam and Communism are completely incompatible and that a Moslem cannot be a Communist, this would have tremendous weight with the people, and would probably be more effective than anything anyone else could do against Communism. But what if, while anti-Communist in principle, he should decide that certain gains might be made by playing along with the Eastern powers, feeling himself strong enough to restrain the people from outright acceptance of Communist ideology? It is a well-known fact that some semblance of Islam remains among some of the Moslem constituent States within the Soviet Union. If he were in a good bargaining position, with Persian oil as the stake, might he not be able to get certain concessions as to freedom for Islam if he consented to enter the Russian orbit? That this is not wholly impossible is evidenced by the fact that in another interview with an Italian visitor, only a short time before I saw him, he expressed warm sympathy for the Eastern bloc. There are those in Iran who are by no means convinced of his complete aversion to Communism. I even heard it suggested that far from being a strong deterrent to Communism he might be the very avenue through which it could come to Iran. I doubt if many people hold this view. It is interesting that such diverse opinions could be expressed concerning one man.

There can be no doubt that any frontal attack by Communists upon Islam would provoke a strong reaction from the masses. I heard stories of villagers' killing persons who "insulted" the Koran. A *mullah* who had favored the Communist cause in the Azerbaijan episode was mobbed by the people after the settlement of the affair. The danger from Communism lies in the indirect approach it makes to the people. It does not come, at least to the peasants, though it does at the intellectual level, as anti-God or antireligious. It comes as an immediate answer to very pressing problems such as hunger, exploitation by absentee landlords, lack of schools, etc., without any hostility to religion. Indeed, religion is declared to be a private

matter. One may cling to his Islamic faith if he so desires. I did not hear in Iran the claim that Communism is simply the political means of implementing Islamic ideals, but I did hear it in India and Pakistan. Some *mullahs* in Iran are said to be at least sympathetic toward Communism. It is facts like these which make the calm assertion that Moslems cannot be Communists meaningless. And it is the relative complacency, based upon this belief, that lays Islamic peoples open to the danger of Communist conquest. They are facing a theory, not the realities of Communism, and it is with the realities that any successful resistance to Communism must deal.

Fourth in importance, my informant, a cabinet minister, put the army, which up until then he thought was relatively free from Communist infiltration. So long as the army holds out against it, it can be considered as a strong deterrent to the coming of Communism.

When I asked specifically what role the American aid was playing, particularly what is being done through the Point Four program, his reply was that at the present level it cannot be rated as highly significant. Not that he and his country are not appreciative of that aid. They are very grateful indeed, but it simply is not on a scale such as to affect seriously, for the present, the general economic status of the country, upon which the success or failure of Communism finally rests. Present expenditures run to something like twenty million dollars a year, most of it being wisely spent in relatively long-term projects, while the *immediate* economic need is very great. The people need money and need it *now*, for the standard of living is steadily sinking, and therein lies Communism's best opportunity. When I further asked what he would consider significant aid, he talked in terms of $100,000,000 a year as a minimum.

But, he hastened to add, we don't want anyone to give us that sum. We only want a chance to develop our oil resources, and the money will come. I find that estimates of what Iran hopes to be able to get from oil run from $50,000,000 to $200,000,000 a year. She has the oil resources. It only remains to get a just settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, and this, they think, America could bring about by using its good offices. In so doing, they say, the Middle East support for the West would be guaranteed. One

cannot spend much time in Iran without meeting this oil issue. No matter where the conversation starts it soon swings to oil.

## Iraq

My stay in Iraq was shorter than elsewhere. First, its relative importance in the Islamic world makes it of less significance in the total picture, and second, the role of Communism in this land seems to have been of less consequence than in other Islamic countries. A simple statement of the pertinent facts will make this clear. But first the effects of war. They were not so marked here as elsewhere, though as one of the forms of impact of the Western world upon Iraqi religion and culture, war was not without effect. Soldiers were quartered here in considerable numbers, but the social customs of the country made it next to impossible for them to come into intimate social contact with the young women of the country as they did in Japan, Korea, and other lands. There was not therefore the breakdown of sex mores to the extent noted elsewhere.

Economic changes wrought by war had indirect effects. The creation of the black market here, as elsewhere, tended to break down business moral standards. There was an increase in urbanization, with consequent loosening of religious and social controls. Congestion in the cities and apparently very poor living conditions had their indirect effects upon the people, though it was pointed out that, low as the standard of living of these people seemed to be, it was probably higher than many of them had known before.

The effect, not simply of war, but of the general impact of the West, had been to produce, first of all, many imitators who "went West" in dress, in social custom, in living standards, and in general outlook, even outdoing the West in many respects. They did not adopt the religion of the West, or its higher spiritual qualities, but the more exaggerated secularism of all of life, to the almost complete abandonment of their traditional religious and moral ideals. This group is said to be lessening. One brilliant young representative of this point of view indicated that it had led most of these people eventually to a sense of disillusionment and frustration—a void had been created within them which they had found nothing to fill.

Among the more religiously conservative there was a contrasting tendency to revive religious attitudes and to try to put forth a system able to meet modern requirements, and do better what needed to be done than any outside forces could do. They came to the conclusion that Western influence had promoted neither greater prosperity nor any increase in moral or spiritual value; indeed, quite the contrary, degeneration had set in. Some became quite hostile to the West and its ideas and institutions.

But there was still another group which saw faults in their own culture, and some values in Western cultures, and insisted that judgment be used in appropriating what was of value in foreign cultures, exchanging it for what was obviously bad in their own. They would, however, keep a link, a strong one, with their own basic culture, while adding to or modifying it. And Islam lies at the very roots of their culture.

Iraq passed through a period of prosperity during and just after the war, with the attendant evils of sudden prosperity. This was followed by several years of depression, which exposed the country to the dangers of Communism because of the wretched plight of the people, for it is on such conditions that Communism flourishes most. But recently there came a change of fortune. Economically they are now experiencing another wave of prosperity, based upon oil production, in which Iraq is rich. She has a good market for all the oil she can produce, on a fifty-fifty basis of division of the proceeds with the exploiting companies and the automatic assurance of any higher return that might be negotiated by the companies with Iran.

So there is intense building activity going on in Iraq. Great plans are being made for the further economic development of the country. Seventy per cent of the oil revenues, I was told, are allocated to a development company, charged with the task of building extensive dams and lakes for the control of the devastating floods of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and the storage of water for release through ever extending canal systems, which will open up vast new areas of fertile land for agriculture. Iraq's population is small, scarcely a tenth of what it was at the peak of its history in the distant past. There is no lack of land for all its people, and

many more, if only the water can be gotten to the land. Iraq, like most Eastern lands, has the problem of large landed estates and absentee landlords, with all the attendant evils, but there is no need to divide the lands of those who now hold them. It is both cheaper and more economically profitable, in the long run, to open up new lands upon which landless people may be settled. If there is surplus land available, and the peasants are not given favorable terms by the landlords, they can easily take up new lands, leaving the large landowners to till their own. Thus the principle of competition will eventually cure most of the social ills which the landless peasants suffer at present. So the leaders think and so they are planning.

There are, to be sure, some Communists in Iraq, though the hanging, not long ago, of four Communist leaders and the rigid suppression of Communism wherever it appears has forced it underground, to the point where no one will venture even to assess its numerical strength. Some informants are sure there are Communists among the intellectuals, though the number is probably small. Of course, under the circumstances, I was unable to make contact with any avowed Communists, or even to talk to any very leftist thinkers.

Practically, my informants believed, there was no immediate Communist threat. Unless some international complication occurred, such for example as the occupation of Iran by Communists, there was little likelihood that it would gather strength enough to be a real menace.

"If we can have five or six years of peace in which to develop our irrigation system, there will be no danger of Communism," one high official in the government declared, "for the economic conditions which favor Communism will have been cleared up."

That there is a real desire for social change there can be no doubt. The dominant party when I was there was the Democratic Socialist, with a large majority in the legislative assembly. And it was committed to a program of broad social development. There was some criticism to the effect that too much was being spent on huge city building projects and plans for higher education, to the neglect of the villages, where the real economic problems largely lie. What truth there is here is not easily discovered. It is so much a matter of personal judgment.

Religion is regarded by most as a deterrent to Communism. I was told that Communism is generally regarded as inimical to religion. I am not so sure that this is generally true, though it may be true at the intellectual levels where this fact is not of such great importance. A few *mullahs* are said to have become interested in Communism. With their blessing, in any numbers, it might be readily accepted by the people. I could discover little or nothing that was being done by Moslems, as Moslems, to counteract it, save that it is sometimes preached against.

One highly placed public official thinks that one of the most strategic points at which to combat the Communists would be the improvement of the training of the religious leaders, the *mullahs*, which is at present very deficient. How this should be done it is not easy to say. He thinks that through a more generous support by the State of the institutions for such training good results could be achieved.

But almost all agreed that the first line of defense against Communism in Iraq was the improvement of the economic lot of the humble people, and Iraq is at present in better condition to effect an improvement here than any country in the East or Middle East that I have visited.

There was a good deal of political unrest in the country while I was there. One distinguished leader who had held an important post in an earlier cabinet said that it would not be long before a *coup d'état* would unseat the then government, and in about three weeks this actually occurred. It is not clear, however, that the change has had any appreciable effect upon the situation in respect to Communism.

## Egypt

The general outlook in Egypt was quite different from that in the other Moslem States I had visited. A new political setup had caught the popular imagination and seemed quite solidified with the people. Everywhere I heard praise for Muhammad Naguib, the strong man —everywhere except among the privileged classes. Naturally they don't like him. The land reforms he has already brought about have nearly ruined them. To be sure, the government has offered to com-

pensate them, but the property has been evaluated at much less than the market price, and the interest on the bonds is very low, 3 per cent, I believe. Whether they will be able to unseat him it is difficult to say. He is said to have the army solidly behind him, but there are forces working against him. Should he fail to hold things together, it is likely that chaos will ensue and if it does, then the Communists will probably move in.

Despite the fact that they are now not allowed to function openly, the testimony of informants was pretty clear to the effect that there is an active under-cover Communist propaganda being carried on. Just how strong it is, it is impossible to say, since it is not in the open. Generally people say the *fellahin* are not much affected by it, and if they have been in the past, the reforms Naguib is promoting tend to remove its major appeal. The industrial population is relatively small. I was told that an attempt had been made to get control of these workers, but rather unsuccessfully, and that the Communists had then turned to the students and intellectuals. Their major strength apparently is there.

Here the economic appeal is not the only one. Many students and intellectuals are said to be relatively fortunate, economically. With them the appeal is either that of idealistic interests in the underprivileged classes or doctrinaire interest in Communism as a philosophy, superior to that afforded by the Christian or Moslem faith. Most of the intellectuals are quite secular in their outlook, so that religion is no longer a restraint, but rather an incentive to Communistic effort, since it seems to them to be, as Lenin said, an opiate designed to keep the people indifferent to their this-worldly status. How much of a driving force this interest is may be questioned. To this group, however, are to be added a very considerable number of unemployed intellectuals, as in India. The universities are crowded with young men. There is Cairo University with twenty thousand or more students, Alexandria with half as many, al Azhar with a considerable number, all turning out educated men and women to be absorbed into the life of Egypt. Well, there just aren't enough jobs of the requisite kind to go around. Possibly if many of them were willing to go out into the villages as teachers, doctors, dentists, lawyers there might be places enough, but many of them

do not want to leave the large modern cities for village or small-city employment. The result is a substantial group of educated people without work, who are bitter and resentful of the system which has educated them but has no adequate place for them to fit into. Like the corresponding groups in India and elsewhere, this unhappy body of able people is wide open to the appeal of Communism.

"Egypt will be the last country in the world to go Communist," passionately asserted a guide who was conducting me through the ancient tombs in the Valley of the Kings, near Luxor.

"Why?" I asked.

"Because we are Moslems and Moslems will never become Communists," he cried.

"Egypt will never go Communist," echoed a fellow passenger in my compartment on the way back from Luxor to Cairo, "because Egypt is Moslem."

Over and over I heard this repeated. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, an exile in Egypt, said the same thing. The head of the Moslem Brotherhood rather naturally assumed that Islam was the most effective deterrent to Communism.

When I asked what Islam, as Islam, was doing to assure that the people not accept Communism, I could discover little or nothing. The Moslem Brotherhood, which represents an intensive effort to restore the pristine purity of the Islamic faith, thinks that in doing this it is erecting the most effective barrier to its advance. It has, the leader admitted, been made more sensitive by Communistic propaganda to the social evils which flourish in Egypt, and partly for this reason has become increasingly political in its outlook. It has seen that the implementation of Islamic ideals involves more than the cultivation of personal piety, important as that is. You cannot, in Islam, separate religion from life. Since in early Islam there was no distinction between religion and the political life, any harking back to early Islamic standards, these people think, means the integration of religion into the political as well as all other phases of modern life. Islam is a total culture. There can be no separating out of the religious from the political life of the time. If, they think, modern political and economic life were truly made

Islamic, the wide differences between the economic and social classes, which make Communism appeal to the people, would cease to exist, and so the danger of Communism would be averted.

But is this the sort of thing that can be done in time to meet the clamoring of the victims of ancient injustice, to whom Communism offers a more direct solution? Ought not Islam to concern itself more actively in the securing of at least minimum justice within the framework of an existing non-Islamic government, while at the same time it works toward the longer-range goal of establishing an Islamic State? The Brotherhood is strong enough to influence government, even if it cannot at present control it. One foresees a bitter struggle before the forces of reaction will give way even to the reasonably modest demands of the Naguib government. But in the success of his efforts at reform, it seems to me, lies the immediate answer to Communist propaganda, not in the creation of an Islamic State. This, if it ever comes, will most certainly delay in coming, and there is an insistence on the part of the victims of exploitation upon immediate relief which, if not heeded, might well lead to the victory of Communism in Egypt.

## Trans-Jordan

I spent a few days in Trans-Jordan, which is of course Moslem. I was mainly engaged in visiting the sacred sites, and made little attempt to interview leaders. I did, however, get some information, pertinent to my inquiry, from a number of people whom I met. War, chiefly in the form of the Arab-Israeli war, took heavy toll of the Arabs and their properties. The establishment of the State of Israel at the expense of Arab territory took away a sizable section of their land. Over 700,000 Arab refugees are still without homes and occupations. They live chiefly on a dole most of which comes from the United Nations. Their lot is a very unhappy one. I saw village after village of them. There are seventy thousand in two settlements near Jericho in the Jordan Valley. On the way to Hebron from Jerusalem one day we passed a large tent city on a barren rocky hillside, where some thirty thousand of them lived. Nor is much being done to settle them permanently.

Israelis accuse the Arab nation of doing nothing for them. Arabs

accuse the Israelis of being the cause of the whole difficulty. Israelis claim that most of the refugees need not have left at all. The Arabs insist that they were in imminent danger of slaughter, and in fear fled to escape it. The Arabs are exceedingly bitter—particularly some who now live in cramped quarters on the Arab side of the no man's land which divides Jerusalem between the two countries but can literally look across and see their comfortable homes now occupied by Israeli families; also farmers who now live in Trans-Jordan but can see their own former farms being tilled by Israelis, using, they claim, the farming implements which when fleeing they left behind.

I saw one day in the Jordan Valley, only a few miles from Jericho, a large area covered with small but neat cottages. But they were quite unoccupied. Naturally I inquired why. They had been built, I was told, for resettling Arab refugees, but the latter had refused to leave their much less comfortable temporary quarters in other refugee villages and move into this village. Why? Because, they said, this would be tantamount to accepting their status as fixed and final. Now they live in hope of going back to their former homes or farms in Israel. So long as they continue to live in the tent cities, or other confessedly temporary quarters, they are a living protest against an unjust deprivation of what is rightfully their own. So they wait, in protest, many of them rather hopelessly now—but there is always a little ray of hope that the wrongs will be righted. They do not propose to jeopardize their chance of a return to their homes and properties by an acquiescence in what they regard as a deep injury inflicted by the Israelis. They too, like the Jewish people, regarded this land as their home. They do not see any justice in being deprived of their home just because another people who have never lived there at all, but stake their claim on an ancestral right, now have come and seized their property. What will be the outcome of it all?

There is no doubt that this war has left a deep hatred and desire for revenge in the minds of the Arabs, which bodes no good for Israel in the future, if she should ever lose the support of the Western nations. This is deeper in Trans-Jordan than in other Arab countries, but it exists also, if in slighter intensity, in most of the Moslem nations of the Near East. It is impossible to get into any of these

countries if one's passport carries an Israeli visa. It is very strong in Iraq, where the creation of Israel was attributed almost wholly to the United States in general, and to Mr. Truman in particular. The people are sure that it was done in the interest of assuring the Jewish vote in New York. There was a great deal of bitterness expressed by the people I met in Iraq at making political capital at the expense of the Arab people. If in Pakistan my informants orated at me on the Kashmir question, and in Iran on the oil problem, it was always on the question of the Israeli State that they orated in Iraq.

One wishes he might report a happier state of affairs, but it seemed very clear, on the basis of what I was told in Arab lands, that only Western support keeps the Arab people from moving on Israel and crushing her. They confidently declare that they could do so if allowed by the Western powers.

Communism is not strong in Trans-Jordan, I was told. But it is there, and it finds a ready hearing among the displaced people in the refugee villages. So long as these remain, and so long as the economic conditions of the less-privileged groups go unrelieved, so long Communism will act as a threat. The recent break of diplomatic relations by Russia with the State of Israel, ostensibly because of the bombing of the Russian Embassy, is believed by many thoughtful people to be a strong bid for Arab good will toward her and of course toward Communism. Undoubtedly she is interested in the oil of the Near East. She needs it very badly. Here seemed an opportunity to attract the Near Eastern Arabs to her. It may be that her whole anti-Semitic drive in recent months has been a calculated move to win the Arab world. Israel is so much a creation of the Western powers that she could hardly be expected to lend too ready an ear to Communism's promises, for fear of losing Western sympathy.

There is a very friendly feeling toward Russia among the Eastern Orthodox churches in Trans-Jordan. As indicated elsewhere (Chapter VI) Russia has often in the past contributed financially to their support, and besides this, the acceptance by the Russian Church of a working relationship with the Communist government makes it easier for the sister churches in other lands to look favorably upon Communist claims.

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, whom I met and interviewed at

length in his home in Heliopolis, a suburb of Cairo, where he lives in exile, is making every effort to bind the Arab countries into a solid bloc to oppose any further expansion of Israel and to get an equitable solution of the refugee problem. I could hardly get him to talk about anything but the plight of the refugees. He did indicate indirectly that he was not hopeful of any return to the *status quo ante*, because of the strong support which Israel has in the West. He was political realist enough to see the unlikelihood of this. But he did think the Western powers had the obligation to see that justice was done to the refugees, and that there should be no further aggression by Israel at the expense of other countries.

This seems to be a real fear among Arab nations—that Israel will continue to bring in more and more Jews from abroad; that Israel will become overpopulated, and that then claim will be made to an expansion of territory, since the adjacent countries are less densely populated. At first when I heard this, in not one but several countries, I thought it was simply a propaganda device to stir up ill will against Israel. But as I talked to more and more people, and heard it repeated and elaborated upon, I became convinced that it was a genuine fear. I was told in Egypt that a map hangs in the national Parliament building in Jerusalem showing Israel as including a very much greater territory, covering much or all of Trans-Jordan. When I asked the now president of Israel if this were true, he replied that he knew of no such map, but that in some office there might be a map of ancient Israel which did extend far beyond her present borders. He attributed no importance to it beyond its historical interest. But of such things are the fears of modern men compounded. An innocent map becomes a cause of suspicion and distrust and fear when men's minds are already filled with foreboding for the future. The one conclusion to which one inevitably comes as he visits and talks with leaders and common folk in the Near East is that here is a tinderbox. All this affects religion very directly. The profound religious loyalties may even be one of the potential causes of future trouble. We shall look now at the way the Jewish faith has been and is being affected.

# VI

# War, Communism and Judaism

THE major part of this chapter will deal with what I discovered to be the effects of war and Communism upon Judaism as it exists in Israel, which I visited on my trip. But at least a brief discussion of the general effects of these factors upon Judaism as a whole seems to be necessary.

In a sense, the very State of Israel is a product of war. There had, of course, long been some kind of hope of the return of the Jews to Palestine. Theodore Hertzl, in the nineties, gave a new impulse to this hope which has not ceased to attract the interest of large numbers of Jews. It was his belief that something practical ought to be, and could be, done about it. He sought valiantly to implement the hope, but until the end of the First World War little success was achieved.

The capture of Jerusalem by General Allenby broke the power of the Turks who controlled Palestine, and the famous Balfour declaration seemed to, and really did, open the door finally for the realizations of the age-old dream of a return to the Jewish homeland, as it had always been called.

A world Zionist organization was founded, large sums of money were raised, and colonization on a fairly large scale in Palestine was undertaken. This land was bought from the Arabs, at first at a very modest price, because it was of little worth. But the zeal of the new colonists, aided by capital from the Jewish Agency which was set up, soon produced results. Dams were built, irrigation ditches constructed, wells drilled, and water gotten onto the land. Relatively desert areas began to blossom as the rose. A great many Jews wanted to go back home, and did so. They employed Arab help, paid them well, as wages then went, and Palestine prospered.

Among the Jews, by no means all were in accord with Zionist hopes. The very orthodox believed that God in His own time and

manner would lead his people back, but they rather thought that the Zionist movement was in a sense forcing His hand in the matter. They did not look with favor upon it. At the other extreme, the Reform Jews, whose Jewishness, thought the Orthodox, was very tenuous, were so little particularistic in their thinking that they were not much attracted by the idea. They were thinking of Judaism primarily as a religion, not linked to country or soil. In between these two lay the main support for it.

In general, there were three kinds of Zionism, or of Zionist interest. A plain humanitarian interest in the Jews who were persecuted or were suffering serious discrimination in the lands in which they dwelt, and who obviously needed some place to which to escape, led many, even of the extreme groups, to favor some kind of arrangement by which they could be taken care of. It would not have mattered greatly to them where this asylum was located. They contributed liberally to funds raised to provide them a home. But in the early postwar years the pressures were not too great.

There was a group, who might be called cultural Zionists, who believed that it was of great importance to have a cultural center somewhere, where Judaic culture could be conserved and developed. As the returning Jews in Palestine built schools and colleges and began to develop a music and an art, and, of even more significance, began to revive the use of the classic Hebrew as a living language, Jews all over the world saw in this movement a great value. Here would be a living center of Jewish culture to which the whole Jewish world could look. Many Reform Jews strongly favored this, and even the Orthodox were not without interest in it.

But there was always a group which felt that nothing short of the establishment of a Jewish State would meet the needs of the Jewish world community. These were the political Zionists, and they bent every energy to the accomplishment of their purpose. They met with stiff resistance from both Orthodox and Reform groups, and it seems doubtful if they could have won had not Hitler appeared on the scene, and set about the systematic destruction of the Jews in Germany. The toll in Jewish life and property was terrible. All told some six million Jews had been killed before the fall of Hitler brought the war to an end. Who, in the face of such slaughter and

persecution, could fail to see the need for a place to which these harried victims of anti-Semitism could flee and find a chance to build their lives anew? Under the circumstances it was not strange that sentiment among the Orthodox and Reform groups changed and in the end only a comparatively small group of Jews refused to support the claims of the National Zionists to the right to establish a Jewish State within Palestine.

This of course aroused the hostility of the Arabs of Palestine, at whose expense the State must be established. They protested vigorously, as did their Arab neighbors throughout the Near East. Fighting broke out between Jews and Arabs. Terrorist groups on both sides attacked and counterattacked. War had come once again to this unhappy land.

It is no part of our purpose to discuss in detail the struggle which ensued. Powerful influences were brought to bear upon the Western nations to furnish both moral support and arms and ammunition with which the Israelis might overcome Arab resistance. Ugly charges have been made that America, particularly, gave her support because the administration needed the Jewish vote in New York in order to keep itself in power. Whatever may be the truth of the charges, it is true that the Israelis did get the needed support and, after a bloody and destructive war, came to occupy a substantial portion of Palestine. Israel was literally born of war.

The extreme dislocation occasioned by the expulsion of nearly a million Arabs from their homes, allowed to exist as rather hopeless refugees in scores of large camps in adjacent Arab countries, has left a terrible hatred toward the Israelis in the minds of all the Arab peoples. They only await the opportune moment, to seek revenge upon Israel. Only the restraining influence of the United Nations keeps them from attempting to right what they consider a great wrong by destroying the new State. Israel stands in a position of great insecurity and fear of war. The outlook of the whole of Judaism has been greatly affected by war.

As for the effect of Communism upon Judaism in general, a great deal might be said. There is a persistent belief, sedulously cultivated by anti-Semitic propaganda, that Communism is a product of the Jewish mind and that it is chiefly led by Jews today. They point out

that Karl Marx was a Jew, of a Christian Jewish family, it is true, but still a Jew. Lenin and Trotzky, the great leaders of the Russian revolution, were also Jews. And these propagandists used to go down the list of lesser, but still influential, leaders and show that they were Jews. Wherever a Jewish name appeared among the leaders in the Communist party in any country, they were quick to note it. As "Communist" became more and more a term of opprobrium, it served well the purposes of the anti-Semites to attach it to the Jews. Anyone to whom both epithets, Jew and Communist, were applied, whether rightly or wrongly, became an object of hatred to many people.

Are Jewish people any more inclined to Communism than others? Are they actually the leaders of Communism in any larger proportion than any other religious or ethical groups? Fortunately information is at hand on these points and it seems quite clear that the charges are not true.

If any further evidence of the fact that Communist and Jew are not synonymous is required, one needs only to review the stories coming out of Russia and her satellites in recent months of the mounting anti-Semitism there. Hardly any prominent leaders of Communism are any longer Jews. One after another, over a considerable period, the highly placed Jewish Communist leaders have been purged. Zionism has become a crime punishable by a stiff sentence. And finally, Russia has severed diplomatic relations with Israel. These facts do not fit the commonly accepted picture in the minds of the anti-Semites. As a matter of fact, Jews are like all other peoples; some are attracted by one political or economic theory, some by another. Certainly the great majority of Jews in Israel are not only not Communists but strongly opposed to Communism.

So far as the picture in Israel itself goes, it is clear that religion is playing a conspicuous if not a dominant role. I visited the Knesset one evening. Mr. Ben Zvie, not then, but now, president of Israel, took me up into the gallery and I spent the better part of an hour there. On the landing of the stairway leading to the chamber there is a large bronze seven-branch candlestick, the Menorah. On the front wall of the chamber there is also a Menorah. On one side of

the gallery, draped in black, was the chair of the late president, Chaim Weizmann. Hung in front of it on the gallery wall was another bronze Menorah. Is this significant? Or is it merely a symbol which has lost its meaning? To some it symbolizes Jerusalem. It suggests the temple, now gone of course. There are religious overtones in it, at least to me. Does it have that meaning to Jews? A rabbi with whom I talked said that for him it did have. For others, he was not so sure.

Also there is a Chief Rabbi, whom I met and interviewed at length. He has no official standing in government. But on ceremonial occasions he is always invited to be present, and protocol gives him precedence over all the ministers of State. He is sometimes asked to give his opinion as to whether proposed legal measures are in conformity with Biblical or Rabbinic teaching. This opinion has no binding effect, but it is evidence of an interest among at least some of those who are building the new State in seeing that it is not out of line with fundamental Jewish ideals and principles.

There is here no well defined movement to make Israel a theocracy, as I found among Moslems in Pakistan. This, said the Chief Rabbi, the Israelis are willing to leave to the Messiah to establish. Israel is a democracy, patterned after the democratic ideas and institutions of the West. Probably a fairly large majority of the leaders are secular minded. The so-called religious parties, Agudat-Israel, the Misrachi, and two others, together have just fifteen representatives in the Knesset, exactly 12½ per cent. This, of course, is not a fair measure of the number of religious-minded persons in the House, but only of those who are aggressively interested in making religion a political force. Many others, perhaps equally religious persons, do not choose to make religion a political issue. They are content to work in and to seek to permeate the larger parties with a religious spirit, or at least to effect essentially religious and moral ends through influencing these more powerful groups. All the parties, save the definitely left-wing Mapam and Communist parties, which have between them only eighteen seats, or just 15 per cent, and are generally oriented toward the East rather than the West, are at least respectful of religion and do not try to eliminate it from consideration. While not themselves observing

Jews, many members of Knesset and of course many of their constituents, put no obstacles in the way of religious practices. They are exceedingly tolerant of Jewish observances, so long as they are voluntary. They are only careful that others be not coerced into observing them or limited in their freedom to follow a more liberal way of life.

Israel as yet has no constitution, though one is in the process of formation. But she does have laws which are generally accepted by the people. She has definitely refrained from legislating in certain areas where violent conflict might develop. The people are concerned in building a State, and do not wish to weaken it by injecting highly controversial issues into the process, believing that these lesser matters will take care of themselves in time, when the State is firmly established.

Points at which religious tradition is involved are, for example, marriage, divorce, inheritances, etc. Thus far there has been no civil marriage law. But 99 per cent of all marriages are Rabbinic in character. Even in the definitely nonreligious Kibbutzim the rabbi is called in to bless the marriages. Sometimes the Kibbutz may wait till there are four or five and have them performed, after consummation often, all at once. This is usually the result of a desire to please the parents, who have convictions about such things, rather than the spontaneous desire of the young people themselves. However, one informant, a woman, who served as my guide in visiting some of the Kibbutzim, declared that there is a growing interest among women in having their marriage formalized in the traditional way, the only way in which it can be formalized at present. It may be that this is due chiefly to a desire for a greater degree of security in their married status, rather than to a specifically religious motive. But it does exist. Divorce can be obtained, in case of a legalized marriage, only through the Rabbinic court. The rabbis are usually concerned about the maintenance of the family and often succeed through skillful counseling in preventing the breakup of a marriage. It should be pointed out that in any case, whether the parents be legally joined or not, the status of the children is the same. Apparently, in Israel there are no illegitimate children, but only illegitimate parents, as someone remarked to me.

Social organization in Israel is still in a highly fluid state. There are ardent Jews, as they think of themselves, who have emancipated themselves from all vestiges of Jewish religion. They are atheistic, and completely intolerant of ancient traditional Jewish religious traditions. Some of them follow definitely the Communist party line in respect to religion, as well as everything else. On the other hand, there are the extreme rightists, who would, if they could, impose the maximum of Jewish religious traditionalism in practice upon everyone else. Yet all are avidly seeking to build a Jewish nation. This calls for a great deal of skill and willingness to compromise on the part of the leaders. They are feeling their way as they go along, experimenting here and there in various directions.

Take for example the observance of the Sabbath. It is by no means uniform throughout the country. There is no national legislation on the matter. In Jerusalem its observance is very strict. Everything is tightly closed. No theaters are open. There are no buses running. A few taxis operate, I was told, but it is difficult to get one. In Tel Aviv the buses do not run, but jitneys do. On the other hand, in Haifa buses run on the Sabbath as on other days, for there are a good many Arabs living there. Also the nonreligious group was much larger there in the earlier days. Private cars, however, are seen everywhere on the Sabbath, though they are much fewer than on other days. In front of the principal synagogue on the Sabbath morning during the service a policeman directs traffic.

In the Kibbutzim practice differs. Some pay no attention to the Sabbath. But in some, even where the religious feeling is strong, since they are agricultural, there is work to be done on the Sabbath as well as other days. Cows must be milked, chickens fed. The members, many of them with no religious convictions, must be provided with food. In one I visited there was a division between the religious and nonreligious groups. At first the religious did no work on the Sabbath. This left all Sabbath chores to be done by the same people week after week, while some did nothing on that day. But a profound principle of group living is equal sharing of labor. Some, therefore, in time came to feel that their abstention from work on the Sabbath was unfair to the others, and so began to assume their share of necessary Sabbath work. This, of course, represents a cer-

tain break with religious traditionalism, for a liberalization at one point is likely to open the way for a like relaxation at other points.

There is no legislation concerning dietary matters. It is not required that all meat sold be kosher, nor that all must have the requisite duplicate sets of pots, pans, and dishes. So far as I could discover there is no law against raising and selling hogs, but it just isn't done, and one never finds pork on the menu in public eating places. In short, there exists a strong tolerance of, and respect for, the ceremonial laws of Judaism, but there would be instant and powerful resistance if there were any disposition to impose them upon all the people of Israel. Most of the religious understand this and are wise enough not to make an issue of these things. The small number who would are negligible in their political influence. So the fluid state is likely to continue indefinitely, and sharp legal definition of requirements to be avoided.

While in general there is, as observed, high respect for Biblical and Rabbinic law, and at least the spirit of it is followed, in practice one traditional Biblical principle has had to give way before an almost overwhelming public opinion. That is the old discrimination between the sexes. Whatever laws would perpetuate that ancient belief are likely to be called sharply into question. A country where men and women have worked side by side in the fields during the pioneering period of the Kibbutzim and have shared equally in the hardships of economic struggle, and even in military combat, is not likely to tolerate any favoritism toward one sex over another. Here the sexes stand on an equal footing. Women are conscripted for national service the same as men, for two years of their lives from eighteen to twenty. Equal wages for equal work is a principle well established in Israel. So in matters of inheritance, the Biblical and Rabbinic law which favored the male is properly called into question here.

So the new State goes forward feeling its way along. Both extremes try now and again to force their will on the people, with a view to creating either a secular State or a theocracy. But the center parties know how to give and take and are wisely keeping the condition fluid, trying to maintain the essential spirit of Judaic tradition without following the crippling letter of the law.

One index of this fact is the way in which religion is wrought into the fabric of Jewish education. The greater number of Israel's children are in the public schools. There are some specifically religious schools, where the major training is in Biblical and Rabbinic lore. The complaint against these is that they do not give a really adequate general education to the child. There are some private schools which do not follow the prescribed government curriculum, but the great bulk of Israel's children go to public schools. In 1951-52 there were about seven thousand pupils in the religious schools and an equal number in schools under private direction. But 309,732 pupils were enrolled in government-supported schools. Incidentally, the rapid increase in population imposes very difficult tasks on government, for there was an increase in school enrollment in 1951-52 over the previous year of over 23 per cent. Education is compulsory in the elementary grades, and up to eighteen for those who have not completed their elementary instruction.

The religious schools, of course, teach religion. The private schools may or may not, as they wish. But in the government schools, from the lowest right up through the university, all teach religion; and students must take it whether they wish to or not. Why? Because the history of the Jews cannot be taught without it. The Bible is the history of the early Jewish periods. There is no other source, save very fragmentary bits from Egyptian and Babylonian or Assyrian history, and the evidence of their presence at certain places given by archaeology. But this only serves to corroborate or to correct what the Biblical narrative furnishes. Then, even for the later periods, it is chiefly the Rabbinical narrative materials which are preserved. Certainly any adequate understanding of Jewish history and life cannot be obtained without the study of the Bible and the rabbis. Nor is there any other literature of the Hebrews for the more remote eras of her history than is to be found in the Bible. Thus, nowhere else, perhaps, can the Bible be as appropriately made a required subject of study as among the Jews of Israel. The instruction is carefully graded. There is admittedly not a little repetition of materials studied from grade to grade, but it is undoubtedly true, as a professor of the Hebrew university said to me,

that nowhere and at no time have so many Jewish people had so much of a knowledge of their religious past and their traditions.

Who does the teaching? In the earlier grades it is the same teachers who teach the other subjects. One may well believe, therefore, that there is a great deal of difference in the religious quality of the instruction. For many teachers it is not teaching religion as religion, but as history, or as literature, or as sociology, or as political science. For them it will be enough if their pupils come through it with a factual knowledge of Israel's religious past. As one said to me: the student may not believe that God gave Moses the Ten Commandments literally engraved on stone, but he will know that that is the story of their origin. He may not always obey them but he will know what the Commandments are. He may not observe the Passover, or Yom Kippur, or any of the other feasts, but he will know what they are, their storied origin, and under the teaching of devout practicing Jews he may come to observe as well as know them factually.

Undoubtedly much will depend upon the teacher. If for him it is only the communication of information about the religion of the Hebrews, it may make little impression practically. If, on the other hand, the teacher himself is a devout practicing Jew, there may be something contagious about the faith he teaches, and children and youth may be drawn into an active living experience of the religion. I personally heard some deplore the lack of real religion on the part of teachers. But I also heard two very eminent Jews of quite different attitudes toward Judaism say that eventually the observance will follow. They are not completely satisfied with things as they are, but both are optimistic with reference to religion in the developing life of Israel.

One of these, probably the most highly regarded thinker of Israel, Martin Buber, thinks that probably there is much more genuine religious feeling among the people than would appear on the surface. It does not take the traditional forms through which Hebrew religiousness has expressed itself historically. With these outer forms there is much dissatisfaction. And naturally so. A considerable number of early settlers in Israel had come out of countries where organized religion was decadent or had put itself squarely on the side

of the exploiting classes. They had come to think of it therefore as something evil, and to abhor it. But they themselves had a certain program of life that was in a real sense religious. They eliminated the external marks of the religion but its moral demands they fulfilled in large measure. These, Buber thinks, had their roots squarely in the Jewish faith. In that faith is to be found an excellent precedent for placing moral demands above cult interest. Had not Amos done the same thing? "What though the rivers run red with the blood of bullocks," he cried. "Let justice roll down like the waters." And Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and others could be cited equally well.

In Israel there will be a great religious revival, Martin Buber believes. Religion may not take exactly the traditional form. It will have to take into account the changed world in which we now live, and make itself relevant to it. But he is not afraid of change. Already the climate is changing to some degree. In the main, it is traditional orthodoxy that flourishes in Israel today. But it is not as uniformly rigid as it appears in some quarters.

A very distinguished Jewish leader asked me if by any chance I was a reformed believer. "No," I replied, "I'm worse than that, I am a Christian." "No, you are wrong," he replied. "A Reformed Jew is worse, for at least the Christians are not trying to destroy Judaism." There are no Reform congregations or even Conservative, but there are many Jews with Reform or Conservative leanings in Israel, and the leadership in supporting National Judaism is largely from these groups. There are signs of some relaxation of Orthodoxy's hold upon the religious life, which may seem to the Orthodox a sign of decadence, but may also reflect the stirring of a new interest in religion among the people who have thrown out orthodox religious controls. I was interested to hear the Chief Rabbi say he believes that many of the so-called secularist Jews have a deeply religio-ethical faith within them. Where this really exists, observance may come later.

It may for many no longer have religious significance, rather only hygienic, but I was told that at least 99 per cent of the males are circumcised, the regular traditional Jewish custom.

How was religion in Israel affected by war, whether the World War or the more recent Arab-Israeli war, or by the anticipation

of wars, local or world-wide, yet to come? I asked this of the Chief Rabbi. He hesitated a moment, not knowing quite how to answer. Just what do you mean? his silence implied. I said, "Well, for example, did the war by its suffering and hardships, etc., have the effect of driving people back to God?" "No," was his instant reply. "It rather drove them in the direction of savagery. Peace may have that effect, but war didn't." Many, he said, on the contrary, lost their faith because they questioned how such things could be, if God were what they have been taught to believe He was. But many of these are recovering their faith. The return to Israel brings it back to some. And some outside, seeing the miracle, as well as those near at hand, have had their faith restored also. He thinks he sees a subconscious revival of the ideals of Judaism, even though the outward observances do not go with it.

Had the sufferings and fears caused by war led to anything like what I discovered had happened to Japan, a conception of the impotence of man to do anything for himself, and a consequent falling back upon God as the only hope for an escape out of the situation? Neither he nor others had noted such an attitude, nor does Messianism seem to have been revived as a result of the crisis in Jewish life. It is quite possible that there is already a conviction that the very return to Israel is in a sense a Messianic occurrence, though I did not find it so considered among any with whom I talked.

Certainly the effect of the Arab-Israeli war was to heighten the sense of Judaism as a national faith. This has seemed to some a clear betrayal of the universalism of Judaism, and they have reacted strongly against such a concept, firmly insisting that the faith must never be tied up exclusively to any nation. Jewish national leaders have been at great pains to assert that in creating a Jewish National State there was no intention to limit Judaism to the State, but only to give it a solid home base, from which it might spread throughout the entire world. By becoming strong nationally, they think the Jewish faith will be in position to claim a respect it has not always been accorded, when it had no fixed national home. So the differing factions argue. It is too early to know what the outcome of it all will be.

What has been the effect of Communism on the religion of Judaism? I confess, from what I had heard before reaching Israel, I had expected to find it very strong, and exercising a powerful influence upon Israel's faith. I had heard, for instance, that 80 per cent of Israel was Communist. This I knew could not be true, else she would be a Communist State and America would hardly be lending her aid to the degree to which she is at present the beneficiary. I had been traveling for weeks through Moslem lands, where the hatred of Israel is so profound that no one who has an Israel visa in his passport can hope to enter there. One might, therefore, expect that Israel would be misrepresented consciously or unconsciously. But even taking this into account and discounting such statements substantially, I was not prepared to find Communism so relatively unimportant politically as in fact it proved to be. I suppose I had been influenced in my thinking by the knowledge that many of the living groups who pioneered the settlement of Israel were what appear from the outside to be Communistic settlements. And some of them are actually Communistic in the ideological sense, as usually understood.

But I was to learn from personal experience and contact that communal or collective living may not be Communistic at all in the Russian manner. I had been shown over one of the older Kibbutzim or collectives, had seen the chicken farm, the dairy, the orchards, the tractor-plowed grainfields; had watched the children being cared for collectively; gone through the school; seen the common dining room for children and the other for adults; heard how the labor is divided up, so that everybody has his share of work to do, even the children. I saw little tots, not over five or six, out digging up their garden plots getting ready for the supervised planting which would come later. The work is graded in difficulty and as to the time required of each age, but everywhere there is the expectation of sharing in the labor and the products of labor by every member of the group.

Our guide, a member of the community, was a Jew from Sweden, where there is little or no discrimination against Jews. He was an enthusiastic member of the Kibbutz. He quoted the famous slogan, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need,"

as the basis of living. The people get no wages. There is a small cash allowance per year, some thirty Israeli pounds, which when I was there could be bought for thirty dollars in American money. One may get an extra vacation allowance if he wishes to spend his two weeks' vacation elsewhere, for example, in a Kibbutz rest home, or for travel. But he gets the clothes he needs. He eats very well, much better than his fellow Jews in the cities, and he has, so long as he lives, a security which many people outside never know. When he is old and cannot work so hard, his work load is lightened, and when old age comes he and his wife are given a comfortable home in the community in which they may live apart from the rest if they wish. Theirs are the best of the houses, often with bath and toilet, and luxuries which the rest of the community do not have.

When I had seen all this I said: "Man, you are living as Communists. How does this differ from Communism of the Soviet type?" "We are not Communists," he cried almost heatedly. "There is only one genuine Communist in our whole Kibbutz. We are made up here of all the different political parties in Israel. The real Communist here doesn't have a chance."

"Then what is the difference?" I asked. "There's a world of difference," he cried. "We are completely free. We choose this way of life of our own accord. We can leave it tomorrow if we so wish, and take up another way. No one in government or elsewhere tells us we must do this or that. We determine the rules of our community. We can accept or reject applicants for membership, after a probation period of a year. If we decide to raise chickens we do so. If we want to run a dairy we do so. If we want to break up our community tomorrow and divide the assets, no one will prevent us from doing so. Do you not see? We are free, and that is a fundamental concern. There are no quotas we must fulfill, or be penalized. We love this way of life. That is why we are here."

Here, I think, may lie part of the reason why outsiders attribute so much Communism to Israel. The hard conditions of pioneering a new land made individual effort ineffective. Here were no lush valleys, just waiting for the plowman, or rich forests only waiting to be cleared and made into fertile fields which would produce

lavishly. Here were rocky hills, and I do mean rocky. I said to myself as I first flew over Palestine and looked down upon the brown-gray rock-strewn hills, "Why should anyone want to fight over this land?" If the world ever runs out of rocks Israel could go a long way toward supplying the deficiency. And where is the water? It is a semidesert land, most of it. Flowers and grass spring up, and I am told literally blanket the hills with verdure and flowers, for a short time. Then the rains stop. Most of the water has run off, carrying with it more of the scarce topsoil every year, and the hills bake for months under a brilliant summer sun, and everything dries up, save the few trees, which run their roots deep down into the cracks between the rocks and manage to stay green. And the land appears to be desolate. There is of course a limited amount of bottom land, in the Jordan Valley and a few of the wadies that drain into it, and there are coastal plains where farming can be done on a large scale if water be gotten into the fields. What can an individual farmer do under such circumstances? Almost nothing. Either the people went about it co-operatively, or they didn't succeed. Logically the communal approach was necessary, and living communally looks like living Communistically. But as seen above, there is a world of difference.

One who visits one of the "rich" Kibbutzim in the Jordan Valley, or indeed in some of the hill settlements where there has been time, twenty-five to thirty-five years, to plant trees, build solid houses and barns, and even adorn them, is likely to forget the hard years at the beginning. I saw one of over thirty years' standing, well built, comfortable, with delightful groves of trees, even a small park, a nice rest house, etc. And then I saw another less than six years old. A group of young people, twenty-five or more, had selected a hilltop, mostly stone, and some surrounding territory. They had hardly begun to work it when the Arab-Israeli war broke out, and for two years it was shelled constantly, being on the very edge of the no man's land which is the present line of demarcation between Jordan and Israel. I saw the caves, roofed over with cement, dug into the top of the hill which gave some little shelter from the devastating rain of shells.

Practically nothing could be done until four years ago when the

shooting war stopped. Temporary wooden living quarters had been built, a tank for water was constructed and water piped up from the Jerusalem pipe line. Then began the work of terracing the rocky hillside, planting olive trees, or in some places grain or vineyards. Barns and chicken houses were constructed below. And finally a large prefabricated dining room and separate cottages for family units were built, some one hundred or more feet below the summit. The young, new members still live in the rude wooden shelter at the top, to remind them perhaps that pioneering days are not all over. The funds for creating these things are supplied, together with the land, the stock, and the implements for working the place, by the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency, in the form of a loan. This group was still heavily in debt, but was on the way to relative prosperity. A resthouse for others which would bring in income was in the building stage. The members I met were young, enthusiastic, and eager. They were all French; many of them had been active *Maquis* in the resistance movement in France during World War II.

There was no Communist in the entire group, but members of most of the other parties. On politics they were in disagreement. On the advantage of communal living, free from any external compulsion, they were completely agreed.

I began, with all this, to understand better why the outside world is so sure there is a great deal of Communism in Israel. I began to understand also the statement which greatly surprised me when heard in the first interview I had in Israel, when I asked how Communism was affecting Jewish faith. "It is very simple," said the rabbi to whom I was talking. "Communism just doesn't seem to be an issue here." I thought he must be mistaken, but subsequent interviews with men in all walks of life from simple citizens to some of the most powerful figures in Israel's life convinced me that he was right. Whether wrongly or rightly, Communism is regarded as a very minor factor in Israel.

This can readily be seen if one looks at the representation of the various political parties in the Knesset or national Parliament. Israel follows the French pattern, rather than the American, in electing its legislative representatives. This is done on the pro-

portional basis, thus assuring representation of all the small political groups in the Congress, rather than just the major parties. In Israel there are several small parties. No single party commands a majority of the membership, so government by coalition is necessary. The result, as elsewhere, is that changes of government are frequent. At present the dominant group is the Mapai, or Labor party, which may well be compared with the English Labor party. It is Socialist, and thoroughly anti-Communist. It has forty-five of the 120 members of Knesset. Next in importance numerically, with twenty-three, is the General Zionist party, which is further to the right than Mapai but has a small left wing, called Progressive Zionists. But it is left, only with reference to the General Zionists. It is still to the right of Mapai, the labor group. Four small religious parties combined have a total of fifteen members, all of them well to the right of Mapai and strongly anti-Communist. There are five Arabs, representing the Arab Community, as Arabs. They generally collaborate with Mapai, the labor party. The Freedom Movement, the most extreme of the rightist groups, formerly the terrorist group, has eight members. That is, a total of 100 of the 120, or 80 per cent, are either Socialist labor groups or to the right of center, all definitely opposed to Communism. Of the remainder, thirteen belong to Mapam, a leftist group, generally oriented in its preferences to the Russian position rather than to the West, but it is not actually Communistic. In any international crisis it would choose the Eastern bloc, and so might be an embarrassment to the nation as a whole, which is dominantly Western in its sympathies. Two additional members of Knesset are a split off Mapam, representing a leftist labor point of view. Just where their sympathies lie internationally, I am unable to say. That leaves just five members who represent definitely the Communist group. Of these, two are Arabs, representing not the Arabs as such but each a Communist-oriented constituency. Whether it is Arab or not, I do not know. It thus turns out that only three Jews, i.e., 2½ per cent of the total membership of Knesset, are out-and-out Communists.

The Mapam group may well be considered as potentially on the Communist side, though they are not Communists. They had just had a terrific shock when I was there, the Prague trials, which

seemed clearly to be anti-Jewish. Indeed, some members of Mapam were among those being tried. Zionism was listed as one of the criminal charges against them. If Russian Communism, or that of the satellite States, which has always made much of its freedom from racial or class bias, now becomes anti-Semitic, how can members of the new Jewish State look upon it sympathetically, much less actually become Communists? Already before I left Israel, two members of Mapam in the Knesset had made public statements dissociating themselves from the party if it should continue to support the Eastern bloc. Mapai was organizing popular meetings, hundreds of them, all over Israel, in protest, and demanding that Mapam clarify its position publicly under the circumstances. As I left Israel, Mapam leaders were in conference in Tel Aviv discussing the matter. It seemed quite clear that if they did not repudiate their support of the East, they would lose a great deal of their popular following. For whatever else the Jews of Palestine are, they are ardent nationalists and can tolerate no acceptance of anti-Semitism on the part of any element in their population, or sympathy with those who practice it in other lands.

The Communists made an early statement to the effect that they had complete confidence in the judicial system in which the trials were being prosecuted, but that perhaps an error had been made in the accusation against the Israelis who were involved in the purge. The whole incident will undoubtedly be a serious setback to Communism in Israel, to the advantage of those who fear its spread among the people.

A good deal of Communist sympathy comes from two sources, both of them minorities, and the two overlap, namely, from the Arabs and from members of the Eastern Orthodox churches. For example, around Nazareth, which is largely of Arab population, and where many of the Arabs are Christians, the Communist sympathy is strong. While Orthodox Christians are not themselves Communists in large numbers, they do have a sympathy for Russia, for the reason, first of all, that the Russian Church is also an Orthodox Church. For centuries there has been a link thus between the Orthodox peoples of the Near East and Russian Orthodox Christians. The Near Eastern Church is essentially a poor church.

Its economic resources are very limited. Again and again when the situation has grown deperate economically, Russian Orthodoxy has come to its aid. Thousands of Russian Orthodox pilgrims have until recent years streamed into Palestine, visited the sacred sites, and made gifts of money to the churches. It is thus quite natural that a bond of sympathy exists between these people. The Russian Church has learned how to live with Communism. After resisting the best efforts of Communism to destroy religion in Russia, the Orthodox Church has found a way to survive and carry on at least a part of its ministry. The Eastern churches have had little help, or sympathy, from the Western churches, who have often regarded them as less than Christian and have sought either to control them, to bring them under the rule of the Western Church, or to convert them. Russian Orthodoxy has done neither of these things. Recalling these facts, it is not so strange that they should exhibit a tendency to favor the East rather than the West. Nor is it difficult to understand why the Arabs still resident in Israel should develop a strain of Communism.

But neither group is strong, and barring some external crisis of an international character which would force Communist rule on Israel, most of my informants have little fear that Communism will come to Israel. It will never come from within, they said, one after another, as I talked with them. It is certainly not regarded as a serious menace. Communism is a legal party. Propaganda can be carried on openly. The Israelis have a profound faith in the democratic process and believe that allowing Communism to stay in the open is the best way to insure its defeat.

I was of course interested in the effect it might be having upon Judaism. I found quite literally that the religious leaders hardly consider it at all. Since it is so minor a feature at the political level, it has not occurred to the religious leaders to do anything about it. I could find no literature on Communism from the standpoint of Judaism. It is taken for granted by those with whom I talked that since Communism is antireligious, of course, good Jews would not be Communists. But there was a consciousness in Israel that not all Jews are religious, and that nonreligious Jews could well be followers of the Communist way. One or two with whom I talked

thought that the Communist emphasis on social justice might have spurred Judaism to a somewhat more active recognition of the profoundly social emphasis of the Jewish faith. The desire for social justice, they say, is rooted deeply in the teachings of the Hebrew prophets. It may be a good thing, they think, that Israel be reminded of that fact and spurred to activity consonant with that teaching. As for Israel itself, in the contemporary period, every effort is being made to do precisely the things that Communism offers to underprivileged people. The Israelis are making every effort to get people to settle on the land, and collectively, as in Russia, but not under compulsion. They hope thus to develop the resources of the land and so achieve a better standard of living. National planning is being done there, as in Russia, though without the denial of the right of private ownership. It is really difficult to see what appeal Communism could have to the people of Israel. Moreover, many of the settlers of Israel have had experience in Communist-controlled lands where freedom is denied, and there is no scope given the individual to develop outside the pattern set by the State. They have been the victims of Communist dictatorships. It is not surprising that they refuse to be moved by the young, who have not seen or known Communism personally but are enthusiastic propagandists.

I remember talking one evening to one of them. She was a brilliant, quite good-looking university student, serving as secretary to one of the Communist members of Knesset whom I had come to interview, but who was caught in an important committee meeting and could not see me.

"Why are you a Communist?" I asked.

"Because," she said, "I want to get rid of—what is the word I want? I don't speak English very well." She went and asked someone and came back with it. The word was *exploitation.* "Exploitation by whom?" I asked. "The exploitation of people by capitalists and the exploitation of nations by capitalistic imperialists," she said with fervor. "Meaning just what nations?" I remarked. "I mean the United States," she replied, "and Britain." "And Russia?" I inquired. "No," she said. "Russia is not exploiting us, or any other nation."

"Russia has no—here," she continued. I didn't know who he was,

so she explained that he was the person who determines the disposition of moneys loaned by the United States and put up in equal quantity by Israel. "Most of it goes," she said, "to the purchase of arms and munitions in furtherance of the policies of the United States. Too much of it goes for arms." With this I agreed. "But does Russia give you any help?" I asked.

"Yes," she replied. Russia had been a big help at one time when the nation was coming to birth. Gromyko made a speech in her favor.

But there had been no monetary help, she admitted, though Russia had offered to trade and exchange goods, and the Israeli government wouldn't do it.

"What else makes you a Communist?" I inquired. "Because I want peace." "Well, so do I," I commented.

"What are you doing about the coming peace conference in Vienna, the one backed by the Curies of France?" she asked. Here she was doing what I have heard done all through the East, identifying Russia with peace, and the West with war and aggression. "And what are you doing about the atomic bomb?" Here again she sought to put me on the defensive, as usual. And so on. . . .

"What do you mean by Communism?" I asked. "And how do you expect to achieve your ends?" This had been worked out at a recent conference, she said, and she would send me a copy either here or in the United States. "How will you attain these ends?" I insisted. She was not specific. "Do you mean by electing more and more members to the Knesset, until you can make the necessary legislation, etc.?" "Yes," was her reply. "Then you are only a Socialist, not a Communist," I said. "Would you advocate the use of violence and the liquidation of enemies in order to achieve Communism?" At this point she did the customary thing, and cited the French revolution. She didn't seem quite so convinced here as at other points. I think she inwardly shrinks from it.

"And what about religion?" I asked. "We are not against it," she said. "Of course we are not religious." "Then you would allow religious freedom?" "Yes, for as people are educated in a scientific way it will just disappear. We do not fight it." "As in Russia," I added. She admitted it. "Do you think religion is an evil?" I queried.

"Not exactly," she said, "it will just disappear." "Then it ought to?" I asked. "You do really think it is an opium, don't you?" She didn't give a direct answer, but it was clear she so regarded it. She didn't recall whether the party program dealt with religion or not.

That was all the time we had. She seemed to be a lovely girl, highly idealistic and earnest. She had been to Moscow once and had attended a youth conference elsewhere in Europe.

Her enthusiasm and eagerness were fine. One wishes there were more of such enthusiasm for democracy, and for religion also, for that matter. It is partly just because of a lack of enthusiasm and eagerness in pushing the social claims of religion and democracy that some of the finest and most idealistic young people are drawn into Communism. Here there is vision, here there is faith, here there is something concrete to live by and for.

It would appear that here as elsewhere in the East the anti-religious character of Communism is not being stressed. If one wishes to go on and be religious there will be no interference, unless it gets in the way of the Communist beliefs and practice. Then it will not be tolerated. But why raise a question which may seem at first to be only academic? First get the Communist principles deeply rooted in the young, and the disappearance of religion as anything more than an external adornment will take care of itself. The Communists can afford to wait. And doing so, they disarm one of the most effective opponents of Communism, the forces of religion, because they do not feel themselves menaced, and therefore do little or nothing about it.

"We are not complacent about the matter," one rabbi said to me, when I asked if he knew of any attempt being made to educate the people as to the nature of Communism and to the resources of Judaism to meet it. "It is just that it is of so little influence in the political life of the country that religion has not concerned itself about the matter. Once it becomes a political force and an active threat, then you may depend upon it that the religious forces will actively concern themselves with it." One can only hope that, when and if that time comes, their efforts may not prove, as has so often been the case, "too little and too late."

# VII

# War, Communism and Christianity

IT MUST be confessed that this chapter has been written on a somewhat different basis from the others. There, it was firsthand inquiry, among people eminently fitted to observe and report how religion was being affected by these twin forces, that led to the conclusions stated. Here, use has been made of already published materials and such personal observation as life in the midst of a Christian world affords, together with some opportunity to visit different areas of Christendom. Because most readers of the book will be Christian, or those of the so-called Christian world, who have had access to many of the same sources, and who have also been able personally to observe the effects, it has seemed to the writer that a certain degree of knowledge on the part of the reader could be assumed and that he need, therefore, occupy himself much less with what has taken place within Christianity. It will be enough here to suggest, somewhat sketchily, the facts pertaining to the Christian world without going into great detail.

War has had tremendous effects upon Christianity. Let us start off with the loss that it caused just in physical plant. We of the United States have suffered little in this way because past wars have been fought on alien soil. But what of Britain and Germany and Holland, Belgium, France, Norway, and Russia? To suggest only a part of the loss, little Holland had 400 churches destroyed or badly damaged; Hungary, 640; France, 212; while over 600 German churches were completely destroyed, 823 more partially so, and 1823 others were damaged. This takes no account of schools, orphanages, hospitals, etc., maintained by the churches.

However, the most serious effects of war are never in the physical realm, but in the moral and spiritual. What are some of these?

Millions of young men and women were suddenly taken out of

the normal social relationships of home, school, and church, and put into military training camps where, whatever else may be said about them, most of the norms which hold in civilian life were not operative. It is an admitted fact that the moral level of an armed camp is not that of a civilian community. The army has again and again disavowed any responsibility for the moral direction of its soldiers, beyond the employment of rather drastic punishment of men who get too far out of line. To be sure, there is provision for a religious ministry of a sort through the chaplain, and the voluntary efforts of civilian religious and social organizations are allowed in behalf of the men in service, but over and over again the official military direction of camps has refused to try to do anything about the deporable moral situation existing in the adjacent towns and cities where soldiers go on leave, even when this lay clearly within their powers of control. The result has been a serious one upon the moral and religious life of young people obliged to serve in the armed forces. It would be a great mistake, of course, to say that all recruits succumb to the temptations which their unnatural surroundings force upon them. On the contrary, many succeed in maintaining their moral integrity and perhaps grow stronger by being obliged consciously to resist. But those who do so benefit are a small minority. In general, the result is a lowered moral sensitivity, a lowering of moral standards, and a general coarsening of the mind and spirit.

How could it be otherwise, when they are taught deliberately the very antithesis of what religion at its best has been trying to inculcate in them? Religion has been emphasizing the attitude of love as basic in all human relationships. Now they are encouraged to hate. It is a generally accepted dictum of the military system that men must learn to hate their enemies, if they would fight them successfully. What then of the word of Jesus, "I say unto you love your enemies"? One needs only to recall the savage way in which the soldier is taught, in bayonet practice, to snarl and curse the dummy, his opponent, as he plunges his deadly weapon into it to see the contrast between the way of religion and that of war. Is it possible to subject impressionable young men to this kind of training, this attitude toward others who happen, for the time to

be enemies, without doing something serious to them? Many, of course, rebel against it, are unable to take it, and become mental wrecks because of the inner strain, but thousands simply come to the conclusion that this is the way things must be, and are brutalized by the whole procedure. They may even be led to adjust their religious thinking to it. There are abundant Old Testament passages which can be made to support such an outlook. They may even come to regard this as quite in accord with the ideas of religion. It is this which is one of the most serious effects war and the war system has upon religion. It tends to keep it at the lower levels which man had thought he had outgrown, rather than lift it to the level which the insights of the prophets of the Old Testament and the New Testament uphold.

Probably the most basic disservice which war has done to religion has been the indoctrination of a whole generation of young men and women in the conception that violence must be the last resort of man and nations; that war is the ultimate arbitrament in the clashes of interest which men experience and probably always will. This is a denial of high religion, whether Christian or Jewish or Hindu or Buddhist. For these and others have always insisted that, ultimately, spirit is more powerful than matter; that there is a better way; and that men can and ought to find it. The Christian calls this spirit love. Gandhi called it soul-force. War is the very antithesis of this, and the indulgence of peoples in war and the training of a whole people in the ways of war, as is now proposed through Universal Military Training, is to set back the clock of civilization and religion by centuries. What chance have voluntary religious forces to make their claims felt, when the great majority of the male citizens have had the military indoctrination now proposed for every man, and probably, before too long, for women also.

But war is a necessity, the military mind declares. Other peoples respect only violence, and understand nothing else. America and/or Britain must be strong, so the argument goes, and less and less are there efforts at pacific settlement of differences. So there are colossal armament races, more and more of the national income goes into expenditures for security, and we become every day less secure.

We build instruments of destruction more powerful each succeeding year, and then tremble lest our enemy has discovered our secret and may use it, or some more dreadful one, to destroy us. So we are on a spiral of never-ending fear and distrust, with no end in sight.

If this were only the secular mind at work it could be looked upon, not with equanimity, but with a sense of understanding. It simply does not know the deep sources of power which reside in the spirit. But the fact is that religion itself, or perhaps better, some segments of the religious world, not only accept this inevitability of war and the use of violence but undertake to defend it in the very name of religion. This may be accounted as perhaps the final evil effect of war upon religion. A brief résumé of the more or less officially expressed attitudes of the religious world during recent years will be illuminating. It will be seen that the world of religion is divided on the question.

It is perhaps an oversimplification of the facts to say that down to the time of the First World War, war as such was not really a problem to most of the religious world. To be sure, there were the Quakers, the Brethren, and the Mennonites, the three historic peace churches, which had steadily maintained their witness against war, but to the Church as a whole it did not loom large as a moral problem. All during World War I, the churches dutifully supported it, sold bonds, recruited soldiers, right in the church, and generally blessed it. There were a few who went to prison as conscientious objectors, but only a few, and they got little sympathy generally from the churches. If one desires to see how wholeheartedly the ministry, representing the Church, fell in with the prevailing spirit of the time, let him read *Preachers, Present Arms!* by Ray Abrams.[1]

But when the war ended, after terrific loss in goods and in human life, and men began to try to build the "brave new world" which had been promised as a result of this war to save democracy, they found that, far from settling anything, the war had multiplied the problems that must be faced. The war was won, but they proceeded to lose the peace. Perhaps it was just the fact of its utter futility which first drove people to critical thought about war. The

[1] Round Table Press, New York, 1933.

cost had been enormous. What had been won? Next to nothing, while a whole Pandora's box of new evils had been let loose upon the world. The general moral breakdown in the postwar world led many to a serious re-examination of the whole business of war. The churches began to be troubled in conscience about what they had rather thoughtlessly been blessing. Some outstanding ministers renounced war forever, announcing, as Harry Emerson Fosdick did, that never again would they bless war. Church bodies discussed war and passed resolutions of a highly critical nature against it. A wave of pacifism swept the country, not always, but usually, religiously motivated. Some churches came very close to going officially pacifist, notably the Methodist Church. Most churches passed resolutions sympathetic to the growing number of young people who, taught by the churches, were becoming conscientious objectors to war, promising them support in their position if war came. Several churches set up peace commissions which elaborated machinery whereby their young people could formally register as conscientious objectors long before war actually came. Much of this church sentiment against war has been gathered up in published form by Walter Van Kirk[2] and makes highly significant reading.

As the war clouds of World War II began to gather, there was a gradual recession from some of these high utterances, but there they stand as the solemn judgments of men not immediately under the stress of war or fear of war. When did they do their truest thinking on the matter, in times of peace, or under the emotional stresses incident to the prosecution of World War II? It is my own personal belief that the conditions of peace produced the truer judgment.

But one sure gain had been made. Somewhere along the line an interchurch body had made the very significant statement that "war is mankind's most colossal sin." War was not just a mistake, inexpedient, unwise. It was a *sin.* That was a startling statement and it put the Church squarely on the spot. If war was *sin,* then the Church could obviously not condone it, because if there was any one thing against which the Christian Church had stood in all its history it was *sin.* It often condoned things which seem to many of

[2] *Religion Renounces War,* Willett, Clark and Co., Chicago, 1934.

us now sinful, but it didn't at the time regard them as *sin*. Whatever the Church regards as *sin* it cannot in good conscience support. Now it had said solemnly that war was not only sin, but mankind's greatest collective *sin*.

When war actually came again, this posed a very serious problem. The government desired and very early sought the support of the churches, as in World War I. But a new condition had arisen. What would the Church do? Its members were citizens, loyal citizens. Many of them were in hearty accord with the war spirit. Some were just as heartily opposed to the war—indeed, any war. An interesting solution was found. Since war was *sin*, the Church *as Church* could not support it, but it could extend its ministry equally to those who felt they must support the war effort and to those who felt that conscientiously they could have no part in it.

To some, this may seem a weasel device, but actually it is not so. Since the Church, particularly the Protestant Church, and it is to this branch of the Church that I refer just here, cannot control the actions of its membership, it could only expel them if it thought best. But it is not the theory of the Church that it is made up of sinless persons. The Church is rather a group of persons, very imperfect in many ways, who associate themselves together for worship and fellowship, in the hope that they may there be instructed and helped to grow into a deeper understanding and a more perfect practice of the faith they hold. Not all are of equal understanding, even if they may be equal in their sincerity. Therefore the Church will maintain these persons in its fellowship and minister to them equally, while officially it will refuse to support the war effort.

Actually, there were probably local churches which did not abide by this rule, and did sell war bonds or recruit in the churches. Some clearly distinguished between those elements of the war effort which were for the saving of life, rather than its destruction, and did co-operate with the Red Cross work and other constructive types of service. But I am unable to recall a report of any great church body which officially and *as Church* put its facilities at the disposal of government in support of the war effort. This seems to me a direct gain and certainly is one of the more constructive

effects which war has had upon the churches, at least the Protestant ones.

World War II came. There were many inner strains within local churches. Should conscientious objectors' names be put on the honor roll usually put up in the churches of those who were serving their country? Actually they were serving in civilian capacity, some of them in positions of greater danger and hardship than many of those wearing uniforms. In addition they got no pay at all, and have since had no benefit of G.I. aid in their further education, or of hospitalization privileges if incapacitated by their service, as some were. In some cases they were put on the roll, but starred, or distinguished in some special way from those in the armed services. In others they were simply overlooked. Sometimes the women's groups in the churches sent toilet kits to them just as to their soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Sometimes they were neglected. In wartime emotion runs high, and even in Christian churches a truly Christian spirit does not always prevail.

During the war grave questions arose as to the conduct of the war. What about the bombing of cities? At first this raised a storm of protest. The indiscriminate killing of innocent women and children and the aged seemed a monstrous thing. Did religion have any word about this? Systematic demolition bombing, the total destruction of whole cities, the use of block busters, of napalm or jellied gasoline incendiaries, raised serious moral questions. And finally the atomic bomb! How did religion react to these?

Well, of course, there was great difference of opinion. A group of distinguished Christian bishops and theologians found a way of justifying total destruction of cities by bombing, and this having been done it was only a logical step to a justification of the use of the atomic bomb. After all, it was only a quantitative difference. Now a single bomb could do what had formerly required the use of several. And a nitrogen bomb is only more destructive than an A-bomb. While it has seemed to millions of Christians and other religious persons that such destruction represents the ultimate in man's capacity to do evil, others, and among them some of the great leaders, have rationalized it as a terrible evil, tolerable only because it avoids one that is greater. In the chapter on India, I

have already referred to the profound adverse effect this has had upon Hindus and others in respect to Christianity. If Christianity can justify this, what may it not justify?

In 1948 at the Amsterdam meeting at which the World Council of Churches was organized, the assembly grappled with the problem and perhaps there is no other statement that has been published which comes nearer to what the Protestant churches of the world think concerning war.

"War as a method of settling disputes is incompatible with the teachings and example of our Lord Jesus Christ. The part which war plays in our present international life is a sin against God and a degradation of man."

Very rightly, they saw that this made inescapable the question as to whether war could ever be justified. To this question they could give no one answer unanimously, but stated three positions held by Christians. (1) There are those who hold that in the absence of an impartial supranational institution military action is the ultimate sanction of the rule of law, and that citizens must be taught the duty of defending the law by force if necessary. (2) There are those who hold that even though entering a war may under particular circumstances be the duty of a Christian, modern warfare with its mass destruction can never be an act of justice. (3) Others, again, are convinced that they must bear an absolute witness against war by refusing to accept military service, since for them the will of God is peace, and they would have the whole Church bear the same witness.

In the face of these different attitudes, the assembly could only acknowledge its deep sense of perplexity and urge upon Christians the duty of wrestling continuously with the difficulties they raise and praying humbly for God's guidance. And they would "continue to hold within their full fellowship all who sincerely profess such viewpoints . . . and are prepared to submit themselves to the will of God in the light of such guidance as may be vouchsafed to them." They "must not allow their spiritual and moral resources to be used by the State, in war or in peace, as a means of propagating an ideology or supporting a cause, in which they cannot wholeheartedly concur. And they must teach the duty of love and prayer

for the enemy in time of war, and of reconciliation between victor and vanquished after the war." Of course they must also attack the causes of war, etc. Here is about where the Church today stands. There has been no significant statement modifying this position in the years since 1948. Perplexity still exists.

The Roman Catholic Church, unlike the Protestant Church, had, long before the present century, defined its official position with reference to war. Just wars, it had proclaimed, are permissible. But what is a just war? Here too the Catholic is specific. There are several characteristics of a just war. They are as follows, as given in simplified form, in a widely used *Catechism of Christian Doctrine*, a text for secondary schools and colleges.[3] "First, if it is necessary to defend the rights of the state in a grave matter; *second*, if it is undertaken only as a last resort after all other means have failed; *third*, if it is conducted justly in accordance with natural and international law; *fourth*, if it is not continued after due satisfaction has been offered or given by the unjust aggressor nation."

But even the Catholic has his difficulties when it comes to judging what wars are just and what are not. When the Roman Church officially blessed Mussolini's attack upon Ethiopia, and when it backed dictator Franco in Spain, there were many, both Protestants and Catholics, who could find no justification even on the basis of the accepted definition of what constitutes a just war. As a matter of fact, there appeared not a few Roman Catholic young people who professed themselves unable to accept armed service of their country on grounds of conscience, and so became conscientious objectors. Draft boards, on the basis of Church teaching, tended to discount this objection, but a few prelates of the Church came to the defense of such youth, and generally they were granted the same status as objectors of other denominations.

Roman Catholicism stands in a somewhat different relation to international wars in that it is not only a religion but a State, and maintains its representatives in the courts of many nations. It therefore becomes involved in a way Protestant churches do not. Being an international Church, it seeks to maintain a neutral position, since it usually has branches on both sides of the line of

[3] St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N. J., 1949, pp. 204-205.

battle. Occupying such a position the Church has again and again sought to be a kind of mediator between warring nations. One of the current arguments for the maintenance of an embassy at the Vatican is that it would be a source of much-needed information from sources not open to all nations. It seems to be overlooked, however, think many Protestants, that if information from other nations can come to us via the Vatican, it may also be carried from us to other nations who may not enjoy representation at Washington.

How has Communism affected Christianity? It will not be an overstatement, I think, to say that its effect upon Christianity has been more devastating than any other single thing that has happened since the beginning of the Christian era. Christianity has suffered many serious blows and had many powerful enemies in the long course of its history. It has never met a more formidable enemy than Communism. There have been waves of indifference to religion, and some definite attacks upon it. But in all the history of Christianity it has never met so determined or skillful or powerful an opponent as Communism.

What makes it so formidable? There has been atheism before. There has been the denial of any life beyond this. What is new and different about Communism in this respect? At least three things: (1) Its antireligious emphasis is assumed to be the necessary condition for the achievement of its aims, many of which are very similar to the professed aims of Christianity. That is, to achieve the good life, which is surely a part of the Christian purpose, Christianity, indeed all religion, must be destroyed. (2) It has become, itself, essentially a religion, humanistic to be sure, rather than theistic, has invested its ideas and ideals with all the emotional accompaniments of religion, and so has been able to call out of its followers such a degree of commitment that it is, in its initial stages at least, well-nigh irresistible. (3) It has organized itself into a compact, highly disciplined party which is able to seize governments and control peoples more effectively and completely than any other movement has thus far been able to do. This latter fact is what has made it so destructive of Christianity and its institutions, wherever it has come to power.

The major impulse to the rise of Communism was a desire for social justice. This is clearly in the best tradition of the great Hebrew prophets. Karl Marx saw in his own time the deep injustices which were practiced upon the underprivileged masses, and like Amos he reacted violently against them. These evils must be righted. But this Hebrew lived in a time when religion seemed definitely to be on the side of the exploiter, and the beginnings of the scientific age had raised doubts in men's minds with reference to God. He himself rebelled against the religion of his fathers, and came to be an atheist, philosophically a dialectical materialist. Obviously, he could not therefore, like Amos, call for the justice of God. Justice must be achieved in some other way. Disbelief in any future life in which the wrongs of this life might be compensated for made it necessary that a measure of justice be achieved here and now if man was ever to enjoy it. Religion, with its deceptive hope in life beyond the grave, in which, though suffering here, man might enter into a life of perpetual joy, seemed to him an impediment to the securing of this-worldly justice, in the only place where it would do man any good. Therefore religion was an opiate, and must be destroyed.

This has been the burden of the writings and preachments of all the great Communists leaders from Marx until the present moment. Although for the sake of expediency the rigors of persecution and destruction have been from time to time relaxed, it is still a basic belief of Communism that religions are the enemy of the people and that ultimately they must be destroyed. Communists have learned much in the course of a generation, and now know that a frontal attack upon religion is likely to be ineffective, and even counterproductive, but they are still confident that the disappearance of religion, particularly Christianity, is both necessary and inevitable, if man is ever to achieve the good life.

The story of the treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church by the Soviet government is too familiar to need extended telling here. It was the boldest, most consistent attempt ever made by a responsible government to destroy the religion of its people.

It began within a few months of the victory of the revolutionists by nationalizing all lands including those of the Church. Thus the

enormous landed wealth of the Church passed out of its hands. The schools followed; even the theological schools were brought under government control. Marriage became only a legal contract, and registry of births, deaths, and marriages was taken over by government. Then all financial support, which the Church had long enjoyed, was withdrawn, and all connection with the State was dissolved. There was no prohibition of public worship, but little by little all the remaining functions of the Church were prohibited, including the right to teach religion to more than three persons at a time. The intent was perfectly clear. Those who were already deeply indoctrinated with the faith of the Church would be permitted to continue to worship, but the rising generation would be effectively prevented from acquiring that faith. Religion would thus in time die out.

But the Communists did not leave this at all to chance. Instead, they began and carried on for years a most active antireligious campaign, designed definitely to overthrow the beliefs of the orthodox, and to win the rising generation to the approved atheistic, materialistic beliefs of Communism. They formed a Society of the Godless, they held lectures, they published antireligious periodicals, set up antireligious museums, held festivals and organized processions, ridiculing the clergy and the orthodox beliefs. In the Constitution which was adopted they specifically stated their belief in the freedom of individual worship and the freedom of antireligious propaganda. This effectively barred propaganda of a religious nature by the Church. Teachers who believed in God were not permitted to teach in the public schools. It began to look as though they might finally crush religion in Russia. There were 40,407 Orthodox churches in 1917, while in 1941 there were but 4,255. Instead of the 50,960 priests in 1917, there were but 5,665 in 1941.[4]

During these years there were periods of greater or lesser severity of religious repression, but the final ideal of the party was never changed, nor has it been to this day. As late as 1948 a pamphlet

[4] Camille M. Cianfarra, *The Vatican and the Kremlin,* E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1950, p. 56.

was published by the Komsomol, or youth organization, giving what are called the "ten commandments of Communism":

1. Never forget that the clergy is the most powerful enemy of the Communist State.
2. Try to win your friends over to Communism and remember that Stalin who has given a new Constitution to the Russian people, is the leader of the Anti-God army, not only in the USSR but throughout the world.
3. Convince your friends not to have any contact with priests.
4. Watch out for spies and report saboteurs to the police.
5. Make sure that atheist publications are distributed among the largest number of people.
6. A good Communist must also be a militant atheist. He must know how to use his weapons and be experienced in the art of war.
7. Wherever you can you must fight religious elements and prevent whatever influence they might have on your comrades.
8. A true "God-less" must also be a good police agent. It is the duty of all atheists to guard the security of the State.
9. Support the God-less movement with your money, which is especially necessary for our propaganda abroad where funds, under present circumstances, can only be sent secretly.
10. If you are not a convinced atheist you cannot be a good Communist or a real Soviet citizen. Atheism is indissolubly bound to Communism. These two ideals are the pillars of Soviet power.

The success of the antireligious movement among the workers and city dwellers was considerable. It had, however, been much less effective among the rural folk, who constituted 65 per cent of the population. In 1939 a Communist party publication declared, "It is much more difficult to uproot religion from the soul of the workers than to liberate people from the capitalist exploiters." Even so, probably the majority of those under eighteen were atheists and a very substantial percentage, 50 or more, were at least agnostic.[5]

With the entrance of Russia into war with Germany, preoccupation with religious persecution was no longer possible. Furthermore, two strong considerations led Russia to a more lenient religious policy. First, there was great need of some morale-building

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

factor. The people were suffering terribly from the German invasion. The Church, such as it was, remained deeply loyal and gave its wholehearted support to the war. So long as it was doing this it seemed best not to harry it by persecution. Then again, Russia was in great need of outside help. The United States was, through Lend-Lease, pouring enormous quantities of arms and ammunition into Russia. The religious persecution was displeasing to freedom-loving America, and it did not seem to be wise to antagonize her ally. So a new religious policy was adopted, one which could be justified on the basis of one of Lenin's own statements, that religion may be allowed to exist, so long as it can be made to serve the interests of the party or the State.

The Church was allowed in 1942 to elect a Metropolitan of Moscow. The militant atheist league was disbanded, because, it was explained, there was no longer need for it, and its newspaper was discontinued, ostensibly because of a shortage of newsprint. In 1943 Stalin went so far as to receive the Metropolitan and his staff, a quite unusual event. And a little later the Church was allowed for the first time in a quarter of a century to elect a Patriarch. On the same day Stalin announced that the Communist party "could no longer deprive the Russian people of their Church and freedom of worship."[6]

There has been no change in the Constitution of the Soviet Union; there has been no change in the fundamental belief of Russian leaders as to the fact that religion ought to disappear. This may only be a lull in the storm of persecution, and it could break out again at any time. But temporarily Communist leaders have decided that the organized Church can be useful to them, so long as it yields to their control. And this it has done up until now. Because of the Iron Curtain it is difficult to know just what is going on in the Church, but one indication that it has succumbed to superior pressures and is, at least for the present, going along with government is the changed attitude that has come over the Russian Church in respect to the organization of a World Council of Churches. In the earlier stages of its promotion, the Russian Church was most sympathetic and co-operative. In more recent years, to

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

the invitation to participate in the World Council it has replied in terms that are highly reminiscent of the language used by Communists concerning the democratic powers. The Council, it is charged, is a thoroughgoing capitalistic, imperialistic affair, obviously organized to support and extend the power of Western imperialism. Whether this is the conviction of Russian Orthodox leaders or what they are required to say as the price of continued survival as an influence in Russia cannot be certainly known. From what has happened in China under a continuous barrage of propaganda against the Western churches and the denial of access to any facts from outside sources, it is not too difficult to believe that the leaders may be quite sincere in such beliefs.

Outside of Russia, but in the satellite countries, the attempt has been made to use the Orthodox Church as in Russia, and with a large measure of success, it appears from the outside. Because the Russian Church seems to have accepted the position assigned to it, it is the easier for Orthodox branches in other countries to side with Communism. For example, in the Near East where other Orthodox churches are at work, many of them seem to be oriented toward Russia rather than the West. Partly this fact stems from the help which the Russian Church has repeatedly given to the Church in the Near East, especially in Israel and Trans-Jordan.

The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church has from the first been that of active opposition to Communism. Catholics too suffered under the rigorous persecution of the Church in Russia and her satellite countries. Indeed, they suffered more in proportion than the Russian Orthodox, because they claimed to be under the final control of a supreme authority outside of Russia, the Pope. This was to set up a formidable rival which the Communists could not permit, so they used the most severe measures, prison, exile, and even liquidation, to bring the Roman Church into line. Their seminaries were all closed. By 1939, the six million Roman Catholics in Russia had been reduced to about a half-million. In 1950 there were but two Roman Catholic priests allowed to say Mass in Russia, both of them non-Russian. Here were in mortal combat two rival totalitarian religions, if this term can be properly applied, as I think it can to Communism. Neither can admit any limitation upon

its control. So the issue is joined, and Catholicism in its Roman form is quite the most active and open enemy among all the religions of the world. There has been talk of a concordat between the Kremlin and the Vatican, and under the newer religious policy of the Kremlin it is now not without the range of possibility. Communism knows how, when necessary, to back up or turn around and go in another direction, temporarily, in the interest of a final victory; and the Church has at times entered into relationships with governments which differ violently from her, where some advantage was to be won thereby. But such a truce could never last long, unless there should be a genuine change of aims on the part of one or the other. Is that likely? I think not.

Meanwhile the Pope has minced no words in attacking Communism. In an encyclical of March 19, 1937, he said,

> The Communism of today, more emphatically than similar movements in the past, conceals within itself a false messianic idea. A pseudo-ideal of justice, of equality and fraternity in labor impregnates all its doctrines and activity with a deceptive mysticism which communicates a zealous and contagious enthusiasm to the multitude entrapped by its delusive promises. . . . In its doctrine there is no room for the idea of God; there is no difference between matter and spirit, soul and body; there is neither survival of the soul after death nor any hope of a future life. . . . Class struggle with its consequent violent hate and destruction, takes on the aspect of a crusade for the progress of humanity, and all other forces of whatever nature, if they resist such systematic violence, must be annihilated as hostile to the human race. . . . Communism strips man of his liberty, robs personality of all its dignity and removes all the moral restraints that check the eruptions of blind impulse. . . . Communism is both contrary to reason and to divine revelation. It subverts the social order because it means the destruction of its foundations, because it ignores the true origin and purpose of the State, because it denies the rights, dignity and liberty of human personality.

He was to reiterate other charges again and again in speeches and encyclicals. On one occasion in 1946 he denounced Communism as "a denial of men's civil and religious rights." Again he called Communists "false prophets who, with cunning and violence, unscrupulously propagate anti-Christian and atheistic concepts of

the world and of the state." Though he had at an earlier time apparently sought to find a working basis of friendship and co-operation with Russia, in the last three or four years he has become an avowed opponent of the system. As stated in *The Vatican and the Kremlin*, he could no longer be neutral, "his customary suavity was replaced by firmness; mediation by a political realism that led him to advocate the creation of blocs of nations as anti-Communist bulwarks. To his appeals for good will and understanding, he added the somber counsel that the Christian world was to resist aggression even 'by force if necessary.' "[7]

The reason for this more drastic attitude toward Communism was the increasing effort on the part of Russia or the satellite States either to destroy Roman Catholicism or to have it absorbed and controlled by the Orthodox Church which was now completely subservient to the Soviet State. The story of these efforts has been well and dramatically told in press and periodical reports, and in book form by Camille M. Cianfarra in *The Vatican and the Kremlin*, and therefore need not be recounted here. The Pope again and again had recourse to excommunication, as for example in the case of all those involved in the trial and condemnation of Archbishop Stepinac in Yugoslavia and Cardinal Mindszenty of Hungary. The Cardinal himself had used the threat of excommunication against any who would yield to the government scheme of nationalization. It was the ultimate weapon the Church had. But it was not enough to hold back the movement, though thousands of nuns and monks resigned as teachers when the bill was finally passed.

The employment of excommunication at the popular level was resorted to by the Church in 1949. The Congregation of the Holy Office, with the blessing of the Pope, announced the excommunication of Catholics "who profess and particularly those who defend and spread the materialistic and anti-Christian doctrines of the Communists." For they are "in reality enemies of God, of true religion and the Church of Christ." This was directed particularly at the Catholics of Italy, many of whom were members of the Communist party. It was designed to weaken the Communists who were seeking that year to win the elections in Italy. It is impossible to say

[7] P. 47.

how effective the measure was in defeating the Communists, for there were many other factors which entered into the election in which the Communists failed to gain control. Many questions were raised in the Catholic press itself as to the efficacy of this method of fighting the Communist threat. So far as I have been able to discover, this edict has never been withdrawn. The fact that the Communist party of Italy is probably the largest outside of Russia itself, and the further fact that Italy is almost solidly Catholic, at least nominally, would indicate that excommunication was not too effective. The fact is that when Communism has done its work effectively, the basic beliefs which give excommunication a compelling power have already been destroyed, and the threat no longer inspires any fear. It may be very effective as a deterrent to those not yet won to the Communist point of view.

The Catholic press is tireless in its attack upon Communism. One need only examine current numbers of such popular Catholic papers as the *Brooklyn Tablet* or *Our Sunday Visitor* to see how constant a preoccupation Communism is in the minds of the editors.

Scarcely a pronouncement of the individual bishops or the Council of Bishops is issued which does not make a frontal attack upon Communism. It may be safely said that there is no more indefatigable enemy of Communism in the world than the Roman Catholic Church.

What of Protestantism? The story is not very different, except for the fact that it is not so organized as to present a solid unbroken front. Since there is no political organization of Protestantism, and since there is no one single Protestant authority, the element of being rival powers is lacking in the Protestant opposition to Communism. But Protestantism is by and large squarely in opposition to its main drive.

It is probably true that among Protestants there has been a more widespread tendency to see in Communism a quest for certain values which they regard as fundamental and greatly to be desired. Particularly among the more left-wing leaders of the Church, who have long been exponents of the social gospel, or the application of the gospel to social relations as well as in private living, there has been more of a disposition to recognize the legitimacy of much that

the Communists seek. Furthermore, there exists among not a few such leaders the belief that no amount of individual soul-saving will achieve the desired ends; that only as the ideals are implemented through political organization and effort will they be made effective. This has given them a greater sympathy with the revolutionary methods of Communism than is felt by Catholicism generally. Though most of these leaders deplore the excessive use of violence by the Russians, they, not being themselves pacifist in belief, are convinced that only by force can some of the reforms in the social and economic order be brought about. Just how much force and violence may be used is a nice question for which they do not have a fixed answer. They deplore the atheistic, materialistic basis of Communism. They oppose that element in it, regarding it as unnecessary and even counterproductive, but they seek by one means or other to work with Communists toward the good practical ends they seek, rather than fighting them constantly.

This is not a large group numerically. But it is from among this group that the members of committees to support this or that idea which is Communist sponsored are recruited. They are regarded as fellow travelers and considered very dangerous.

The great majority of Protestants are decidedly anti-Communist, and almost all the great Church bodies have at one time or another passed official resolutions condemning Communism. So also has the National Council of Churches.

Finally there is the World Council of Churches, which speaks not only for the Protestants of the world but also for some of the non-Roman Catholic churches of Europe and America. At Amsterdam, at the first meeting of the Council in 1948, in dealing with the Church and the disorder of society, it made an analysis of the points at issue between Christianity and Communism, and specifically condemned the evils that lie in Communism. The approach was not one of indiscriminate attack upon everything Communism stands for. On the other hand, Christians ought to ask why Communism makes so strong an appeal to the masses throughout the world. "They should recognize the hand of God in the revolt of multitudes against injustice that gives Communism much of its strength." They should not seek to curb the people's aspirations toward justice but to "go

beyond them and direct them toward the only road that does not lead to a blank wall, obedience to God's will and his justice." Furthermore, they should realize that for many young people "Communism seems to stand for a vision of human equality and universal brotherhood for which they were prepared by Christianity and its influences"; Christians who have benefited from capitalism should seek to understand how many who are excluded from its benefits and privileges see in Communism a means of delivery from poverty and insecurity, and how races which have suffered from discrimination are appealed to by its apparent disregard of color lines.

Many churches, even, have been involved in forms of economic injustice and racial discrimination which have created conditions that give Communism its appeal. And churches have failed often to offer their youth an appeal which "evokes a disciplined, purposeful and sacrificial response," while in this respect "Communism has for many filled a deep moral and spiritual vacuum."

But taking all this into account, there is nevertheless a clear conflict between Christianity and the atheistic Marxian Communism of today, at the following points: (1) "the Communist promise of what amounts to a complete redemption of man in history; (2) the belief that a particular class, by virtue of its role as the bearer of a new order, is free from the sins and ambiguities that Christians believe to be characteristic of all human existence; (3) the materialistic and deterministic teachings, however they may be qualified, that are incompatible with belief in God and with the Christian view of man as a person, made in God's image and responsible to Him; (4) the ruthless methods of the Communists in dealing with their opponents; (5) the demand of the party on its members for an exclusive and unqualified loyalty which belongs only to God, and the coercive policies of Communist dictatorship in controlling every aspect of life."

Along with this ringing condemnation of Communism the Council, largely impelled to it by certain ones in the European scene who while anti-Communist or at least against the worse elements in it nevertheless believe that capitalism has not the complete answer, felt obliged to disassociate itself from a strict support of that system. After detailing four evils of capitalism, it declared forthrightly that

Christian churches should "reject the ideologies of both communism and *laissez-faire* capitalism, and should seek to draw men away from the false assumption that these extremes are the only alternatives." By inserting the qualifying adjective, *laissez-faire*, it left room for the possibility of a modified capitalism. This occasioned perhaps as much comment as anything the Council said or did.

It was Professor Hromadka, distinguished theologian, dean of the theological faculty in Prague, who declared in an address at Amsterdam that "Communism represents under an atheistic form much of the social impetus of the living church. . . . Many barbarians are, through the Communist movement, coming of age and aspiring to a place in the sun." Victory for the West could not be taken for granted in a clash between East and West and "if in the end the West militarily prevailed, the Western powers would be normally politically unable to cope with the area now under the Soviet government." He thought that we are restless, confused, and nervous and haven't much to offer along lines of moral, philosophical, or spiritual leadership to the Communist world.

As may be seen from what has already been said, one of the effects of Communism on Christianity has been to challenge it to do something about the economic and social order out of which so much injustice has grown. It has forced Christianity to restudy the Soviet world of which it is a part, to analyze the cause of the dislocation and injustice which occur throughout human society, and has set itself to the task of discovering what the resources of Christianity really are worth with which to offset the appeal of Communism. This is a clear gain.

It may not be wholly to the credit of Christianity that it did not concern itself vitally with the problems which gave rise to Communism until it became a matter of survival to concern itself with them. For it has come to precisely that point in some parts of the world. Either Christianity must do something about them or else—. So here and there, individual Christian leaders began to interest themselves in the problem, and finally the official churches themselves began at least to pass resolutions, at least recognizing that the problems exist.

Among the first American Protestants to confront the issue was

E. Stanley Jones, who, in his book *The Choice Before Us*[8] made a detailed study of the respective aims and convictions of Communism and Christianity. Since this was written during the period of Nazi control of Germany, Nazism was also studied. In parallel columns, Dr. Jones put down the beliefs, whether agreeing or differing, so that the casual reader could at a glance see where the deep differences lie. Not everyone agreed entirely with the author in his detailed representation of what each stood for, but there was no question as to the fundamental cleavages between the rival ideologies. Other books and articles followed. Professor John Bennett of the Union Theological Seminary in his *Social Salvation* examined, to some degree, the respective claims, and in a much later book, *Christianity and Communism*,[9] brought together one of the most effective discussions of the two that has yet been issued.

The Garrett Biblical Institute faculty set themselves at one time to an examination of Communism and of Christianity, and the resources Christianity possesses to oppose the counterclaim of Communism. This has had a very wide circulation and is well worth discussing here. Done, first of all, as an intellectual and spiritual exercise by the faculty, it was printed in a church periodical and attracted such wide attention that reprints to the number of more than 180,000 have been sold, while it has been reprinted in various journals, and has been translated and published in eight or more different languages. It is still in steady demand.

It begins with a statement defining Christianity, for the authors' purposes, as "not only that way of faith and life which we find in Christ, but also the significance of this in and for society today." By Communism they mean "not only the theory proposed by Marx and his followers, but the expression of this in the Soviet Union, its satellites, and the Communist parties around the world, in their policies and practices." They recognize that there are some points common to both, and mention specifically Communism's emphasis on the equality of men, irrespective of race or color, and Christianity's assertion that "God made of one blood all men to dwell upon the earth"; the concern of Communism for economic welfare for

[8] Published by Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1937.
[9] Association Press, New York, 1948.

all men, and Christ's coming to preach good tidings to the poor, release for the captives, liberty for the oppressed, and the coming of a new world of justice and righteousness. They recognize that Christianity's failure to embody in its institutions and practices Christ's full gospel has afforded Communism an opportunity to make its appeal.

But having admitted the points in which Christianity and Communism are alike, they assert that there are radical differences both in aims and in the methods used to attain them. They then proceed to set forth in parallel columns representative but all-inclusive differences they see between them. Here we cannot give the full statements and all the minor exceptions which they frankly recognize, but set one over against another they are, in general, as follows:

1. As to criticisms of the existing order

COMMUNISM CONDEMNS

a. *Private ownership of property*, except for a few types of consumer goods, asserting that private property results in the exploitation of the masses (the proletariat or "working class").

b. *Inequalities in opportunity and power*, resulting from capitalism, which must be removed by concentrating economic control in the state.

c. *Emphasis on individualism and unrestrained self-expression.* All should work for the promotion of "the cause," according to a plan.

d. *Middle-class bourgeois morality* as expressed in traditional standards of marriage and the family. These are sanctioned only in so far as they fulfill a function for the state.

CHRISTIANITY CONDEMNS

a. *Selfish use of property*, as all property, private and public, is a trust from God. "The earth is the Lord's." (For Communism the crucial matter is the ownership of property; for Christianity, its use.)

b. *Concentration of power*, in the state or other agency, which endangers the liberties of the people. It also condemns the inequitable distribution and the irresponsible use of power.

c. *Depersonalizing of the individual* through the control of large

impersonal organizations or the state. It also condemns emphasis on selfish individualism.

d. *Attitudes of irreverence and irresponsibility toward sex and family life.* (For example, for the Christian, marriage vows are not a mere legal contract, but also a pledge of love and loyalty made before God.)

2. As to the character of a just social order

COMMUNISM PROCLAIMS

a. *The supremacy of the proletariat,* in which the individual's significance derives from his membership in the class.

b. *A classless society,* which is to be secured by eliminating all but one class.

c. *Economic security* as the supreme concern (secured, however, by the sacrifice of human freedoms, as we understand that term).

d. *No racial discrimination* (but other types of discrimination are deliberately used).

CHRISTIANITY PROCLAIMS

a. *Supremacy of the person,* who is conceived of as a child of God and an object of inherent worth.

b. *The brotherhood of man,* in which all individuals and groups work for the common good.

c. *Security with freedom.* Economic security, while imperative, is not the sole or even the supreme good. Genuine security requires intelligent self-restraint and uncoerced concern for the general welfare.

d. *Equality before God,* which means all men of all races and classes are entitled to justice and freedom from discrimination.

3. As to the methods of effecting social change

COMMUNISM INVOLVES

a. *Dictatorship of the proletariat,* actually exercised by small disciplined groups. Beyond the proletariat there is no higher authority.

b. *Elimination of dissenting minorities* as a threat to the new order.

c. *Violent revolution,* as the indispensable way for the redistribution of political and economic power.

d. *The doctrine that the end justifies the means*: any means are justified that secure the desired ends as determined by the aims of the party.

CHRISTIANITY INVOLVES

a. *Government founded on the consent of the governed,* who are children of God, and therefore worthy to have a voice in their own rule. All political power is a trust from God.

b. *Protection of dissenting minorities* in the exercise of constitutional freedoms of assembly, speech, and petition.

c. *Peaceful change,* through education, persuasion, and reconciliation. "Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good."

d. *Christian character development,* which cannot be achieved by means that deny or are in conflict with the ends sought.

4. As to the meaning of life

COMMUNISM TEACHES

a. *Atheism.* Religion is a product of fear and a flight into fantasy. "Religion is the opiate of the people," used as a control device by capitalism.

b. *Social derivation of all values.* The only significant standards and values are those which arise out of society; these are derived from the interaction of economic forces.

c. *A utopian view of history.* Human existence will find fulfillment on earth in a progressively improved social order, through the operation of economic laws and by means of the class struggle.

d. *The subordination of individual personality.* The interests of the individual must be subordinate to the Communist system (and must be sacrificed if necessary as a means to victory in the class struggle).

e. *The restricted nature of community.* Fellowship, though potentially world-wide, is earth-bound and is restricted to those holding the communist philosophy.

## CHRISTIANITY TEACHES

a. *Theism.* An all-righteous, all-loving God is the source of man's existence and his only final deliverance from sin and evil. Service to Him is man's primary motivation in continuing personal and social reconstruction of life.

b. *All moral and spiritual values* founded in the character of God. The good life is achieved through responsible obedience to His will.

c. *The Kingdom of God.* The meaning of human existence must be understood in terms not only of the processes of history but also of God's purposes for man's life now and in eternity. If men will obey the will of God, justice and peace will increasingly prevail in history.

d. *The supreme worth and dignity of persons.* Every individual is of infinite worth in the eyes of God and must always be regarded by his fellows, not as a means to an end, but as an end in himself.

e. *A universal and eternal fellowship.* Men are made by God for fellowship with Himself and with one another, in time and eternity, within a community transcending all barriers of nation, race, class, or political opinion.

The Christian beliefs thus set out have logical implications for the churches. Because of them the Garrett faculty believes that the Church should:

1. Continue to declare that above all human authorities there is the supreme authority of the just, righteous, and loving will of God. This declaration requires the honest recognition that no existing economic or political system can be identified with the perfect will of God; that all are limited and warped by human ignorance, pride, and selfishness. The will of the majority is not necessarily the will of God.

2. Teach that all men share a common humanity and have essentially the same physical and spiritual needs.

3. Voice continuous and creative criticism of social institutions and practices which violate the requirements of the Kingdom of God: love, justice, and universal brotherhood.

4. Practice a ministry of reconciliation, both within and outside

the Church, between conflicting groups of men, whether they be divided by race, creed, political belief, nationality, or economic status.

These principles need to be applied to the whole range of life—political, economic, and social—including the life of the organized Church. Christian men will differ as to the specific procedures by which these principles are to be implemented. However, the following commend themselves to us as appropriate actions.

a. Resist all individual and group practices which restrict or threaten constitutional human rights. This involves the condemnation of every type of totalitarianism, whether it be political, economic, or religious.

b. Support efforts to extend civil liberties to individuals or minority groups now denied them.

c. Provide more adequate and equitable educational facilities and services throughout the country.

d. Develop a broad program of health protection, to secure reasonably satisfactory medical care for all, regardless of location or economic condition.

e. Work for a comprehensive housing program, realistically planned and executed so as to make possible wholesome home life.

f. Advocate opportunity for regular work for persons desiring it without regard to race, religion, or national origin, with provision for adequate compensation and protection against occupational hazards, illness, and involuntary unemployment, and with assurance that such employment shall promote the dignity of human labor.

g. Warn against the threat of mounting militarization in America and elsewhere; advocate world disarmament; strengthen the civil functions of government.

h. Insist upon the more efficient use of United States government funds to reconstruct the peacetime economies of the nations.

i. Advocate government by law on a world basis and support constructive movements in that direction.

j. Encourage and support private humanitarian agencies such as the world service organizations of the churches, CARE, and Citizens' Committee on Displaced Persons, for whose programs there is abundant need beyond all the government agencies can perform.

k. Appeal directly through press, radio, and, where possible, personal contacts to Russians and other peoples, showing our Christian concern for the establishment of peace with justice throughout the world.

l. Work toward the achievement of these objectives through local voluntary organizations—economic, educational, political, and religious—and counsel others to do likewise.

Communism is not simply an economic program. It is a total theory of life, which is radically in conflict with Christianity, especially in its methods, but also in its goals and its attitudes toward persons. Communism itself recognizes this in its opposition to religion and the Church. Our failure to apply consistently the basic Christian principles of justice and freedom and equal opportunity for all, our failure to rectify the common wrongs of exploitation and the common ills of poverty—this is what has given opportunity for the specious appeals not only of Communism but also of Fascism. As long as there is poverty, insecurity, fear, oppression, there will be a fruitful field for such false messiahs as have led people astray in this last generation. No campaign against Communism can succeed unless it also attacks these evils and proceeds toward the realization of a just and Christian society.

To single out these examples of how Christianity is meeting Communism is in no wise to minimize the excellent statements that have been made by others. One would particularly like to present some of the constructive efforts that have been made by such groups as the Quakers, who have been outstanding leaders in the championing of the rights of man and the struggle against human injustice. No group has shown greater insight or wisdom in its approach to the Communist world.

So the struggle goes on. Who will be the winner? Few Christians doubt that the issue will be resolved in a manner favorable to the fundamental values for which Christianity stands. That the Christian Church will, in the process of winning the battle, itself undergo healthful changes is altogether likely. The net result of Communism is likely, in the end, to be a world in which the ideals of Communism with reference to justice and equality will be won, but not by the ruthless violence of a proletarian dictatorship. Rather it will

be through a reborn Christianity which has been made aware of these values by Communism's threat and impelled to seek the realization of their avowed ends by means which further, rather than interfere with, their attainment. This would not be the first time in human history in which a great human scourge has been turned to constructive ends. "God works in a mysterious way, his wonders to perform."

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